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hive-runtime: read the ACP provider key from bao

An opencode ACP agent got its provider API key only from the hand-placed
backendEnvironmentFile. It now also reads it from the swarm secret store
at swarm/agents/<agent>/acp-provider, field api_key, under its own
certificate, and sets it in the spawned ACP agent's environment only.
Nothing is written to disk.

Precedence: a value already in the process environment (the env file)
wins and the store is not asked. Otherwise the stored key is used when
present. With no store, nothing stored, or a failed read, the agent is
spawned without the key as before, and one line is logged without the
value.

The variable name comes from the existing per-agent option
acp.opencode.provider.apiKeyEnv, exported as HIVE_ACP_API_KEY_ENV on the
harness only for the opencode preset. Other ACP commands are unchanged.

The read lives in hive-runtime, where the ACP child is spawned, so both
hive-agent and hive-subagent-daemon use it. The subagent daemon unit
gets the key name and, when the agent has a store, the agent's store
identity (the same credentials queue-identity.nix gives the harness).

No new option or setting. Closes #4841.
This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-09-30 21:23:05 +02:00 • committed by mara
commit c5b21403a6
13 changed files with 486 additions and 9 deletions

1
Cargo.lock generated
View file

@ -1987,6 +1987,7 @@ dependencies = [
"hive-claude",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"swarm-secret-client",
"tempfile",
"thiserror 2.0.18",
"tokio",

View file

@ -299,7 +299,10 @@ page applies as written.
On `acp`:
- each run spawns its own copy of the parent's ACP agent, which exits
when the run ends. The unit loads `backendEnvironmentFile` for it.
when the run ends. The unit loads `backendEnvironmentFile` for it. On the
`opencode` preset, the daemon reads a provider key that file leaves unset
from the swarm secret store at `swarm/agents/<agent>/acp-provider`, as the
harness does.
- the session id lives in `subagent-acp-session-<name>` under the harness
dir. `start` moves an old one aside, `continue` loads it into a fresh
agent process, and a `continue` with none recorded fails straight away.

View file

@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ workspace = true
hive-claude.workspace = true
serde.workspace = true
serde_json.workspace = true
# The ACP agent's provider key, read under the agent's own certificate
# (`acp::provider_key`).
swarm-secret-client.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
tokio.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true

View file

@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
//! reporting no usage fails with [`AcpError::EmptyEndTurn`]. An agent that
//! never reports usage therefore surfaces every such turn as that error.
mod provider_key;
mod rpc;
mod stream;
@ -418,7 +419,17 @@ impl<P: CompactionPolicy> AcpRuntime<P> {
async fn start(&self, config: &Config) -> Result<Live> {
let (_, servers) = mcp_servers(config)?;
let cwd = session_cwd(config);
let conn = Connection::spawn(&self.command, &cwd, self.permit.clone(), servers)?;
let key = match &self.command.api_key_env {
Some(name) => provider_key::resolve(name).await,
None => None,
};
let conn = Connection::spawn(
&self.command,
key.as_ref(),
&cwd,
self.permit.clone(),
servers,
)?;
let init = conn
.request(
"initialize",
@ -1164,6 +1175,7 @@ done
.iter()
.map(|(k, v)| ((*k).to_owned(), (*v).to_owned()))
.collect::<BTreeMap<_, _>>(),
api_key_env: None,
};
AcpRuntime::new(
command,

