docs: fix alex whitelist + condescending-word findings

Fixes the 'genuine' bucket from #4040's triage: whitelist/allowlist
(6 hits across 5 files, including a heading rename in turn-loop/mcp.md
-- checked no anchor links reference it first) and the
simply/obvious/easy condescending-word cluster (10 of 13 hits, real
sentence-level rewrites rather than mechanical deletion so nothing
reads awkwardly).

Left 3 alex.Condescending hits untouched on purpose:
integrations/matrix.md:271 and process/conventions.md:442 both say
"non-obvious", swarm/ca.md:162 says "not obvious" -- alex matched
the substring "obvious" inside a negated phrase, the literal opposite
of condescending. Flagging these on the issue rather than silently
leaving them out.

docs/agent-lifecycle/approvals.md

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ request.
    config, not the tree to edit: authoring in place there produces no PR
    and no approval. (It is currently mounted read-write, which is a
    defect tracked separately, not an authoring path.)
-   Branch protection (push/merge whitelist = `core`, approvals whitelist
+   Branch protection (push/merge allowlist = `core`, approvals allowlist
    = operator team; see "Forge mirror" and #1787) makes the agent a
    write collaborator that **cannot merge its own config PR**.
 2. hive-c0re's `/webhook/config-pr` endpoint receives the Forgejo

docs/agent-lifecycle/persistence.md

@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ the basename of the first real command, looking past `cd repo &&`
 prefixes, env-assignments, and prefix-runners like `sudo`/`env`. It
 backs the "favorite tools" view on the /stats page (aggregated
 host-side). Best-effort and created on first write
-(`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`), so it's simply absent until a bash
+(`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`), so it's absent until a bash
 task runs.
 
 turn-stats.sqlite has **no vacuum** — it's one tiny row per turn
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ boundary a convention rather than a permission.
 approval resolves: that writes the child's initial config repo as
 **hive-c0re, against the host path**, and `read_only` on a bind
 constrains writers *inside* a container only. The two are unrelated —
-conflating them is an easy way to reason your way into thinking this
+conflating them can lead you to reason your way into thinking this
 mount should be writable when it shouldn't.
 
 Per-child isolation still holds: a container only ever has its *own*

docs/integrations/github.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ injected into the agent's state dir out of band.
 
 The integration is **on by default** for every agent (`hyperhive.github.enable
 = true`), inert until a PAT is provisioned. There is nothing per-agent to
-declare — an agent gains GitHub simply by having a PAT written to its token
+declare — an agent gains GitHub by having a PAT written to its token
 file.
 
 To turn it off for the whole hive, set the host option:
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ When enabled, the container gets:
 Both scripts read the token from `<state>/github-token` **at invocation
 time**, so a PAT written (or rotated) mid-session takes effect immediately
 — no container rebuild or restart. Until the file exists, `gh` / `git push`
-simply fail unauthenticated. The token path is baked into the scripts at
+fail unauthenticated. The token path is baked into the scripts at
 build time (not read from an env var), because claude's Bash tool runs in a
 minimal environment that wouldn't carry one.
 
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ for `gh` + `git push` typically carries `repo` only, which is enough to
 push and open PRs but **not** to read the notification stream (nor to
 mark a thread read, which is the same scope). A PAT without it doesn't
 break anything: the poller logs the refusal and stays quiet, and the
-agent simply never gets GitHub wakes. If an agent's GitHub
+agent never gets GitHub wakes. If an agent's GitHub
 notifications never arrive, check the token's scopes first — the
 symptom is silence, not an error.
 

docs/networking/snapshot-store.md

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ The swarm's `btrfs receive` endpoint. Hives push agent snapshots to it
 over the WireGuard mesh; a destination hive later pulls one back to
 complete a migration.
 
-Two things it is not, both worth stating because both are easy to
-assume:
+Two things it is not, both worth stating because both are common
+assumptions:
 
