feat(#702): hive-priv privileged helper binary

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damocles 2026-06-01 16:33:34 +02:00 committed by mara
commit ab861dd8dc

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hive-priv/src/main.rs Normal file
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//! Minimal privileged helper for hive-c0re.
//!
//! Runs as root. Exposes a narrow unix socket at `/run/hive/priv.sock`
//! that accepts `PrivRequest` JSON lines and executes only the
//! operations that genuinely require root. All coordination logic,
//! broker, HTTP, and scheduling stay in the unprivileged hive-c0re
//! process.
//!
//! **Security model**: every request is validated against a strict
//! container-name allowlist before any filesystem or process operation.
//! Only containers whose names match the hive convention (`h-*`,
//! the manager container, or known sibling services) are accepted.
//!
//! **Socket activation**: when systemd passes the listener socket via
//! `LISTEN_FDS=1` + `LISTEN_PID=<self>`, the inherited fd 3 is used
//! instead of binding a fresh socket.
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use anyhow::{Context as _, Result, bail};
use hive_sh4re::priv_proto::{PRIV_SOCK, PrivRequest, PrivResponse};
use tokio::io::{AsyncBufReadExt, AsyncWriteExt, BufReader};
use tokio::net::{UnixListener, UnixStream};
use tokio::process::Command;
/// Sub-agent container prefix (mirrors `lifecycle::AGENT_PREFIX`).
const AGENT_PREFIX: &str = "h-";
/// Manager container name (mirrors `lifecycle::MANAGER_NAME`).
const MANAGER_NAME: &str = "hm1nd";
/// Sibling service containers managed by hive-c0re.
const SIBLING_CONTAINERS: &[&str] = &["hive-forge", "hive-matrix", "hive-gateway"];
/// Allowed path prefixes for `Chown` / `Chmod` operations.
const SAFE_PATH_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &["/run/hive-agent/", "/var/lib/hyperhive/"];
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> Result<()> {
tracing_subscriber::fmt()
.with_env_filter(
tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "info".into()),
)
.init();
let listener = socket_listener()?;
tracing::info!("hive-priv listening");
loop {
match listener.accept().await {
Ok((stream, _)) => {
tokio::spawn(handle(stream));
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!(error = %e, "accept failed");
}
}
}
}
fn socket_listener() -> Result<UnixListener> {
// Socket activation: systemd passes the socket as fd 3 when
// LISTEN_FDS >= 1 and LISTEN_PID matches our pid.
let listen_fds: Option<i32> = std::env::var("LISTEN_FDS")
.ok()
.and_then(|s| s.parse().ok());
let listen_pid: Option<u32> = std::env::var("LISTEN_PID")
.ok()
.and_then(|s| s.parse().ok());
if let (Some(n), Some(p)) = (listen_fds, listen_pid) {
if n >= 1 && p == std::process::id() {
// SAFETY: systemd has passed us a ready UnixListener on fd 3.
let std_listener = unsafe {
use std::os::unix::io::FromRawFd;
std::os::unix::net::UnixListener::from_raw_fd(3)
};
std_listener
.set_nonblocking(true)
.context("set socket non-blocking")?;
let listener =
tokio::net::UnixListener::from_std(std_listener).context("wrap systemd socket")?;
tracing::info!("using systemd-activated socket");
return Ok(listener);
}
}
// Fallback: bind the socket ourselves.
let path = Path::new(PRIV_SOCK);
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)
.with_context(|| format!("create {}", parent.display()))?;
}
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
let listener =
UnixListener::bind(path).with_context(|| format!("bind {PRIV_SOCK}"))?;
// Mode 0660: only the hive-core group can connect.
std::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o660))
.context("chmod priv.sock")?;
tracing::info!(path = PRIV_SOCK, "bound priv socket");
Ok(listener)
}
async fn handle(stream: UnixStream) {
let (reader, mut writer) = stream.into_split();
let mut lines = BufReader::new(reader).lines();
while let Ok(Some(line)) = lines.next_line().await {
let resp = dispatch(&line).await;
let mut json = serde_json::to_string(&resp).unwrap_or_else(|e| {
format!("{{\"ok\":false,\"stdout\":\"\",\"stderr\":\"\",\"error\":\"serialise failed: {e}\"}}")
});
json.push('\n');
if let Err(e) = writer.write_all(json.as_bytes()).await {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "write response failed");
break;
}
}
}
async fn dispatch(line: &str) -> PrivResponse {
match serde_json::from_str::<PrivRequest>(line) {
Ok(req) => match exec(req).await {
Ok((stdout, stderr)) => PrivResponse {
ok: true,
stdout,
stderr,
error: None,
},
Err(e) => PrivResponse {
ok: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: String::new(),
error: Some(format!("{e:#}")),
},
},
Err(e) => PrivResponse {
ok: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: String::new(),
error: Some(format!("parse request: {e}")),
},
}
}
/// Execute a validated `PrivRequest`. Returns `(stdout, stderr)` on success.
