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swarm-controller: make authelia's operators matrix homeserver admins

swarm-authelia-bridge gains ListOperators, the usernames in authelia's
operator group (`operatorGroup = "admins"`, passed in from
swarm-authelia.nix). Unlike the two agent verbs, which admit any active
token, it answers only the client named by
SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_OPERATOR_READER_CLIENT_ID (swarm-controller's
queueClientId) and returns 403 to every other active token: authelia
issues machine tokens to every hive and its agents as well. The bridge's
introspection now models `client_id` to make that check, the same way
swarm-nats-auth's does.

swarm-controller runs a grant-only pass at start and every five minutes:
read the group, map each username to the account an SSO login lands on
(tuwunel lowercases `preferred_username`), skip anyone already joined to
`#admins:<server>` (tuwunel's definition of admin) or without a matrix
account, and send `!admin users make-user-admin <user>` there as @swarm
with the swarm appservice token. Nothing is ever revoked: tuwunel has no
command for it (#4799).

The admin-room calls (alias, joined members, profile, send) go into
swarm-matrix-client next to whoami, keeping its no-body-in-errors rule.

Closes #4585
This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-10-04 15:21:41 +02:00 • committed by mara
commit 9e7fdb55ae
15 changed files with 787 additions and 33 deletions

View file

@ -187,7 +187,8 @@ newer channel breaks in ways hyperhive's CI doesn't catch.
You are an SSO user too: `swarmctl user add <you> --group admins`, and a
first login through authelia creates your forge and matrix accounts;
`swarmctl forge make-admin <you>` promotes the forge one.
`swarmctl forge make-admin <you>` promotes the forge one, and the matrix
one becomes a homeserver admin within five minutes of that first login.
## Where to read next

View file

@ -169,6 +169,25 @@ when it's missing, unknown to the homeserver, or someone else's. An
agent's daemon picks a re-minted token up on its next start, and a timer
restarts it while it's down.
### Operators are homeserver admins
Every member of authelia's `admins` group who has a matrix account is a
homeserver admin. `swarm-controller` reads the group through
`swarm-authelia-bridge` at start and every five minutes after, and for
each member not yet in `#admins:<server_name>` it sends
`!admin users make-user-admin @<name>:<server_name>` there as `@swarm`.
`<name>` is the authelia username lowercased, the account an SSO login
lands on.
- **Grant-only.** Removing someone from `admins` leaves their matrix
admin in place: tuwunel has no command that takes it away.
- **No account, no grant.** A member who has never logged in to matrix
has no account to promote. The first pass after their first SSO login
promotes them.
- Runs only on a controller with both
`services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.authBridgeUrl` and
`services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.matrixHomeserverUrl` set.
### The appservice's sender account, and why it isn't an admin
`@hive-<hive>:<server_name>` is the appservice's own `sender_localpart`,

View file

@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ result isn't.
| callback URL | `<root>/user/oauth2/<source>/callback` | `<homeserver>/_matrix/client/unstable/login/sso/callback/<client_id>`, a shape tuwunel fixes rather than accepts |
| cost of a malformed entry | the login source is missing | the homeserver can refuse to start |
Three consequences worth stating plainly:
Four consequences worth stating plainly:
- **A person's first forge login creates their forge account**, named
after authelia's `preferred_username` (`[oauth2_client]` in the forge
@ -192,6 +192,11 @@ Three consequences worth stating plainly:
`swarm-controller` all have local accounts, and `swarmctl user add`
refuses none of those names.
- **A member of `admins` becomes a matrix homeserver admin** once their
first matrix login has created the account: `swarm-controller` promotes
them within five minutes, and never demotes. See
[`../integrations/matrix.md`](../integrations/matrix.md#operators-are-homeserver-admins).
- **tuwunel re-reads its secret file on every OAuth exchange**, not only
at startup, and its own sandboxing hides most paths from it. It gets the
file through `LoadCredential` for the same reason the appservice

View file

@ -924,6 +924,11 @@ in
# includes `bridgeClient`) — same file this container's own
# `renderClient` reads the digest half of.
SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE = "${clientsDir}/${bridgeClientId}.secret";
# The operator list names who holds operator rights, so the
# bridge answers it to the controller's client and refuses every
# other active token (each hive and its agents hold one).
SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_OPERATOR_READER_CLIENT_ID = hyperhiveCfg.swarm.controller.queueClientId;
SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_OPERATOR_GROUP = operatorGroup;
};
};

View file

@ -262,6 +262,20 @@ let
&& lib.hasInfix "-authelia-users-placeholder.yml \"$users\"" s
&& !(lib.hasInfix ''echo "users: {}"'' s);
}
{
# The bridge refuses its operator list to every client but the one
# named here, so this has to be the client the controller authenticates
# as. A drift is a controller whose admin sync is refused every pass.
name = "the authelia bridge answers its operator list to the controller's client only";
ok =
let
env =
autheliaColocated.containers.swarm-authelia.config.systemd.services.swarm-authelia-bridge.environment;
in
env.SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_OPERATOR_READER_CLIENT_ID
== autheliaColocated.services.hyperhive.swarm.controller.queueClientId
&& env.SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_OPERATOR_GROUP == "admins";
}
{
# Config NAMES the IdP; it never computes where the IdP is. Both arms
# matter together: the address is the swarm's name on a hive that runs