View file

@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
//! The ACP agent's provider API key, read from the swarm secret store at
//! `swarm/agents/<agent>/acp-provider` (field `api_key`) under the agent's own
//! certificate, and handed to the spawned agent's environment only.
//!
//! A value the process already inherited (`backendEnvironmentFile`) wins and
//! the store is not asked. Without either, the agent is spawned without it.
use std::future::Future;
use std::time::Duration;
use swarm_secret_client::{
SecretStore,
acp::{ProviderKey, provider_key_path},
client::{DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT, ENV_ADDR, ENV_CACERT, Settings},
policy,
};
/// Names the agent whose key is read; the cert-auth role and the store path
/// are both built from it.
const ENV_AGENT_NAME: &str = "HIVE_AGENT_NAME";
/// How long one read of the store may take before the agent is spawned
/// without the key.
const STORE_READ_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
/// A variable to add to the spawned agent's environment.
///
/// No `Debug`: `value` is the key.
pub(super) struct KeyVar {
pub(super) name: String,
pub(super) value: String,
}
/// Where [`resolve_with`] reads the key from. A trait so the precedence can
/// be exercised without a store.
trait KeySource {
/// The store path, for log lines. Never the value.
fn origin(&self) -> &str;
/// The key stored now, or `None` when nothing is stored.
fn fetch(&self) -> impl Future<Output = Result<Option<String>, swarm_secret_client::Error>>;
}
struct StoreSource {
settings: Settings,
role: String,
path: String,
}
impl KeySource for StoreSource {
fn origin(&self) -> &str {
&self.path
}
async fn fetch(&self) -> Result<Option<String>, swarm_secret_client::Error> {
let store = SecretStore::connect(&self.settings, &self.role, DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT).await?;
let stored: Option<ProviderKey> = store.read_optional(&self.path).await?;
Ok(stored.map(|k| k.api_key))
}
}
/// Where this agent's key would be read from, or `None` when this process
/// was given no store. Same variables as `hive-agent`'s `swarm_queue`.
fn store_source(
get: impl Fn(&str) -> Option<String>,
) -> Result<Option<StoreSource>, swarm_secret_client::Error> {
if get(ENV_ADDR).is_none_or(|v| v.is_empty()) {
return Ok(None);
}
let agent = get(ENV_AGENT_NAME)
.filter(|v| !v.is_empty())
.ok_or(swarm_secret_client::Error::MissingEnv(ENV_AGENT_NAME))?;
let settings =
Settings::from_lookup(|k| get(k).filter(|v| k != ENV_CACERT || ca_is_usable(v)))?;
Ok(Some(StoreSource {
settings,
role: policy::agent_object_name(&agent)?,
path: provider_key_path(&agent)?,
}))
}
/// Whether the CA bundle at `path` is a file with bytes in it. Absent means
/// the container's own trust store.
fn ca_is_usable(path: &str) -> bool {
std::fs::metadata(path).is_ok_and(|m| m.len() > 0)
}
/// The variable to add for `name` to the agent's environment, if any.
pub(super) async fn resolve(name: &str) -> Option<KeyVar> {
let inherited = std::env::var(name).ok();
resolve_with(
name,
inherited,
|| {
store_source(|k| std::env::var(k).ok()).unwrap_or_else(|e| {
tracing::warn!(
error = %e,
"this agent's secret store coordinates are incomplete, so its ACP \
provider key cannot be read from the store"
);
None
})
},
STORE_READ_TIMEOUT,
)
.await
}
/// [`resolve`] over an inherited value and a store, each logged once without
/// the key.
async fn resolve_with<S: KeySource>(
name: &str,
inherited: Option<String>,
source: impl FnOnce() -> Option<S>,
timeout: Duration,
) -> Option<KeyVar> {
if inherited.is_some_and(|v| !v.trim().is_empty()) {
tracing::info!(var = name, "ACP provider key is set in the environment");
return None;
}
let Some(source) = source() else {
tracing::info!(
var = name,
"ACP provider key is not set and this agent has no secret store; spawning without it"
);
return None;
};
