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fix Microsoft.Quotes vale findings - move punctuation inside quotes

Browse source 
Moved 27 instances of periods and commas from outside closing quote marks
to inside, following American-style punctuation placement. Changes span
across ~15 documentation files including integration, process, scheduler,
trust-boundary, and web-ui docs.
This commit is contained in:
iris 2026-09-07 14:29:59 +02:00 • committed by mara
commit c20496604c
16 changed files with 27 additions and 27 deletions
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2
docs/trust-boundary/boundary.md
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@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ group**, which is why its mode is what it's:
| `hive-c0re` | dials `agent.sock` (todo wakes) | traverse |
| the gateway's nginx | dials `web.sock` | traverse |
The last two land in "other", so the dir is **`0751`, owned by the
The last two land in "other," so the dir is **`0751`, owned by the
agent's container uid/gid** — `o=--x` is traverse without listing, and
both sockets are `0666`, which is all a dialer needs.

10
docs/trust-boundary/security.md
View file

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ The sections below document specific mechanisms (the state-file endpoint,
nixbld isolation, privilege separation). This section frames the model they
serve: **what hyperhive defends, what it deliberately doesn't, and where the
operator is accepting risk.** It's the reference for "is it safe to give an
agent capability X?".
agent capability X?."
### The trust boundary is the container, not credential storage
@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ state-file endpoint stops one agent proxying another's files. Those harden the
boundary; they don't sandbox the agent from itself.)
The corollary: **don't reason about security as "can the agent be stopped from
touching its credentials". Reason about it as "what's the blast radius if this
agent does the worst possible thing with everything it can reach".**
touching its credentials." Reason about it as "what's the blast radius if this
agent does the worst possible thing with everything it can reach."**
### Scoped tokens bound the blast radius
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Each agent gets its own scoped credentials, never shared:
So a compromised/confused agent's reach on the forge or matrix is bounded by
_its own_ account's scope, not the swarm's. This is the main thing standing
between "one agent does something dumb" and "the whole hive is affected".
between "one agent does something dumb" and "the whole hive is affected."
**Identity vs. secret (matrix).** The scoping is on the _secret_, not the
_identity_: an agent's matrix **token** is private to its own account, but its
@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ accepting**. The rule of thumb:
If an agent can deploy to prod, you are accepting the risk of a dropped
production database (via injection or plain error). If that's unacceptable,
the answer is _don't grant the capability_ — not "grant it and hope the
sandbox holds", because there is no sandbox between an agent and the tools you
sandbox holds," because there is no sandbox between an agent and the tools you
handed it.
### No autosandboxing of external tokens