View file

@ -58,6 +58,13 @@ pub enum BridgeRequest {
/// are separate sets on purpose, and an agent in the roster that has
/// never reported is not the same as one that does not exist.
ListAgentIdentities,
/// The usernames in authelia's operator group — the subjects that reach
/// operator-only surfaces.
///
/// ⚠️ **Only `swarm-controller`'s client may ask.** Every other verb
/// admits any active token; this one names who holds operator rights, so
/// the bridge refuses it to every other caller with `403`.
ListOperators,
}
/// One roster entry.
@ -128,6 +135,14 @@ pub enum BridgeResponse {
/// means a consumer diffing two answers sees real changes only.
agents: Vec<AgentIdentity>,
},
/// The operator group's members, in answer to
/// [`BridgeRequest::ListOperators`].
Operators {
/// Authelia usernames, sorted. Plain strings rather than [`Ident`]:
/// these are humans, and the store admits `.`, `_` and uppercase in a
/// human's name.
operators: Vec<String>,
},
/// The request was rejected or the write failed. Carries a message
/// for the caller to log/propagate, not a typed error enum: the
/// failure modes here (bad username, authelia binary failed, disk
@ -175,6 +190,15 @@ mod tests {
serde_json::json!({"status": "agents", "agents": [{"name": "atlas"}]})
);
let operators = serde_json::to_value(BridgeResponse::Operators {
operators: vec!["mara".to_owned()],
})
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
operators,
serde_json::json!({"status": "operators", "operators": ["mara"]})
);
let err = serde_json::to_value(BridgeResponse::Error {
message: "boom".to_owned(),
})
@ -205,6 +229,10 @@ mod tests {
let json = serde_json::to_string(&BridgeRequest::ListAgentIdentities).unwrap();
let back: BridgeRequest = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
assert!(matches!(back, BridgeRequest::ListAgentIdentities));
let json = serde_json::to_string(&BridgeRequest::ListOperators).unwrap();
let back: BridgeRequest = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
assert!(matches!(back, BridgeRequest::ListOperators));
}
/// An empty roster must be a roster, not an absence: `{"agents":[]}`

View file

@ -20,11 +20,16 @@ simply owns the file it writes. No elevated privilege anywhere.
- One endpoint, `POST /requests`, body = `swarm-authelia-bridge-sock`'s
`BridgeRequest` verbatim — `EnsureAgentIdentity` (idempotently ensure an
agent exists as an authelia subject) and `ListAgentIdentities` (the
roster: the subjects carrying the agent marker group, names only).
agent exists as an authelia subject), `ListAgentIdentities` (the
roster: the subjects carrying the agent marker group, names only) and
`ListOperators` (the operator group's usernames).
- Bearer-authenticated via authelia's own OIDC token introspection (RFC
7662), against `swarm-controller`'s **existing** machine-client identity
(already minted for the queue connection) — no new credential.
(already minted for the queue connection) — no new credential. The two
agent verbs admit any active token. ⚠️ `ListOperators` admits only the
client named by `SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_OPERATOR_READER_CLIENT_ID`
(`swarm-controller`'s) and answers every other active token `403`:
authelia issues machine tokens to every hive and its agents too.
- No restart of authelia after a write — relies on
`authentication_backend.file.watch`, confirmed working against the
pinned 4.39.20 build during this design work.

