swarm-bao: let the controller write agent credentials, and gate that it can
Closes #4124. The controller's policy granted only the bootstrap paths -- hive cert-auth roles and hive ACLs. #4113 then made it a secret WRITER, and nothing related the grants to the paths the code writes, so every matrix token provision answered 403. The two halves landed on different issues and neither looked wrong on its own. `secret/data/` is KV v2's ACL prefix and is absent from the path the code passes, so matching `swarm-secret-client`'s spelling literally would have granted nothing. Write-only: the controller mints these and never reads one back, and a read capability would let it recover every agent's credentials rather than only replace them. The gate is the point. Two module-eval arms -- the grant exists and is not a broader wildcard, and its capability list is pinned whole, because an ADDED capability is what a presence check misses -- plus a test in path.rs pinning MOUNT/AGENT_PREFIX and naming the nix file, since renaming either constant is a silent 403 rather than a compile error. setup.md carried two warnings this makes false: that nothing in the tree had ever authenticated to the store, and that no deployment shape mints a leaf whose CN reads swarm-controller. glue-bao-tls.nix has minted one since #3726 item 1.
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@ -94,14 +94,12 @@ Put the token's value at `services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.bootstrapTokenFile`
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store's container reads it, writes the `swarm-controller` policy, enables the
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cert auth method, and creates the `swarm-controller` role that attaches the two.
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⚠️ **None of this has been run against a live store.** Nothing in the tree has
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ever authenticated to OpenBao, so treat the block above as derived rather than
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exercised — the grants come from `-output-policy`, not from a swarm that came
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up on them.
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⚠️ **The role it creates has nothing to present a certificate for yet.** No
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deployment shape mints a leaf whose CN reads `swarm-controller`, so until one
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does, the role stays provisioning that waits for a consumer.
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⚠️ **This has been exercised once, and it did not go all the way through.** The
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first real provision against a live store returned 403 (hyperhive#4124), so
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treat the block above as derived-then-partly-tested rather than proven: the
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grants still come from `-output-policy`, not from a swarm that came up on them.
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What that 403 does _not_ tell you is whether the login or the write was
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refused — `bao read auth/cert/certs/swarm-controller` separates the two.
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**Delete the file once that has run.** The unit skips when it's absent, so a
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host that has finished bootstrapping stops carrying the credential — and the
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