async fn exec(req: PrivRequest) -> Result<(String, String)> {
match req {
PrivRequest::ContainerRun { ref args } => {
validate_container_args(args)?;
let out = Command::new("nixos-container")
.args(args)
.output()
.await
.context("invoke nixos-container")?;
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).into_owned();
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).into_owned();
// Log each line so progress is visible in journald even
// without a streaming protocol.
for line in stdout.lines() {
tracing::info!(target: "nixos-container", "{line}");
}
for line in stderr.lines() {
tracing::warn!(target: "nixos-container", "{line}");
}
if !out.status.success() {
bail!(
"nixos-container {} failed ({}): {}",
args.join(" "),
out.status,
stderr.trim()
);
}
Ok((stdout, stderr))
}
PrivRequest::DaemonReload => {
let out = Command::new("systemctl")
.arg("daemon-reload")
.output()
.await
.context("invoke systemctl daemon-reload")?;
if !out.status.success() {
bail!(
"systemctl daemon-reload failed ({}): {}",
out.status,
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).trim()
);
}
Ok((String::new(), String::new()))
}
PrivRequest::WriteNspawnConf { ref container, ref content } => {
validate_container_name(container)?;
let path = format!("/etc/nixos-containers/{container}.conf");
std::fs::write(&path, content).with_context(|| format!("write {path}"))?;
Ok((String::new(), String::new()))
}
PrivRequest::WriteSystemdDropin {
ref container,
ref filename,
ref content,
} => {
validate_container_name(container)?;
validate_dropin_filename(filename)?;
let dir =
format!("/run/systemd/system/container@{container}.service.d");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir)
.with_context(|| format!("create {dir}"))?;
let path = format!("{dir}/{filename}");
std::fs::write(&path, content).with_context(|| format!("write {path}"))?;
Ok((String::new(), String::new()))
}
PrivRequest::RemoveSystemdDropin { ref container } => {
validate_container_name(container)?;
let dir =
format!("/run/systemd/system/container@{container}.service.d");
if Path::new(&dir).exists() {
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir)
.with_context(|| format!("remove {dir}"))?;
}
Ok((String::new(), String::new()))
}
PrivRequest::Chown { ref path, uid, gid } => {
validate_safe_path(path)?;
std::os::unix::fs::chown(path, Some(uid), Some(gid))
.with_context(|| {
format!("chown {} to {uid}:{gid}", path.display())
})?;
Ok((String::new(), String::new()))
}
PrivRequest::Chmod { ref path, mode } => {
validate_safe_path(path)?;
std::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(mode))
.with_context(|| {
format!("chmod {:o} {}", mode, path.display())
})?;
Ok((String::new(), String::new()))
}
PrivRequest::SystemdRunMachine { ref machine, ref cmd } => {
validate_container_name(machine)?;
let mut args = vec!["--machine".to_owned(), machine.clone(), "--quiet".to_owned(), "--".to_owned()];
args.extend(cmd.iter().cloned());
let out = Command::new("systemd-run")
.args(&args)
.output()
.await
.context("invoke systemd-run")?;
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).into_owned();
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).into_owned();
if !out.status.success() {
bail!(
"systemd-run --machine={machine} failed ({}): {}",
out.status,
stderr.trim()
);
}
Ok((stdout, stderr))
}
}
}
/// Validate that nixos-container args reference only hive-managed containers.
fn validate_container_args(args: &[String]) -> Result<()> {
if args.is_empty() {
bail!("ContainerRun: args must not be empty");
}
// Verbs whose second positional argument is a container name.
const CONTAINER_ARG_VERBS: &[&str] =
&["start", "stop", "kill", "restart", "destroy", "update", "run", "create"];
if CONTAINER_ARG_VERBS.contains(&args[0].as_str()) {
if let Some(name) = args.get(1) {
validate_container_name(name)?;
}
}
// `list` and unknown verbs take no container arg - no further validation needed.
Ok(())
}
/// Validate that a container name is managed by hive.
fn validate_container_name(name: &str) -> Result<()> {
if name == MANAGER_NAME {
return Ok(());
}
if SIBLING_CONTAINERS.contains(&name) {
return Ok(());
}
if name.starts_with(AGENT_PREFIX) {
let suffix = &name[AGENT_PREFIX.len()..];
if !suffix.is_empty()
&& suffix.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_lowercase() || c.is_ascii_digit() || c == '-')
{
return Ok(());
}
}
bail!("container name {name:?} is not managed by hive");
}
fn validate_dropin_filename(filename: &str) -> Result<()> {
if filename.is_empty() || filename.contains('/') || filename.contains("..") {
bail!("invalid drop-in filename: {filename:?}");
}
Ok(())
}
fn validate_safe_path(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
let s = path.to_string_lossy();
for prefix in SAFE_PATH_PREFIXES {
if s.starts_with(prefix) && !s.contains("..") {
return Ok(());
}
}
bail!("path {} is outside allowed prefixes", path.display());
}