View file

@ -3,10 +3,10 @@
//! Own copy of `swarm-nats-auth::introspect`'s shape (RFC 7662 token
//! introspection), not a shared dependency — `swarm-nats-auth` has no lib
//! target to import, and this is a handful of lines; factor out if a third
//! consumer shows up. Same verdict rule: `active` is the whole answer, and
//! everything that isn't an explicit `active: true` is a denial (network
//! error, timeout, non-2xx, unparseable body) — the failure modes of an
//! HTTP call are exactly the conditions an attacker would like this to
//! consumer shows up. Same verdict rule: `active` is the whole admission
//! answer, and everything that isn't an explicit `active: true` is a denial
//! (network error, timeout, non-2xx, unparseable body) — the failure modes of
//! an HTTP call are exactly the conditions an attacker would like this to
//! fall open under.
//!
//! [`Verdict`] has three variants where admission has two: the extra one
@ -33,9 +33,25 @@ use serde::Deserialize;
/// hung introspection call must not wedge a `CreateIdentity` job forever.
pub const INTROSPECTION_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
/// `active` decides whether to admit; `client_id` says as whom, which is
/// what lets one verb be scoped to a single client. Same two fields, for the
/// same reasons, as `swarm-nats-auth::introspect`.
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct IntrospectionResponse {
active: bool,
#[serde(default)]
client_id: Option<String>,
}
impl IntrospectionResponse {
fn verdict(self) -> Verdict {
if !self.active {
return Verdict::Inactive;
}
Verdict::Active {
client_id: self.client_id.filter(|id| !id.is_empty()),
}
}
}
/// The outcome of asking authelia about a token.
@ -44,10 +60,15 @@ struct IntrospectionResponse {
/// the call can go wrong is already a variant. A caller that forgets a case
/// does not compile, and there is no error path that could be `?`-ed past
/// into an accidental admission.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Verdict {
/// 2xx with `active: true`. The only admitting outcome.
Active,
Active {
/// The client the token was issued to. `None` when authelia named
/// none, or named an empty one: a verb scoped to one client refuses
/// such a caller, it does not match it to a blank.
client_id: Option<String>,
},
/// 2xx with `active: false` — authelia evaluated the token and said no.
/// The **caller's** credential is the problem.
Inactive,
@ -96,8 +117,7 @@ pub async fn introspect(
return Verdict::Unavailable;
}
match resp.json::<IntrospectionResponse>().await {
Ok(body) if body.active => Verdict::Active,
Ok(_) => Verdict::Inactive,
Ok(body) => body.verdict(),
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "introspection body did not parse; cannot validate");
Verdict::Unavailable
@ -129,4 +149,35 @@ mod tests {
"authelia answering `active: false` is authelia working, not authelia failing"
);
}
fn parse(body: &str) -> Verdict {
serde_json::from_str::<IntrospectionResponse>(body)
.expect("introspection body")
.verdict()
}
#[test]
fn an_active_token_names_the_client_that_holds_it() {
assert_eq!(
parse(r#"{"active":true,"client_id":"swarm-controller"}"#),
Verdict::Active {
client_id: Some("swarm-controller".to_owned())
}
);
}
#[test]
fn a_missing_or_empty_client_id_names_no_client() {
for body in [r#"{"active":true}"#, r#"{"active":true,"client_id":""}"#] {
assert_eq!(parse(body), Verdict::Active { client_id: None }, "{body}");
}
}
#[test]
fn an_inactive_token_names_no_client_even_when_the_body_does() {
assert_eq!(
parse(r#"{"active":false,"client_id":"swarm-controller"}"#),
Verdict::Inactive
);
}
}

