fix(#2351): scan error result raw so prompt-too-long in result field is detected
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1 changed files with 43 additions and 12 deletions
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@ -75,18 +75,29 @@ impl Sentinels {
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if matches!(ty, Some("assistant" | "user")) {
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return;
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}
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// The terminal `result` event carries the model's final answer in its
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// `result` field — model-authored text, same trust level as an
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// assistant message. A marker quoted there (e.g. the model explaining
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// *this* code, or echoing an error string back) would falsely trip a
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// sentinel and needlessly kill/downgrade the turn. So for a `result`
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// event, scan the control fields (`subtype` / `error` / `is_error`)
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// but scrub the model-authored `result` field first; a genuine
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// prompt-too-long/auth/session signal lives in those control fields
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// (it's emitted *instead of* a successful model answer), never in the
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// `result` text. Other control events (`error` / `system`) are
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// claude-authored end to end, so they scan raw.
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if ty == Some("result") {
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// A `result` event's `result` field is the model's final answer on a
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// SUCCESSFUL turn — model-authored text, same trust level as an
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// assistant message. A marker quoted there (the model explaining *this*
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// code, or echoing an error string back) would falsely trip a sentinel
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// and needlessly kill/downgrade the turn, so for a *success* result we
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// scrub `result` before scanning and rely on the control fields.
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//
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// But on an ERROR result the same `result` field carries claude-code's
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// OWN failure text — a genuine "Prompt is too long" (an API 400) lands
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// there, emitted *instead of* a model answer. The model can't forge
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// `is_error` / a non-`success` subtype (the CLI sets them from the real
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// outcome), so an error result is claude-authored end to end and is
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// safe to scan raw. Scrubbing it unconditionally (the original
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// result-scrub fix) blinded prompt-too-long / auth detection — hence
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// keying the scrub on success only. Other control events are
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// claude-authored throughout, so they also scan raw.
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let error_result = ty == Some("result")
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&& (event.get("is_error").and_then(serde_json::Value::as_bool) == Some(true)
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|| event
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.get("subtype")
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.and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str)
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.is_some_and(|s| s != "success"));
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if ty == Some("result") && !error_result {
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let mut scrubbed = event.clone();
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if let Some(obj) = scrubbed.as_object_mut() {
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obj.remove("result");
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@ -164,6 +175,26 @@ mod tests {
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assert!(matches!(s.soft_error(), Some(Error::PromptTooLong)));
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}
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#[test]
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fn prompt_too_long_in_error_result_field_is_detected() {
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// Regression guard: claude-code reports a genuine "Prompt is too long"
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// (API 400) in the `result` field of an ERROR result event. The earlier
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// result-scrub blinded this by stripping `result` unconditionally. An
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// error result is claude-authored (the model can't forge `is_error`),
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// so it must be scanned raw.
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for raw in [
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r#"{"type":"result","subtype":"error_during_execution","is_error":true,"result":"API Error: 400 Prompt is too long"}"#,
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r#"{"type":"result","subtype":"success","is_error":true,"result":"Prompt is too long"}"#,
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] {
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let s = Sentinels::default();
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s.scan_stdout_json(&json(raw), raw);
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assert!(
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matches!(s.soft_error(), Some(Error::PromptTooLong)),
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"prompt-too-long in an error result's `result` field must be detected: {raw}"
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);
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn result_field_model_text_quoting_marker_is_ignored() {
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// The terminal `result` event's `result` field is the model's final
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