hive-c0re: hand the daemon the store identity it cannot open itself
`credential.rs` calls `SecretStore::from_env`, and nothing set `BAO_*` for this unit — only `swarm-bao-matrix-token` had them. Fixing that alone would not have been enough: hive-c0re runs as hive-core, and glue-bao-tls mints the client key `0600` inside a `0700` directory, so the daemon cannot read the file even when it is named. Both halves go through LoadCredential, which this unit already uses for the swarm-status client secret: root reads the identity at unit start, hive-core sees it under `%d`, and no second on-disk copy exists. The gate is the identity, never `deploy.bao.enable` — a hive that reads a store on another machine holds a certificate and runs no store. Four module-eval cases: the co-located and off-host presence arms, the absence arm for a hive with no identity, and a presence/absence pair for the optional CA.
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3 changed files with 103 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -9,6 +9,13 @@
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}:
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let
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cfg = config.services.hyperhive.c0re;
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baoDeploy = config.services.hyperhive.deploy.bao;
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baoCfg = config.services.hyperhive.swarm.bao;
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# The same test ../glue-matrix-bao-token.nix applies, and for the same
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# reason: a reader is defined by holding a certificate the store accepts,
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# not by sharing a host with the store. Deriving this from
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# `deploy.bao.enable` would be the co-location assumption itself.
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haveBaoClientIdentity = baoDeploy.clientCertFile != null && baoDeploy.clientKeyFile != null;
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in
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{
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# nix (the prebuild `nix build`, flake-check, and meta eval) writes
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@ -263,3 +270,23 @@ in
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# ./default.nix. The daemon reads a path, never a value.
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HIVE_C0RE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE = "%d/swarm-status-client.secret";
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}
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//
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# Where the swarm's secret store is, and the identity this hive presents to
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# it (hive-c0re::workers::credential). `swarm_secret_client` reads these
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# spellings explicitly rather than vaultrs's `VAULT_*` defaults — falling
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# through to those would build a client with no identity and fail at the TLS
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# handshake, naming neither.
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lib.optionalAttrs haveBaoClientIdentity {
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BAO_ADDR = "https://${baoCfg.domain}:${toString baoCfg.port}";
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# `%d`, not the paths themselves: the key is `0600` root-owned and this
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# daemon runs as hive-core, so it never gets read access to the original.
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# See the LoadCredential in ./default.nix.
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BAO_CLIENT_CERT = "%d/bao-client.pem";
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BAO_CLIENT_KEY = "%d/bao-client-key.pem";
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}
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// lib.optionalAttrs (haveBaoClientIdentity && baoDeploy.serverCaFile != null) {
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# Absent means the system trust store — right for a deployment with a real
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# CA, wrong for the self-signed one ../glue-bao-tls.nix mints, which is why
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# that file names this path rather than leaving it to a default.
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BAO_CACERT = "%d/bao-ca.pem";
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}
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