View file

@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
//!
//! One endpoint, `POST /requests`, body =
//! [`swarm_authelia_bridge_sock::BridgeRequest`] verbatim: ensure an agent
//! exists as an authelia subject, and list the ones that do. Not a
//! exists as an authelia subject, list the ones that do, and list the
//! operator group (to `swarm-controller` only, see `permit`). Not a
//! wholesale-replace-the-file API — this process owns rendering
//! `users.yml` internally; see `store` module.
@ -52,6 +53,10 @@ struct Config {
introspection_url: String,
client_id: String,
client_secret: String,
/// The one client [`BridgeRequest::ListOperators`] answers.
operator_reader_client_id: String,
/// The authelia group whose members are operators.
operator_group: String,
}
impl Config {
@ -63,6 +68,8 @@ impl Config {
introspection_url: env_var("SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_INTROSPECTION_URL")?,
client_id: env_var("SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_CLIENT_ID")?,
client_secret: read_secret_file(&env_var("SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE")?)?,
operator_reader_client_id: env_var("SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_OPERATOR_READER_CLIENT_ID")?,
operator_group: env_var("SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_OPERATOR_GROUP")?,
})
}
}
@ -139,14 +146,26 @@ async fn handle_request(
headers: HeaderMap,
Json(req): Json<BridgeRequest>,
) -> Response {
if let Err(resp) = authorize(&state, &headers).await {
return resp;
let caller = match authorize(&state, &headers).await {
Ok(caller) => caller,
Err(resp) => return resp,
};
if let Err(refusal) = permit(
&req,
caller.as_deref(),
&state.config.operator_reader_client_id,
) {
// The client id is not a credential; naming it is what lets an
// operator see which client asked for something it may not have.
tracing::warn!(client_id = ?caller, request = ?req, "refused a request scoped to another client");
return refuse(refusal);
}
let (op, result) = match req {
BridgeRequest::EnsureAgentIdentity { name } => {
("ensure_identity", handle(&state, name).await)
}
BridgeRequest::ListAgentIdentities => ("list_identities", list(&state)),
BridgeRequest::ListOperators => ("list_operators", list_operators(&state)),
};
match result {
Ok(body) => (StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response(),
@ -168,8 +187,9 @@ async fn handle_request(
/// in."
///
/// Anything short of an active token is refused; **which status** depends
/// on whose credential failed, see [`Refusal`].
async fn authorize(state: &AppState, headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<(), Response> {
/// on whose credential failed, see [`Refusal`]. `Ok` carries the client the
/// token was issued to, for [`permit`].
async fn authorize(state: &AppState, headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<Option<String>, Response> {
let Some(auth) = headers.get(axum::http::header::AUTHORIZATION) else {
return Err(refuse(Refusal::Caller));
};
@ -196,14 +216,32 @@ async fn authorize(state: &AppState, headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<(), Response
/// of [`authorize`] so the rule is testable without an authelia — and it is
/// the *real* rule, not a restatement of it, because this is the function
/// the request path calls.
fn classify(verdict: introspect::Verdict) -> Result<(), Refusal> {
fn classify(verdict: introspect::Verdict) -> Result<Option<String>, Refusal> {
match verdict {
introspect::Verdict::Active => Ok(()),
introspect::Verdict::Active { client_id } => Ok(client_id),
introspect::Verdict::Inactive => Err(Refusal::Caller),
introspect::Verdict::Unavailable => Err(Refusal::Bridge),
}
}
/// Whether an admitted caller may make this particular request.
///
/// [`BridgeRequest::ListOperators`] answers only `operator_reader`, the
/// controller's client: authelia also issues machine tokens to every hive and
/// every hive's agents, and those are as active as the controller's. A caller
/// with no client id is refused it too, rather than compared as a blank.
fn permit(
req: &BridgeRequest,
client_id: Option<&str>,
operator_reader: &str,
) -> Result<(), Refusal> {
match req {
BridgeRequest::EnsureAgentIdentity { .. } | BridgeRequest::ListAgentIdentities => Ok(()),
BridgeRequest::ListOperators if client_id == Some(operator_reader) => Ok(()),
BridgeRequest::ListOperators => Err(Refusal::Forbidden),
}
}
/// Whose credential was at fault when a request was refused.
///
/// The distinction is the whole point: these used to be one 401, so a
@ -216,10 +254,13 @@ enum Refusal {
/// This bridge could not get an answer out of authelia at all, so the
/// request was never evaluated.
Bridge,
/// The token is valid, but its client may not make this request.
Forbidden,
}
impl Refusal {
/// `401` for the caller; `503` for us.
/// `401` for the caller; `503` for us; `403` for a valid caller asking
/// for something scoped to another client.
///
/// 401 would be wrong for [`Refusal::Bridge`] under RFC 7235 — nothing
/// about the caller's credential was determined — and it is also the
@ -235,6 +276,7 @@ impl Refusal {
match self {
Refusal::Caller => StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
Refusal::Bridge => StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
Refusal::Forbidden => StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
}
}
@ -247,6 +289,7 @@ impl Refusal {
match self {
Refusal::Caller => "missing or invalid bearer token",
Refusal::Bridge => "cannot validate credentials",
Refusal::Forbidden => "not permitted",
}
}
}
@ -351,6 +394,14 @@ fn list(state: &AppState) -> Result<BridgeResponse> {
})
}
/// The operator group's members. No write lock, for [`list`]'s reason.
fn list_operators(state: &AppState) -> Result<BridgeResponse> {
let user_store = store::load_store(&state.config.users_file)?;
Ok(BridgeResponse::Operators {
operators: store::group_members(&user_store, &state.config.operator_group),
})
}
/// Mint a password digest via the **configured** authelia — the argon2
/// parameters baked into a hash have to match the verifier's, same
/// reasoning `swarmctl::generate_password` documents (this is
@ -393,7 +444,7 @@ async fn generate_password(bin: &std::path::Path) -> Result<String> {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{Refusal, StatusCode, classify, introspect::Verdict};
use super::{BridgeRequest, Refusal, StatusCode, classify, introspect::Verdict, permit};
/// Fail-closed, asserted per variant rather than as one negation:
/// splitting blame out of a single denial is exactly the change that
@ -401,7 +452,12 @@ mod tests {
/// its own line.
#[test]
fn only_an_active_token_is_admitted() {
assert_eq!(classify(Verdict::Active), Ok(()));
assert_eq!(
classify(Verdict::Active {
client_id: Some("swarm-controller".to_owned())
}),
Ok(Some("swarm-controller".to_owned()))
);
assert_eq!(
classify(Verdict::Inactive),
Err(Refusal::Caller),
@ -441,7 +497,7 @@ mod tests {
/// applied, nor anything about this bridge's own credential.
#[test]
fn refusal_messages_say_nothing_useful_to_an_attacker() {
for refusal in [Refusal::Caller, Refusal::Bridge] {
for refusal in [Refusal::Caller, Refusal::Bridge, Refusal::Forbidden] {
let message = refusal.message();
for leak in ["secret", "client_id", "authelia", "http", "status"] {
assert!(
@ -451,4 +507,56 @@ mod tests {
}
}
}
const CONTROLLER: &str = "swarm-controller";
/// The trust boundary on the operator list. Every caller below holds a
/// token authelia calls active — a hive and a hive's agents are issued
/// machine tokens too — and only the controller's client is answered.
#[test]
fn only_the_controller_may_list_operators() {
let req = BridgeRequest::ListOperators;
assert_eq!(permit(&req, Some(CONTROLLER), CONTROLLER), Ok(()));
for other in ["hive-alpha", "hive-alpha-agent", "swarm-authelia-bridge"] {
assert_eq!(
permit(&req, Some(other), CONTROLLER),
Err(Refusal::Forbidden),
"{other} holds an active token but is not the controller"
);
}
assert_eq!(
permit(&req, None, CONTROLLER),
Err(Refusal::Forbidden),
"a token authelia attributed to no client is not the controller's"
);
}
/// The control for the test above: the agent verbs stay open to any
/// admitted caller, so the refusal there comes from the scoping and not
/// from `permit` refusing everyone who is not the controller.
#[test]
fn the_agent_verbs_stay_open_to_any_active_caller() {
for req in [
BridgeRequest::EnsureAgentIdentity {
name: "atlas".to_owned(),
},
BridgeRequest::ListAgentIdentities,
] {
assert_eq!(
permit(&req, Some("hive-alpha"), CONTROLLER),
Ok(()),
"{req:?}"
);
assert_eq!(permit(&req, None, CONTROLLER), Ok(()), "{req:?}");
}
}
#[test]
fn a_scoped_refusal_is_403_not_401() {
assert_eq!(
Refusal::Forbidden.status(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"the token is valid; a 401 would send the caller off to mint a new one"
);
}
}

