From c9f7de294d51facb5ee5f315b0fbacde5d0a5d28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: iris Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2026 14:20:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] docs: clear write-good.Passive hits in docs/scheduler/ci.md --- docs/scheduler/ci.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/scheduler/ci.md b/docs/scheduler/ci.md index 74196cd5..983f166e 100644 --- a/docs/scheduler/ci.md +++ b/docs/scheduler/ci.md @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ nspawn containers can't create user-namespaces, so the module sets `nix.settings A malicious `default.nix` or build script in a PR can therefore: -- **Make arbitrary network requests** to any address reachable from the container. The container runs in its own netns behind the hive bridge, so it reaches the forge only through the gateway (`http://`, public/read endpoints — no admin credentials) and **can't** reach host-loopback services: the unauthenticated core dashboard at `127.0.0.1:7000` and the raw forge port are off-limits (bridge→127.0.0.0/8 is dropped). +- **Make arbitrary network requests** to any address reachable from the container. The container runs in its own netns behind the hive bridge, so it reaches the forge only through the gateway (`http://`, public/read endpoints — no admin credentials) and **can't** reach host-loopback services: the unauthenticated core dashboard at `127.0.0.1:7000` and the raw forge port are off-limits (a firewall rule drops bridge→127.0.0.0/8 traffic). - **Write to the container filesystem**, including corrupting the runner's state dir or `.runner` credentials. The core admin token (`forge-core-token`) **isn't** bind-mounted into the container. it's held and used only by hive-c0re on the host (`forge/ci_runner.rs`), which mints per-runner registration tokens; only that registration token reaches the container's env-file. A build process can still reach forge over the network, but can't use the admin token to issue privileged API calls.