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swarm options: no swarm.* value depends on a deploy option or this host's hive

- swarm.serviceDomains lists every swarm service name on every host. The
  store's issuing role is built from it, so the store now admits a leaf
  for grafana, metrics, otel, logs, the bao UI and the apex whichever host
  runs the store. Each gateway's own leaf stays narrowed by
  localServiceDomains.
- swarm.matrix.apiUrl defaults to http://<swarm.matrix.gatewayHost>
  (null when gatewayHost is null) instead of loopback on the matrix host.
- The authelia vhost proxies /bridge/ to swarm-authelia-bridge with the
  prefix stripped, and deploy.swarm-controller.authBridgeUrl defaults to
  ${swarm.authelia.url}/bridge on every host. swarm.authelia.bridgeUrl is
  removed.
- swarm-authelia-bridge admits only swarm-controller's OIDC client on
  every request (403 for any other active token), configured by
  SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_CONTROLLER_CLIENT_ID (renamed from
  ..._OPERATOR_READER_CLIENT_ID, which gated ListOperators alone).
- swarm.peerHives is removed; swarm-wireguard.nix filters this host's own
  hive out of swarm.hives itself.

Closes #4933
This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-10-04 17:26:13 +02:00
commit bed4358e19
21 changed files with 226 additions and 283 deletions

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@ -82,10 +82,10 @@ pin the value before the homeserver mints any ids under the default.
## Default-closed firewall
`deploy.matrix.openFirewall` defaults to `false`: the host
reaches the homeserver on loopback, and agent containers reach it
at `chat.<swarm-domain>` via the gateway — so the firewall hole only
matters for access from *outside* the host. Flip to `true` when
`deploy.matrix.openFirewall` defaults to `false`: hive-c0re and agent
containers on every hive reach the homeserver at `chat.<swarm-domain>`
via the gateway, so the firewall hole only matters for direct access to
`httpPort` from *outside* the host. Flip to `true` when
announcing the homeserver to other hives or when an external matrix
client needs to reach the client-server API directly.

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@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ You rarely switch it on yourself. `gateway.enable` defaults to off, and every mo
| --- | --- | --- |
| `<swarm>/` | swarm-ui dist (static), behind an authelia subrequest | `swarm-ui.nix`, `deploy.swarm-ui.enable` |
| `auth.<swarm>/` | authelia (`9091`) | `swarm-authelia.nix`, `deploy.authelia.enable` |
| `auth.<swarm>/bridge/*` | swarm-authelia-bridge (`9092`), prefix stripped; answers swarm-controller's client only | `swarm-authelia.nix`, `deploy.authelia.enable` |
| `forge.<swarm>/` | forgejo (`3000`) | `hive-forge/`, `deploy.forgejo.enable` |
| `chat.<swarm>/_matrix/*` | tuwunel (`8008`) | `hive-matrix.nix`, `swarm.matrix.gatewayHost != null` |
| `chat.<swarm>/` | fluffychat-web static | `hive-matrix.nix`, `swarm.matrix.gatewayHost != null` |

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@ -472,9 +472,9 @@ services.hyperhive = {
host's routing table).
- It opens UDP port 51820 (or `listenPort`) on the host firewall.
- `swarm-wireguard.nix` reads each entry's `wireguardAddress` directly
from `services.hyperhive.swarm.peerHives` to build `wg-hive`'s
`allowedIPs`, so intra-swarm traffic can route over the mesh address
rather than the public domain.
from `services.hyperhive.swarm.hives`, minus this host's own hive, to
build `wg-hive`'s `allowedIPs`, so intra-swarm traffic can route over
the mesh address rather than the public domain.
- It sets `persistentKeepalive = 25` by default; override or null to
disable (not needed when both sides have public IPs and no NAT).

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@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ copies from. Every hive does this with its own identity, so holding the
swarm root's private key stopped being what decides whether a hive can
serve its swarm's names.
`services.hyperhive.swarm.serviceDomains` populates the role's
`services.hyperhive.swarm.serviceDomains`, every swarm service name and the
same list on every host, populates the role's
`allowed_domains`, so asking for a name nobody configured is a refusal
from the store naming that name — not a certificate quietly issued for
it. A host's own SANs are narrower still: it asks only for the names it

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@ -106,6 +106,14 @@ there is one IdP and one auth path.
Agent subjects come from swarm-controller's agent-creation job, written
into the users database by `swarm-authelia-bridge`; human ones come from
`swarmctl user add` → [setup.md § 2](../getting-started/setup.md#2--your-sso-account).
The bridge listens on loopback on the authelia host, and the gateway
publishes it as
`https://<swarm.authelia.domain>/bridge/`, which is where
`deploy.swarm-controller.authBridgeUrl` points by default on every host.
It answers only swarm-controller's OIDC client
(`swarm.controller.queueClientId`) and refuses every other token `403`.
On first boot this module seeds the users database with a disabled placeholder subject, so authelia has a non-empty store to start against before any real account exists (`swarm-authelia.nix:873`). Authelia generates session and storage keys in the container on
first boot and never rotates them automatically; replacing one
invalidates data already written (sessions, the encrypted store), so

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@ -249,9 +249,10 @@ HTML instead of the failure that actually happened:
- `/api/oidc/token`, `/.well-known/openid-configuration` — a client
parsing an error page as its JSON document
The gateway routes authelia's `/api/` and `/.well-known/` prefixes
**without** error interception. The split is by _audience_, not by an enumerated path
list: a human gets the page, every machine caller gets the status.
The gateway routes authelia's `/api/` and `/.well-known/` prefixes, and
the bridge's `/bridge/`, **without** error interception. The split is by
_audience_, not by an enumerated path list: a human gets the page, every
machine caller gets the status.
Enumerating endpoints individually would leave the next one added
silently intercepted.