View file

@ -132,10 +132,16 @@ pub fn mark_as_agent(store: &mut UserStore, name: &str) -> bool {
/// Sorted because [`UserStore::users`] is a `BTreeMap`, so this is free and
/// a consumer diffing two answers sees real changes rather than reordering.
pub fn agent_names(store: &UserStore) -> Vec<String> {
group_members(store, AGENT_GROUP)
}
/// The names in the store that carry `group`, sorted for
/// [`agent_names`]'s reason.
pub fn group_members(store: &UserStore, group: &str) -> Vec<String> {
store
.users
.iter()
.filter(|(_, user)| user.groups.iter().any(|g| g == AGENT_GROUP))
.filter(|(_, user)| user.groups.iter().any(|g| g == group))
.map(|(name, _)| name.clone())
.collect()
}
@ -343,9 +349,9 @@ mod tests {
}
}
/// The group an operator carries — a literal here rather than a shared
/// constant, because this binary does not read the operator group and a
/// test that imported one would imply it did.
/// The group an operator carries — a literal here, because this binary
/// takes the operator group from its environment and has no constant to
/// import.
fn operator(password: &str) -> User {
User {
groups: vec!["admins".to_owned()],
@ -477,6 +483,22 @@ some_future_top_level_key: 7
assert_eq!(agent_names(&store), ["atlas"]);
}
/// The operator list is the group's members only — not agents, and not
/// an account that carries no group.
#[test]
fn the_operator_list_is_the_groups_members_and_not_the_file() {
let mut store = UserStore::default();
store.users.insert("atlas".to_owned(), agent("$argon2id$a"));
store
.users
.insert("mara".to_owned(), operator("$argon2id$b"));
store
.users
.insert("ungrouped".to_owned(), user("$argon2id$c"));
assert_eq!(group_members(&store, "admins"), ["mara"]);
}
/// An identity that predates the marker is invisible to the roster until
/// agent creation runs again — which is the agreed migration, so it has
/// to actually change something.

View file

@ -97,6 +97,21 @@ impl AuthBridge {
}
}
/// The usernames in authelia's operator group. The bridge answers this
/// to this daemon's client only.
///
/// Names only, for [`Self::list_agent_identities`]'s reason.
pub async fn list_operators(&self) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
match self.request(&BridgeRequest::ListOperators).await? {
BridgeResponse::Operators { operators } => Ok(operators),
other => {
anyhow::bail!(
"swarm-authelia-bridge answered an operator-list request with {other:?}"
)
}
}
}
/// One authenticated round-trip to the bridge.
///
/// A fresh token per call, deliberately — see the module doc. Shared by

View file

@ -2283,16 +2283,20 @@ fn configured_matrix_homeserver() -> Option<Arc<str>> {
}
/// Start the matrix-account backfill and the hive sender-token pass when a
/// homeserver is configured. Lifted out of `main` for
/// `clippy::too_many_lines`.
/// homeserver is configured, and the operator admin pass when the bridge is
/// too. Lifted out of `main` for `clippy::too_many_lines`.
fn spawn_matrix_account_backfill(
jobq: &Arc<Mutex<hive_jobq::scheduler::Scheduler<SwarmNodeKind, SwarmResourceKind>>>,
homeserver: Option<Arc<str>>,
hives: &[HiveEntry],
auth: Option<Arc<auth::AuthBridge>>,
) {
let Some(base) = homeserver else {
return;
};
if let Some(bridge) = auth {
matrix_account::operator_admin::spawn(bridge, Arc::clone(&base));
}
let sched = Arc::clone(jobq);
matrix_account::agent_token::spawn(Arc::clone(&base), move |agents| {
if let Err(e) = queue_matrix_account_mints(&sched, agents) {
@ -2875,7 +2879,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
hive_jobq::resources::ResourceTable::new(),
)));
let hives = load_hives();
spawn_matrix_account_backfill(&jobq, deps.matrix_homeserver.clone(), &hives);
spawn_matrix_account_backfill(&jobq, deps.matrix_homeserver.clone(), &hives, auth.clone());
spawn_jobq_worker(Arc::clone(&jobq), deps);
// Bound to a named variable, not `_` — dropping the provider stops its
// `PeriodicReader`, so it must live as long as `main` does (which it

View file

@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
//! where the agent's daemon reads it. See docs/swarm/credentials.md for why
//! `main` is the one name [`put_matrix_account`] refuses to write.
//! [`hive_sender`] mints each **hive's** sender account the same way, sharing this module's helpers with [`agent_token`].
//! [`operator_admin`] makes authelia's operators homeserver admins with the same
//! appservice token.
//!
//! **The external one** — [`put_matrix_account`] and everything under it — is
//! an account somewhere else that an operator hands us a credential for: put it
@ -34,6 +36,7 @@ use super::{AppState, error_problem, swarm_hive};
pub mod agent_token;
pub mod hive_sender;
pub mod operator_admin;
fn default_mode() -> String {
"token".to_owned()