 - **It is not the swarm controller**, and does not depend on one. It is
   a NixOS host role: a btrfs subvolume tree, a socket-activated
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ services.hyperhive.swarm.snapshotStore = {
 };
 ```
 
-Two deliberate asymmetries in that pair, both easy to misread as
+Two deliberate asymmetries in that pair, both liable to be misread as
 inconsistency:
 
 - **`address` has no default.** It is a deployment fact a pushing hive
@@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ The rule that matters:
 > **The receiver owns the destination root. The sender-supplied name is
 > validated, never used as a path.**
 
-Validation is a whitelist --- `[A-Za-z0-9_-]+` and nothing else. No
+Validation is an allowlist --- `[A-Za-z0-9_-]+` and nothing else. No
 slash and no dot means neither directory traversal nor an absolute path
-can survive it. It is deliberately a whitelist and not a list of
+can survive it. It is deliberately an allowlist and not a list of
 forbidden characters: a blocklist only ever excludes the attacks
 somebody already thought of.
 

docs/process/gotchas.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ rewrites this line.
 
 `nixos-container`'s start script builds the nspawn command line
 directly. Dropping a `.nspawn` file under `/run/systemd/nspawn/`
-looks like the obvious extension point and does nothing. Use
+looks like a natural extension point and does nothing. Use
 `EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS` (above).
 
 ### `boot.isNspawnContainer = true`
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ socket without needing a clean reinstall.
 
 `claude-code` comes from the flake's main `nixpkgs` (nixos-26.05).
 It's unfree, so the agent modules set `config.allowUnfreePredicate`
-at the container level to whitelist `claude-code` specifically —
+at the container level to allowlist `claude-code` specifically —
 scoped, only this one package. This is needed because each per-agent
 `nixosConfiguration` evaluates its own nixpkgs instance and the
 operator's host-level `allowUnfree` does **not** propagate in.
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ What crosses is the **store path**, not the derivation. Containers
 share the host's `/nix/store`, so the binary is already reachable
 inside them with its whole closure; hive-c0re writes the path into each
 agent's flake as a string literal and the agent module symlinks
-`bin/claude` onto PATH. Two things rule out the obvious alternatives: a
+`bin/claude` onto PATH. Two things rule out the natural-seeming alternatives: a
 `path:/nix/store/<pkg>` flake input is re-copied into the store as a
 reference-less `-source` (so the runtime closure never arrives), and
 `lib.types.package` fed a bare path runs `builtins.storePath`, which

docs/swarm/README.md

@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ evaluates cleanly points at a real machine that isn't the one you meant.
 
    ⚠️ **That container currently trusts no swarm-internal CA**, so a
    self-signed gateway certificate does not federate. The swarm root
-   can't simply be listed there: `security.pki.certificateFiles` is
+   can't be listed there: `security.pki.certificateFiles` is
    read when the system is _built_, and the root is a runtime file (its
    key must never enter the store), so there is no build-time name for
    it. Bridging that needs a runtime mechanism and is tracked as its own

docs/swarm/ca.md

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ It defaults from `services.hyperhive.deploy.singleHostSwarm`, the single
 switch that says "this box is the whole deployment".
 
 **A hive given neither artifact keeps the self-signed CA it has always
-had.** It serves TLS exactly as before and simply isn't part of a
+had.** It serves TLS exactly as before and isn't part of a
 swarm's trust hierarchy — the right outcome for a hive nobody has
 federated yet. Only `autoConfigure` issues a hive sub-CA, because only
 that case can: signing one needs the root's private key.

docs/swarm/ui.md

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ the surface the hive's own domain serves (dashboard, per-agent routing,
 matrix discovery); a swarm service declares its own vhost next to its
 own options, the way `swarm-ui.nix` and `swarm-authelia.nix` do.
 
-⚠️ The certificate one is the least obvious and the most visible when
+⚠️ The certificate one is the hardest to predict and the most visible when
 missed. `serviceDomains` is _both_ the services sub-CA's
 `nameConstraints` set and the leaf's SAN list, and the apex is a
 **sibling** of `forge.<swarm>` / `chat.<swarm>` / `auth.<swarm>`, not a

docs/turn-loop/README.md

@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ The rest lives alongside this page, in three topic files:
   filtering).
 - **[mcp.md](mcp.md)** — the MCP tool surface claude sees: core tools,
   privileged tool groups, self-wake, authoritative state, the tool envelope,
-  and the built-in tool whitelist.
+  and the built-in tool allowlist.
 
 Per-subsystem impl detail lives in each module's `//!` doc-comment; these pages
 describe present-state behaviour + wiring, not line-level mechanics.

docs/turn-loop/mcp.md

@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ than deriving from SSE events.
 runs the body, logs the result. Pre-/post-log only — the inbox
 status hint lives in the wake prompt + UI header, not here.
 
-## Tool whitelist (`mcp_config::ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS`)
+## Tool allowlist (`mcp_config::ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS`)
 
 - Allowed built-ins: `Edit`, `Glob`, `Grep`, `Read`, `Skill`, `Write`.
   `Skill` is what makes an installed plugin's `SKILL.md` invokable —