swarm-bao: let the controller write agent credentials, and gate that it can
Closes #4124. The controller's policy granted only the bootstrap paths -- hive cert-auth roles and hive ACLs. #4113 then made it a secret WRITER, and nothing related the grants to the paths the code writes, so every matrix token provision answered 403. The two halves landed on different issues and neither looked wrong on its own. `secret/data/` is KV v2's ACL prefix and is absent from the path the code passes, so matching `swarm-secret-client`'s spelling literally would have granted nothing. Write-only: the controller mints these and never reads one back, and a read capability would let it recover every agent's credentials rather than only replace them. The gate is the point. Two module-eval arms -- the grant exists and is not a broader wildcard, and its capability list is pinned whole, because an ADDED capability is what a presence check misses -- plus a test in path.rs pinning MOUNT/AGENT_PREFIX and naming the nix file, since renaming either constant is a silent 403 rather than a compile error. setup.md carried two warnings this makes false: that nothing in the tree had ever authenticated to the store, and that no deployment shape mints a leaf whose CN reads swarm-controller. glue-bao-tls.nix has minted one since #3726 item 1.
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4 changed files with 62 additions and 8 deletions
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@ -528,6 +528,34 @@ let
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in
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lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl/hive-*" s && !(lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl/*" s);
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}
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{
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# The policy authorising this route lives in another file, and nothing
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# else relates the grants to the paths the code actually writes.
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#
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# `secret/data/` is KV v2's ACL prefix; `swarm/agents` is
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# `swarm_secret_client::path::AGENT_PREFIX`, whose value that crate
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# pins in its own test.
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name = "the controller may write agent credentials, and only under the agent prefix";
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ok =
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let
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s = baoGrantHere.containers.swarm-bao.config.systemd.services.swarm-bao-controller-policy.script;
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in
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lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/agents/*" s
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&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/*" s)
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&& !(lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/*\"" s);
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}
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{
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# Write-only is the property, not an accident of how it was typed: a
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# `read` here would let the controller recover every agent's credentials
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# instead of only replacing them. Pinned as the whole capability list,
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# because an added capability is exactly what a presence check misses.
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name = "the controller's grant on agent credentials is write-only";
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ok =
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let
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s = baoGrantHere.containers.swarm-bao.config.systemd.services.swarm-bao-controller-policy.script;
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in
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lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"update\"]" s;
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}
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{
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# The policy above grants paths under a mount nothing else creates, so
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# the unit that writes the policy has to create it too — otherwise every
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