View file

@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
//! Homeserver admin for authelia's operators: every member of the operator
//! group who has an account on the swarm's homeserver is made a homeserver
//! admin, at start and every [`RECONCILE_INTERVAL`] after.
//!
//! ⚠️ **Grant-only.** tuwunel has no command that revokes homeserver admin,
//! so leaving the operator group leaves a matrix admin in place.
//!
//! The account an operator's SSO login lands on is named after authelia's
//! `preferred_username`, lowercased: `hive-matrix.nix` sets `userid_claims`,
//! and tuwunel lowercases the claim and refuses one that is not a legal
//! localpart. [`localpart`] applies the same rule.
//!
//! The command is `!admin users make-user-admin <user>` in the admin room
//! `#admins:<server>`, sent as `@swarm` with the swarm appservice token —
//! `@swarm` is the one account the homeserver promotes at boot, and tuwunel
//! runs a command only when its sender is already an admin. Being an admin
//! *is* being joined to that room, so the room's joined members are the
//! operators who need nothing. An operator with no matrix account yet (no SSO
//! login so far) gets no command either: tuwunel would only refuse it, every
//! pass.
//!
//! The bot's reply is not read. A command that did not take shows up as the
//! same operator still missing from the room on the next pass, which sends it
//! again.
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use std::sync::Arc;
use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail};
use swarm_matrix_client::{self as homeserver, Whoami};
use super::agent_token::appservice_token;
use crate::auth::AuthBridge;
/// How often [`spawn`] re-checks the operator group.
const RECONCILE_INTERVAL: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_mins(5);
/// The localpart of tuwunel's admin room alias, `#admins:<server>`.
const ADMIN_ROOM_ALIAS_LOCALPART: &str = "admins";
/// The localpart an SSO login by authelia user `username` lands on, or `None`
/// when tuwunel would refuse the name and no account can exist for it.
///
/// Lowercased and then checked against the user-id grammar's localpart
/// characters, which is what tuwunel does with the claim.
pub fn localpart(username: &str) -> Option<String> {
let lower = username.to_lowercase();
let legal = !lower.is_empty()
&& lower.bytes().all(|b| {
b.is_ascii_lowercase()
|| b.is_ascii_digit()
|| matches!(b, b'.' | b'_' | b'=' | b'-' | b'/' | b'+')
});
legal.then_some(lower)
}
/// What one pass decided, before any account is looked up.
#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Plan {
/// `(authelia username, user id)` for each operator not yet an admin.
pub grant: Vec<(String, String)>,
/// Operators whose username maps to no legal localpart.
pub unmappable: Vec<String>,
}
/// Decide which of `operators` need a grant on `server`, given the user ids
/// already joined to the admin room.
pub fn plan(operators: &[String], server: &str, admins: &BTreeSet<String>) -> Plan {
let mut plan = Plan::default();
for name in operators {
let Some(localpart) = localpart(name) else {
plan.unmappable.push(name.clone());
continue;
};
let user_id = format!("@{localpart}:{server}");
if !admins.contains(&user_id) {
plan.grant.push((name.clone(), user_id));
}
}
plan
}
/// The server name of a full user id, `@<localpart>:<server>`.
fn server_name(user_id: &str) -> Option<&str> {
user_id
.strip_prefix('@')?
.split_once(':')
.map(|(_, server)| server)
.filter(|server| !server.is_empty())
}
/// What one pass did.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct Outcome {
granted: usize,
no_account: usize,
failed: usize,
}
/// One pass: read the operator group, and send a grant for each operator
/// who has a matrix account and is not an admin.
///
/// Fails as a whole when the group, the token, the server name, the admin
/// room or its members cannot be read: with any of them missing there is no
/// decision to make.
async fn pass(bridge: &AuthBridge, base: &str) -> Result<Outcome> {
let operators = bridge
.list_operators()
.await
.context("reading authelia's operator group")?;
let store = crate::store::connect()
.await
.context("logging in to the swarm secret store")?;
let token = appservice_token(&store).await?;
let http = homeserver::client()?;
let Whoami::User(sender) = homeserver::whoami(&http, base, &token)
.await
.context("asking the homeserver who the swarm appservice token is")?
