network: fix stale assertion messages; move prose to docs/network.md

This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-06-03 09:39:53 +02:00 committed by mara
commit b89c5f5334
2 changed files with 61 additions and 63 deletions

View file

@ -150,8 +150,8 @@ in
services.hyperhive.network.enable = true requires
services.hyperhive.domain to be set the resolver needs a
domain to be authoritative for. Either pin a hostname
(`services.hyperhive.domain = "example.com";`) or leave
`network.enable` at its default of false.
(`services.hyperhive.domain = "example.com";`) or set
`services.hyperhive.network.enable = false` explicitly.
'';
}
{
@ -161,18 +161,15 @@ in
services.hyperhive.gateway.enable = true the dnsmasq
resolver runs inside the hive-gateway container (single
front-door for both DNS and HTTP). Enable the gateway or
leave `network.enable` at its default of false.
set `services.hyperhive.network.enable = false` explicitly.
'';
}
];
# Bridge interface on the host. Empty interfaces list = purely
# virtual bridge (no slave NICs attached). Per-agent veth pairs
# will join this bridge once #14 lands; at v1 it stands alone.
# Virtual bridge — veth pairs attach when isolateContainers flips on.
networking.bridges.${cfg.bridgeName}.interfaces = [ ];
# Host-side IP assignment on the bridge. This is what dnsmasq
# (inside the gateway container, shared host netns) binds on.
# Bridge IP — dnsmasq (in the gateway container) binds here.
networking.interfaces.${cfg.bridgeName}.ipv4.addresses = [
{
address = cfg.bridgeIp;
@ -180,19 +177,15 @@ in
}
];
# Open the resolver port in the host firewall for traffic from
# the bridge subnet only. Other interfaces stay closed —
# external DNS-amplification surface is not exposed.
# DNS only on the bridge interface — no external amplification surface.
networking.firewall.interfaces.${cfg.bridgeName} = {
allowedUDPPorts = [ 53 ];
allowedTCPPorts = [ 53 ];
};
})
# Guard: isolateContainers requires the bridge to be up. This arm is
# unconditional on cfg.enable so the assertion fires even when an
# operator sets isolateContainers=true but forgets enable=true (the
# combined-condition arm below would silently do nothing in that case).
# Guard: fires unconditionally on isolateContainers so the assertion
# is not silently swallowed when enable=false.
(lib.mkIf cfg.isolateContainers {
assertions = [
{
@ -206,66 +199,25 @@ in
];
})
# Container network isolation (#14 v1). Ships as a separate overlay
# on top of the base bridge config (which stays unconditional) so
# operators can stand the bridge + resolver up first, validate
# everything, then flip isolation on independently.
# Container isolation overlay — see docs/network.md#container-isolation.
(lib.mkIf (cfg.enable && cfg.isolateContainers) {
# IP forwarding — agents need to route through the bridge to reach
# the internet. NixOS firewall's `nat.enable` sets this too, but
# making it explicit here keeps the intent visible alongside the
# NAT rule.
# Agents route internet traffic via the bridge; NAT masquerades their RFC-1918 IPs.
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.ip_forward" = 1;
# NAT/masquerade: translate agent bridge IPs → host's outbound
# IP for internet-bound traffic. Without masquerade, packets from
# 10.42.0.X arrive at external servers with an RFC-1918 source
# that can't be routed back.
networking.nat = {
enable = true;
# `internalInterfaces` causes `MASQUERADE` on packets from the
# bridge leaving via any external interface. Only traffic from
# agents crosses the bridge — hive-gateway / forge / matrix
# stay on host netns and don't need NAT.
internalInterfaces = [ cfg.bridgeName ];
};
# DROP traffic from the bridge subnet to host loopback addresses.
# Defence-in-depth: the c0re dashboard already binds 127.0.0.1
# (not 0.0.0.0), so bridge-sourced traffic can't reach it via
# the bridge IP. But a misconfigured service that slips to
# 0.0.0.0 would otherwise be reachable. The DROP rule closes that
# window. Use `extraInputRules` (nftables `input` chain, priority
# 0, same ruleset as `allowedTCPPorts`) so it's processed before
# the accept rules for bridge-side DNS we added above.
#
# The rule fires only when an agent container has a bridge IP
# (i.e. after the Rust side also ships `PRIVATE_NETWORK=1`);
# until then all containers share host netns and no traffic
# originates from 10.42.0.0/24 so this is a dead letter.
# Defence-in-depth: DROP bridge→loopback so compromised agents can't
# reach host-loopback services even via routing table leaks.
networking.firewall.extraInputRules = ''
ip saddr ${cfg.bridgeIp}/${toString cfg.bridgePrefixLength} ip daddr 127.0.0.0/8 drop
'';
# Signal to the c0re Rust side that container isolation is
# enabled. c0re reads `HIVE_NETWORK_ISOLATION` from its service
# environment and uses it in `lifecycle::set_nspawn_flags` to set
# `PRIVATE_NETWORK=1`, `LOCAL_ADDRESS=<hash-ip>`, and
# `HOST_BRIDGE=<bridgeName>` in each agent's container config.
# Also forwards the bridge name + subnet so c0re can wire the
# veth without hardcoding.
#
# `systemd.services.hive-c0re.environment` is an attrset; NixOS
# merges contributions from all modules that set it, so this
# cross-module injection is idiomatic and doesn't require a
# dedicated option in hive-c0re.nix.
#
# Note: HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET is the host-side bridge IP + prefix
# length (e.g. "10.42.0.1/24"), not the canonical network address
# ("10.42.0.0/24"). The Rust side must normalize (bitwise AND the
# IP with the mask) before using it for subnet membership checks or
# address arithmetic.
# Tells hive-c0re to pass PRIVATE_NETWORK + bridge settings to each
# container. HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET is host-bridge IP/prefix, not canonical
# network address — the Rust side normalises before subnet arithmetic.
systemd.services.hive-c0re.environment = {
HIVE_NETWORK_ISOLATION = "1";
HIVE_NETWORK_BRIDGE = cfg.bridgeName;