let value = match tokio::time::timeout(timeout, source.fetch()).await {
Ok(Ok(value)) => value.map(|v| v.trim().to_owned()).filter(|v| !v.is_empty()),
Ok(Err(e)) => {
// `%e`, not the source chain: a decode error's source can quote the stored value.
tracing::warn!(
var = name,
path = source.origin(),
error = %e,
"reading the ACP provider key from the store failed; spawning without it"
);
return None;
}
Err(_) => {
tracing::warn!(
var = name,
path = source.origin(),
"the store did not answer within {timeout:?}; spawning the ACP agent without \
its provider key"
);
return None;
}
};
let Some(value) = value else {
tracing::info!(
var = name,
path = source.origin(),
"no ACP provider key is stored; spawning without it"
);
return None;
};
tracing::info!(
var = name,
path = source.origin(),
"ACP provider key read from the store"
);
Some(KeyVar {
name: name.to_owned(),
value,
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use std::cell::Cell;
use super::*;
const VAR: &str = "ACP_PROVIDER_API_KEY";
/// A store answering `answer`, counting how often it is asked.
struct Fake {
answer: fn() -> Result<Option<String>, swarm_secret_client::Error>,
asked: Cell<u32>,
}
impl Fake {
fn new(answer: fn() -> Result<Option<String>, swarm_secret_client::Error>) -> Self {
Self {
answer,
asked: Cell::new(0),
}
}
}
impl KeySource for &Fake {
fn origin(&self) -> &'static str {
"swarm/agents/a1/acp-provider"
}
async fn fetch(&self) -> Result<Option<String>, swarm_secret_client::Error> {
self.asked.set(self.asked.get() + 1);
(self.answer)()
}
}
async fn resolve(inherited: Option<&str>, store: Option<&Fake>) -> Option<(String, String)> {
resolve_with(
VAR,
inherited.map(str::to_owned),
|| store,
Duration::from_secs(1),
)
.await
.map(|k| (k.name, k.value))
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_inherited_key_wins_and_the_store_is_not_asked() {
let store = Fake::new(|| Ok(Some("from-store".into())));
assert!(resolve(Some("from-file"), Some(&store)).await.is_none());
assert_eq!(store.asked.get(), 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn without_an_inherited_key_the_stored_one_is_added() {
let store = Fake::new(|| Ok(Some("from-store\n".into())));
assert_eq!(
resolve(None, Some(&store)).await,
Some((VAR.to_owned(), "from-store".to_owned()))
);
// An empty inherited value is no value.
assert!(resolve(Some(" "), Some(&store)).await.is_some());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn neither_adds_nothing() {
assert!(resolve(None, None).await.is_none());
let empty = Fake::new(|| Ok(None));
assert!(resolve(None, Some(&empty)).await.is_none());
let blank = Fake::new(|| Ok(Some(" ".into())));
assert!(resolve(None, Some(&blank)).await.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_unreachable_store_adds_nothing() {
let failing = Fake::new(|| Err(swarm_secret_client::Error::MissingEnv("BAO_ADDR")));
assert!(resolve(None, Some(&failing)).await.is_none());
assert_eq!(failing.asked.get(), 1);
}
#[test]
fn no_store_address_means_no_store() {
let source = store_source(|_| None).expect("an absent store is legal");
assert!(source.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn a_store_without_the_agent_name_is_refused() {
let Err(e) = store_source(|k| (k == ENV_ADDR).then(|| "https://bao:8200".to_owned()))
else {
panic!("a store address without an agent name is a half-delivered container");
};
assert!(e.to_string().contains(ENV_AGENT_NAME), "{e}");
}
#[test]
fn the_store_source_reads_the_agents_own_path() {
let env = [
(ENV_ADDR, "https://bao:8200"),
(ENV_AGENT_NAME, "a1"),
("BAO_CLIENT_CERT", "/run/credentials/c"),
("BAO_CLIENT_KEY", "/run/credentials/k"),
];
let source = store_source(|k| {
env.iter()
.find(|(n, _)| *n == k)
.map(|(_, v)| (*v).to_owned())
})
.expect("a complete environment")
.expect("a store address was given");
assert_eq!(source.path, "swarm/agents/a1/acp-provider");
assert_eq!(source.role, policy::agent_object_name("a1").unwrap());
}
}