else {
bail!("the homeserver does not know the swarm appservice token");
};
let server = server_name(&sender)
.with_context(|| format!("the homeserver named the swarm sender {sender:?}"))?;
let room = homeserver::resolve_alias(
&http,
base,
&token,
&format!("#{ADMIN_ROOM_ALIAS_LOCALPART}:{server}"),
)
.await?;
let admins = homeserver::joined_members(&http, base, &token, &room).await?;
let plan = plan(&operators, server, &admins);
for name in &plan.unmappable {
tracing::warn!(
operator = %name,
"operator's username is no legal matrix localpart, so no SSO login can \
have an account to make admin; skipped"
);
}
let mut outcome = Outcome::default();
for (name, user_id) in &plan.grant {
match grant(&http, base, &token, &room, user_id).await {
Ok(true) => {
tracing::info!(
operator = %name,
%user_id,
"sent make-user-admin for an operator who is not a homeserver admin"
);
outcome.granted += 1;
}
Ok(false) => {
tracing::debug!(
operator = %name,
%user_id,
"operator has no matrix account yet; nothing to make admin"
);
outcome.no_account += 1;
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
operator = %name,
%user_id,
error = %format!("{e:#}"),
"make-user-admin for an operator failed"
);
outcome.failed += 1;
}
}
}
Ok(outcome)
}
/// Send the grant for `user_id` when its account exists; `false` when it
/// does not, and nothing was sent.
async fn grant(
http: &reqwest::Client,
base: &str,
token: &str,
room: &str,
user_id: &str,
) -> Result<bool> {
if !homeserver::user_exists(http, base, token, user_id).await? {
return Ok(false);
}
homeserver::send_text(
http,
base,
token,
room,
&format!("!admin users make-user-admin {user_id}"),
)
.await?;
Ok(true)
}
/// Run [`pass`] now and every [`RECONCILE_INTERVAL`] after. A pass that fails
/// is logged and retried on the next tick; it never stops the daemon.
pub fn spawn(bridge: Arc<AuthBridge>, base: Arc<str>) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(RECONCILE_INTERVAL);
loop {
ticker.tick().await;
match pass(&bridge, &base).await {
Ok(outcome) if outcome.failed > 0 => tracing::warn!(
granted = outcome.granted,
failed = outcome.failed,
retry_in_s = RECONCILE_INTERVAL.as_secs(),
"operator matrix admin: pass incomplete; retrying next tick"
),
Ok(outcome) if outcome.granted > 0 => tracing::info!(
granted = outcome.granted,
no_account = outcome.no_account,
"operator matrix admin: grants sent"
),
Ok(outcome) => tracing::debug!(
no_account = outcome.no_account,
"operator matrix admin: every operator with an account is an admin"
),
Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
error = %format!("{e:#}"),
retry_in_s = RECONCILE_INTERVAL.as_secs(),
"operator matrix admin: pass failed; retrying next tick"
),
}
}
});
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn names(names: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
names.iter().map(|&n| n.to_owned()).collect()
}
fn ids(ids: &[&str]) -> BTreeSet<String> {
ids.iter().map(|&n| n.to_owned()).collect()
}
#[test]
fn an_operator_already_in_the_admin_room_gets_no_command() {
let plan = plan(
&names(&["mara", "vinzenz"]),
"t.local",
&ids(&["@mara:t.local", "@swarm:t.local"]),
);
assert_eq!(
plan.grant,
[("vinzenz".to_owned(), "@vinzenz:t.local".to_owned())]
);
assert!(plan.unmappable.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn a_pass_with_every_operator_admin_sends_nothing() {
let plan = plan(&names(&["mara"]), "t.local", &ids(&["@mara:t.local"]));
assert_eq!(plan, Plan::default());
}
#[test]
fn an_uppercase_username_maps_to_the_lowercased_account() {
// tuwunel lowercases the claim, so `Mara`'s login is `@mara:`, and that
// account being admin already is a match, not a second grant.
let plan = plan(&names(&["Mara"]), "t.local", &ids(&["@mara:t.local"]));
assert_eq!(plan, Plan::default());
assert_eq!(localpart("Mara.B_c").as_deref(), Some("mara.b_c"));
}
#[test]
fn a_name_tuwunel_would_refuse_is_reported_not_granted() {
let plan = plan(&names(&["bad name", "ok"]), "t.local", &BTreeSet::new());
assert_eq!(plan.grant, [("ok".to_owned(), "@ok:t.local".to_owned())]);
assert_eq!(plan.unmappable, ["bad name"]);
assert_eq!(localpart(""), None);
assert_eq!(localpart("é"), None);
}
#[test]
fn the_server_name_comes_from_the_full_user_id() {
assert_eq!(server_name("@swarm:t.local"), Some("t.local"));
assert_eq!(server_name("@swarm:t.local:8448"), Some("t.local:8448"));
assert_eq!(server_name("@swarm:"), None);
assert_eq!(server_name("swarm"), None);
}
}