View file

@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ use tokio::io::{AsyncBufReadExt, AsyncWriteExt, BufReader};
use tokio::process::{Child, ChildStdin, Command};
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, oneshot};
use super::provider_key::KeyVar;
use super::stream::mcp_server_of;
use super::{AcpError, PermissionAsk, PermissionPolicy};
use crate::spec::AcpCommand;
@ -38,16 +39,21 @@ pub(super) struct Connection {
}
impl Connection {
/// Spawn the agent in `cwd` and start reading its output.
/// Spawn the agent in `cwd`, with `key` added to its environment, and
/// start reading its output.
pub(super) fn spawn(
command: &AcpCommand,
key: Option<&KeyVar>,
cwd: &Path,
permit: PermissionPolicy,
servers: Vec<String>,
) -> Result<Self, AcpError> {
let mut child = Command::new(&command.command)
.args(&command.args)
.envs(&command.env)
let mut cmd = Command::new(&command.command);
cmd.args(&command.args).envs(&command.env);
if let Some(key) = key {
cmd.env(&key.name, &key.value);
}
let mut child = cmd
.current_dir(cwd)
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())

View file

@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ pub const ACP_ARGS_ENV: &str = "HIVE_ACP_ARGS";
/// Extra environment for the ACP agent only, as a JSON object of strings.
/// Optional. The agent also inherits the harness's own environment.
pub const ACP_ENV_ENV: &str = "HIVE_ACP_ENV";
/// The variable the ACP agent reads its provider API key from. Optional. When
/// set and the process environment leaves that variable unset, the agent is
/// spawned with it read from the swarm secret store.
pub const ACP_API_KEY_ENV_ENV: &str = "HIVE_ACP_API_KEY_ENV";
/// The runtime an agent is configured with.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
@ -25,6 +29,8 @@ pub struct AcpCommand {
pub command: String,
pub args: Vec<String>,
pub env: BTreeMap<String, String>,
/// See [`ACP_API_KEY_ENV_ENV`].
pub api_key_env: Option<String>,
}
/// A runtime configuration that cannot be acted on.
@ -63,6 +69,7 @@ impl RuntimeSpec {
command,
args: json_or_default(&lookup, ACP_ARGS_ENV)?,
env: json_or_default(&lookup, ACP_ENV_ENV)?,
api_key_env: lookup(ACP_API_KEY_ENV_ENV).filter(|v| !v.trim().is_empty()),
}))
}
other => Err(SpecError::UnknownRuntime(other.to_owned())),
@ -119,6 +126,7 @@ mod tests {
"HIVE_ACP_ENV",
r#"{"AGENT_CONFIG":"/nix/store/y/config.json"}"#,
),
("HIVE_ACP_API_KEY_ENV", "ACP_PROVIDER_API_KEY"),
])
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
@ -127,6 +135,7 @@ mod tests {
command: "/nix/store/x/bin/agent".into(),
args: vec!["acp".into(), "--flag".into()],
env: [("AGENT_CONFIG".into(), "/nix/store/y/config.json".into())].into(),
api_key_env: Some("ACP_PROVIDER_API_KEY".into()),
})
);
}
@ -139,6 +148,7 @@ mod tests {
};
assert!(cmd.args.is_empty());
assert!(cmd.env.is_empty());
assert_eq!(cmd.api_key_env, None);
}
#[test]

View file

@ -4171,6 +4171,7 @@ done
mode.to_owned(),
],
env: std::collections::BTreeMap::new(),
api_key_env: None,
},
sessions: dir.to_path_buf(),
};

View file

@ -210,6 +210,10 @@ in
restored — makes systemd skip it rather than refuse to start the
harness. See `services.hyperhive.agent.useApiKey`'s doc for the option this one is
paired with.
On an ACP agent using the `opencode` preset, a provider key this file
leaves unset is read from the swarm secret store at
`swarm/agents/<agent>/acp-provider`, field `api_key`, if one is stored.
'';
};
@ -325,7 +329,9 @@ in
default = "ACP_PROVIDER_API_KEY";
description = ''
Environment variable opencode reads the provider's API key from.
Set it in `services.hyperhive.agent.backendEnvironmentFile`.
Set it in `services.hyperhive.agent.backendEnvironmentFile`, or store
the key in the swarm secret store at
`swarm/agents/<agent>/acp-provider`, field `api_key`.
'';
};
};
@ -519,6 +525,11 @@ in
HIVE_ACP_COMMAND = acp.command;
HIVE_ACP_ARGS = builtins.toJSON acp.args;
HIVE_ACP_ENV = builtins.toJSON acp.env;
}
// lib.optionalAttrs (isAcp && acp.preset == "opencode") {
# Read by `hive_runtime`, which fills it from the store when the
# environment leaves it unset.
HIVE_ACP_API_KEY_ENV = oc.provider.apiKeyEnv;
};
serviceConfig = {
ExecStart = "${config.services.hyperhive.agent.packages.hive-agent}/bin/${binary}";

View file

@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ let
# has the memory to spare, which is what keeps overprovisioning
# (several agents that rarely compile at the same time) working.
subagentMemoryHigh = containerMemoryMaxBytes * 2 / 3;
# Set on the harness only for an ACP agent on the opencode preset
# (./agent-service.nix). The subagent daemon then reads that key from the
# store as this agent, so it is handed the same store identity
# ./queue-identity.nix hands the harness.
acpApiKeyEnv = config.systemd.services.hive-agent.environment.HIVE_ACP_API_KEY_ENV or null;
subagentReadsStore = acpApiKeyEnv != null && config.services.hyperhive.agent.bao.addr != null;
in
{
options.services.hyperhive.agent.allowedRecipients = lib.mkOption {
@ -392,12 +398,13 @@ in
# — the same "absent" the harness itself would see.
HIVE_TOOL_GROUPS = config.systemd.services.hive-agent.environment.HIVE_TOOL_GROUPS or null;
# The harness's runtime selection, forwarded the same way, so an ACP
# agent's subagents run on its ACP agent. All four are absent on a
# agent's subagents run on its ACP agent. All five are absent on a
# claude agent, which the daemon reads as claude.
HIVE_RUNTIME = config.systemd.services.hive-agent.environment.HIVE_RUNTIME or null;
HIVE_ACP_COMMAND = config.systemd.services.hive-agent.environment.HIVE_ACP_COMMAND or null;
HIVE_ACP_ARGS = config.systemd.services.hive-agent.environment.HIVE_ACP_ARGS or null;
HIVE_ACP_ENV = config.systemd.services.hive-agent.environment.HIVE_ACP_ENV or null;
HIVE_ACP_API_KEY_ENV = acpApiKeyEnv;
# Same `services.hyperhive.agent.availableModels` the harness's own assertions gate
# the primary session's model against, so a subagent can't be spawned
# on a model the operator didn't make available to this agent. The
@ -424,6 +431,14 @@ in
# only — the operator's ruling was explicit that the main agent's
# environment stays as is.
BASH_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = "1800000"; # 30 minutes
}
// lib.optionalAttrs subagentReadsStore {
# Paths and a name only. `%d` is this unit's own credentials directory.
HIVE_AGENT_NAME = userName;
BAO_ADDR = config.services.hyperhive.agent.bao.addr;
BAO_CLIENT_CERT = "%d/hive-agent-bao-cert";
BAO_CLIENT_KEY = "%d/hive-agent-bao-key";
BAO_CACERT = "%d/hive-agent-bao-server-ca";
};
serviceConfig = {
ExecStart = "${config.services.hyperhive.agent.packages.hive-subagent-daemon}/bin/hive-subagent-daemon --http 127.0.0.1:${toString config.services.hyperhive.agent.mcp.subagentHttpPort}";
@ -459,6 +474,15 @@ in
// lib.optionalAttrs (containerMemoryMaxBytes != null) {
MemoryHigh = toString subagentMemoryHigh;
}
// lib.optionalAttrs subagentReadsStore {
# Bare ids: inherits the credentials the container manager passed in,
# the same form ./queue-identity.nix uses.
LoadCredential = [
"hive-agent-bao-cert"
"hive-agent-bao-key"
"hive-agent-bao-server-ca"
];
}
//
lib.optionalAttrs
(