View file

@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
//! The appservice calls against the swarm's homeserver: register, log in, and
//! ask a token who it is. Shared by `swarm-matrix-ctl` and `swarm-controller`;
//! The appservice calls against the swarm's homeserver: register, log in, ask
//! a token who it is, and the room calls `swarm-controller`'s admin-room
//! commands need (resolve an alias, list members, check an account exists,
//! send a message). Shared by `swarm-matrix-ctl` and `swarm-controller`;
//! see the README for why both mint through the same device id.
//!
//! 🩸 **Every error in this module is built from the response's `status` and
@ -188,6 +190,183 @@ fn whoami_verdict(status: reqwest::StatusCode, json: &serde_json::Value) -> Resu
bail!("the homeserver refused whoami: {}", why(status, json))
}
/// The room id `alias` names.
///
/// # Errors
/// When the request cannot be sent, the response will not decode, or the
/// homeserver refuses.
pub async fn resolve_alias(
client: &reqwest::Client,
base: &str,
token: &str,
alias: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
let (status, json) = get(
client,
&format!(
"{base}/_matrix/client/v3/directory/room/{}",
path_segment(alias)
),
token,
)
.await
.with_context(|| format!("GET /directory/room for {alias}"))?;
if !status.is_success() {
bail!(
"the homeserver refused to resolve {alias}: {}",
why(status, &json)
);
}
json["room_id"]
.as_str()
.map(str::to_owned)
.with_context(|| format!("the homeserver's answer for {alias} carried no `room_id`"))
}
/// The user ids joined to `room_id`. The token's own user must be one of them.
///
/// # Errors
/// When the request cannot be sent, the response will not decode, or the
/// homeserver refuses.
pub async fn joined_members(
client: &reqwest::Client,
base: &str,
token: &str,
room_id: &str,
) -> Result<std::collections::BTreeSet<String>> {
let (status, json) = get(
client,
&format!(
"{base}/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{}/joined_members",
path_segment(room_id)
),
token,
)
.await
.with_context(|| format!("GET /rooms/{room_id}/joined_members"))?;
if !status.is_success() {
bail!(
"the homeserver refused to list {room_id}'s members: {}",
why(status, &json)
);
}
json["joined"]
.as_object()
.map(|joined| joined.keys().cloned().collect())
.with_context(|| format!("the homeserver's member list for {room_id} carried no `joined`"))
}
/// Whether `user_id` has an account on this homeserver.
///
/// Asked through the profile endpoint, which answers `M_NOT_FOUND` for a
/// local user id with no account.
///
/// # Errors
/// When the request cannot be sent, the response will not decode, or the
/// homeserver refuses with anything other than `M_NOT_FOUND`.
pub async fn user_exists(
client: &reqwest::Client,
base: &str,
token: &str,
user_id: &str,
) -> Result<bool> {
let (status, json) = get(
client,
&format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/profile/{}", path_segment(user_id)),
token,
)
.await
.with_context(|| format!("GET /profile/{user_id}"))?;
if status.is_success() {
return Ok(true);
}
if errcode(&json) == Some("M_NOT_FOUND") {
return Ok(false);
}
bail!(
"the homeserver refused {user_id}'s profile: {}",
why(status, &json)
)
}
/// Send `body` to `room_id` as an `m.text` message, and return its event id.
///
/// # Errors
/// When the request cannot be sent, the response will not decode, or the
/// homeserver refuses.
pub async fn send_text(
client: &reqwest::Client,
base: &str,
token: &str,
room_id: &str,
body: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
let resp = client
.put(format!(
"{base}/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{}/send/m.room.message/{}",
path_segment(room_id),
random_hex(8)?
))
.bearer_auth(token)
.json(&serde_json::json!({ "msgtype": "m.text", "body": body }))
.send()
.await
.with_context(|| format!("PUT a message into {room_id}: sending the request"))?;
let status = resp.status();
let json = resp
.json::<serde_json::Value>()
.await
.with_context(|| format!("PUT a message into {room_id}: decoding the response"))?;
if !status.is_success() {
bail!(
"the homeserver refused a message into {room_id}: {}",
why(status, &json)
);
}
json["event_id"]
.as_str()
.map(str::to_owned)
.with_context(|| {
format!("the homeserver's answer to a message into {room_id} carried no `event_id`")
})
}
/// `value` percent-encoded for one URL path segment: room ids, aliases and
/// user ids carry `!`, `#`, `@` and `:`, and `#` would otherwise end the path.
fn path_segment(value: &str) -> String {
use std::fmt::Write as _;
value.bytes().fold(String::new(), |mut acc, b| {
if b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(b, b'-' | b'.' | b'_' | b'~') {
acc.push(char::from(b));
} else {
// Infallible, for `random_hex`'s reason.
let _ = write!(acc, "%{b:02X}");
}
acc
})
}
/// One authenticated GET, returning the status beside the decoded body.
async fn get(
client: &reqwest::Client,
url: &str,
token: &str,
) -> Result<(reqwest::StatusCode, serde_json::Value)> {
let resp = client
.get(url)
.bearer_auth(token)
.send()
.await
.context("sending the request")?;
let status = resp.status();
let json = resp
.json::<serde_json::Value>()
.await
.context("decoding the response as JSON")?;
Ok((status, json))
}
/// The device every token this binary mints is pinned to.
fn device_id(localpart: &str) -> String {
format!("hyperhive-{localpart}")
@ -360,6 +539,14 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[test]
fn a_path_segment_escapes_what_would_end_or_split_the_path() {
assert_eq!(path_segment("#admins:t.local"), "%23admins%3At.local");
assert_eq!(path_segment("!abc:t.local"), "%21abc%3At.local");
assert_eq!(path_segment("@a.b_c-d:t.local"), "%40a.b_c-d%3At.local");
assert_eq!(path_segment("a/b"), "a%2Fb");
}
#[test]
fn a_minted_password_is_hex_of_the_declared_length() {
// The control on the hex fold: a short or non-hex password would be