View file

@ -39,6 +39,29 @@ let
claude = agentOn "claude";
acp = agentOn "acp";
# The opencode preset, with and without a secret store.
opencodeWith =
extra:
agentWith {
services.hyperhive.agent = {
runtime = "acp";
acp.preset = "opencode";
acp.opencode.provider.baseUrl = "https://inference.t.local/v1";
acp.opencode.provider.apiKeyEnv = "T_PROVIDER_KEY";
acp.opencode.model = "m";
}
// extra;
};
opencode = opencodeWith { };
opencodeBao = opencodeWith { bao.addr = "https://bao.t.local:8200"; };
acpBao = agentWith {
services.hyperhive.agent = {
runtime = "acp";
acp.command = "/bin/agent";
bao.addr = "https://bao.t.local:8200";
};
};
subagent = machine: machine.systemd.services.hive-subagent-daemon;
harness = machine: machine.systemd.services.hive-agent;
runtimeVars = [
@ -56,6 +79,43 @@ let
var: (subagent acp).environment.${var} or null == (harness acp).environment.${var}
) runtimeVars;
}
{
name = "an opencode agent's harness and subagent daemon are told its provider key variable";
ok =
(harness opencode).environment.HIVE_ACP_API_KEY_ENV == "T_PROVIDER_KEY"
&& (subagent opencode).environment.HIVE_ACP_API_KEY_ENV == "T_PROVIDER_KEY";
}
{
# Only the opencode preset has a provider key variable; any other ACP
# command reads nothing from the store.
name = "an ACP agent off the opencode preset is told no provider key variable";
ok =
!((harness acpBao).environment ? HIVE_ACP_API_KEY_ENV)
&& (subagent acpBao).environment.HIVE_ACP_API_KEY_ENV or null == null
&& !((subagent acpBao).serviceConfig ? LoadCredential);
}
{
name = "an opencode agent's subagent daemon gets the agent's store identity";
ok =
let
u = subagent opencodeBao;
in
u.serviceConfig.LoadCredential == [
"hive-agent-bao-cert"
"hive-agent-bao-key"
"hive-agent-bao-server-ca"
]
&& u.environment.HIVE_AGENT_NAME == "a1"
&& u.environment.BAO_ADDR == "https://bao.t.local:8200"
&& u.environment.BAO_CLIENT_CERT == "%d/hive-agent-bao-cert"
&& u.environment.BAO_CLIENT_KEY == "%d/hive-agent-bao-key";
}
{
name = "an opencode agent with no store hands its subagent daemon no store identity";
ok =
!((subagent opencode).serviceConfig ? LoadCredential)
&& !((subagent opencode).environment ? BAO_ADDR);
}
{
name = "an ACP agent's subagent daemon loads the backend credentials";
ok = (subagent acp).serviceConfig.EnvironmentFile or null == "-${backendEnv}";

View file

@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
//! The ACP provider agreement: where an agent's inference-provider API key
//! lives in the store, and what the object at that path holds.
//!
//! The operator writes it by hand; the agent reads it under its own
//! certificate when it spawns its ACP agent (`hive_runtime`).
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::{
Error,
path::{Kind, principal_prefix},
};
/// The path holding `agent`'s ACP provider API key.
///
/// A flat leaf under the agent's prefix, like [`crate::forge::agent_token_path`],
/// so the agent's own read stanza ([`crate::policy::render_agent`]) already
/// covers it.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when `agent` contains anything but `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`,
/// which is what keeps one agent's name from addressing another agent's secret.
pub fn provider_key_path(agent: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
let prefix = principal_prefix(Kind::Agent, agent)?;
Ok(format!("{prefix}/acp-provider"))
}
/// What an agent's ACP provider path holds.
///
/// No `Debug`: `api_key` is a live provider credential.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ProviderKey {
/// The key itself. The operator enters this field name in the store's UI.
pub api_key: String,
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn the_key_lands_under_the_agent_prefix() {
// Spelled out: the operator types this path into the store's UI.
assert_eq!(
provider_key_path("atlas").expect("a plain name is legal"),
"swarm/agents/atlas/acp-provider"
);
}
#[test]
fn a_traversal_in_the_agent_name_is_refused() {
for bad in ["../argus", "a/b", "a.b", ""] {
let e = provider_key_path(bad).expect_err("a traversal is not legal");
assert!(matches!(e, Error::PathSegment { kind: "agent", .. }), "{e}");
}
}
#[test]
fn the_stored_field_is_api_key() {
let stored: ProviderKey =
serde_json::from_str(r#"{"api_key":"k"}"#).expect("the documented shape decodes");
assert_eq!(stored.api_key, "k");
}
}

View file

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
//! the rules every path obeys ([`path`]), the translation from this
//! deployment's environment into a logged-in client ([`client`]), and, per kind
//! of secret, the path it lives at together with the fields it holds
//! ([`matrix`], [`queue`], [`mtls`], [`forge`]). Each of those is a thing the controller
//! ([`matrix`], [`queue`], [`mtls`], [`forge`], [`acp`]). Each of those is a thing the controller
//! and a hive must say identically, so it is said once here.
//!
//! [`policy`] is the same kind of agreement seen from the other side: which of
@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
//! [`mtls`] is the one module about reaching the store rather than about a
//! value inside it, and its doc explains why that is not circular.
pub mod acp;
pub mod client;
pub mod forge;
pub mod matrix;