docs(network): rewrite for always-on isolation; remove phased-rollout rationale

The two-phase network rollout (bridge-first, then isolateContainers) is
complete. Both options are now deprecated no-ops — isolation is always on.
Update the doc to reflect current state:

- Drop the phased-rollout intro ('off by default during rollout') and the
  v1/v2 comparison table; keep a brief historical note
- Remove 'Why ship before netns isolation' section (rollout is done)
- Update configuration example: network.enable is no longer needed
- Merge firewall description into a single table (80/443 always open)
- Remove 'Prerequisites before flipping on' and 'Migration behaviour'
  subsections (isolation was a one-time flip; no longer a toggle)
- Simplify resolver wiring: hive-priv always drops the marker; remove
  'only when isolated' conditional framing
This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-07-04 20:30:23 +02:00
commit 902d4dd461

View file

@ -1,31 +1,14 @@
# hive-network
Host-side bridge + per-agent DNS resolver — the foundation that
makes container netns isolation safe to land. Configured via
`services.hyperhive.network.*`; off by default during rollout.
Host-side bridge + per-agent private-netns isolation — always on
whenever hyperhive is enabled. Configured via
`services.hyperhive.network.*`.
## Why ship before netns isolation
If netns isolation lands first, agent containers lose
`/etc/resolv.conf` propagation from the host and DNS breaks until a
separate resolver is up. Inverting the sequence — bridge + dnsmasq
first, netns flip second — makes the flag day boring: the resolver
endpoint is already live, agents just discover it via veth instead
of shared netns.
## v1 vs v2
| feature | v1 (this PR) | v2 (after netns isolation) |
| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------- |
| bridge interface | created on host, no slave NICs | per-agent veth pairs attach |
| dnsmasq binding | bridge IP (reachable via host loopback in shared netns) | bridge IP (reachable via veth in private netns) |
| agent container netns | shared host | private |
| agent `/etc/resolv.conf` | unchanged (host DNS) | `nameserver <bridge-ip>` |
| `address` rules target | `<bridge-ip>` (works in both modes) | unchanged from v1 |
The `address` rules ship pointing at the bridge IP from v1 so the
DNS contract is fixed before any container actually depends on it
— minimises the things that flip on netns day.
> **Historical note:** the bridge and private-netns isolation landed in
> two separate phases. `services.hyperhive.network.enable` and
> `services.hyperhive.network.isolateContainers` are retained as
> deprecated no-op options so existing configs eval without change; both
> are ignored — isolation is the only mode.
## Container shape (where dnsmasq lives)
@ -33,9 +16,7 @@ Co-located in the existing `hive-gateway` container — single
front-door for both DNS and HTTP, saves a sibling container, single
systemd-unit / state surface to monitor. The gateway shares host
netns (`privateNetwork = false`) so dnsmasq's `bind-interfaces`
listener on `bridgeIp` works without any veth gymnastics today; when
agent containers flip to private netns the binding doesn't change
(it's still on the host's bridge interface).
listener on `bridgeIp` is on the host's bridge interface.
## Configuration
@ -44,19 +25,14 @@ agent containers flip to private netns the binding doesn't change
services.hyperhive = {
enable = true;
domain = "darkest.space";
network.enable = true; # opt in to bridge + DNS
network.bridgeIp = "10.42.0.1"; # default
network.upstreamDns = [ # default Cloudflare + Quad9
"1.1.1.1"
"9.9.9.9"
];
# network.bridgeIp = "10.42.0.1"; # default
# network.upstreamDns = [ "1.1.1.1" "9.9.9.9" ]; # default
};
}
```
Asserts `services.hyperhive.domain != null` (resolver needs a domain
to be authoritative for) + `services.hyperhive.gateway.enable =
true` (resolver lives in the gateway container).
Requires `services.hyperhive.domain` to be set — the dnsmasq resolver
is authoritative for `<hive-domain>` and its sub-domains.
## Bridge addressing
@ -91,15 +67,14 @@ agent containers.
## Firewall posture
`networking.firewall.interfaces.<bridge>.allowedUDPPorts = [ 53 ]`
`networking.firewall.interfaces.<bridge>.allowedTCPPorts = [ 53 80 443 ]`
- `allowedTCPPorts = [ 53 ]` opens the resolver on the bridge
interface only. Other interfaces stay closed. The hive resolver
isn't an external-facing service.
When `isolateContainers = true`, `allowedTCPPorts` is extended with
`[ 80 443 ]` so isolated agents can reach nginx (gateway container,
shared host netns) for the forge sub-domain, per-agent UI proxies,
and any other HTTP services.
- Port 53 opens the resolver on the bridge interface only. Other
interfaces stay closed. The hive resolver isn't an external-facing
service.
- Ports 80 and 443 let isolated agents reach nginx (gateway
container, shared host netns) for the forge sub-domain, per-agent
UI proxies, and any other HTTP services.
### Reaching host services (`exposeHostPorts`)
@ -126,11 +101,9 @@ DNS/gateway), so only expose services safe for any agent to reach.
## Container isolation
`services.hyperhive.network.isolateContainers` (default `false`) flips
agent containers from shared host netns to private netns. Set only after
`enable = true` is stable in production — an assertion blocks the reverse.
### What the nix side does when `isolateContainers = true`
Each agent container runs in a private network namespace with a dedicated
veth pair attached to the bridge. The following table summarises what
the nix side sets up unconditionally:
| effect | mechanism |
| -------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
@ -138,7 +111,6 @@ agent containers from shared host netns to private netns. Set only after
| Internet NAT | `networking.nat { enable = true; internalInterfaces = [ bridgeName ]; }` — MASQUERADE on packets leaving via any external NIC |
| Loopback DROP | `networking.firewall.extraInputRules` — drops bridge-subnet → `127.0.0.0/8` traffic; defence-in-depth against routing table leaks |
| Gateway access | `networking.firewall.interfaces.<bridge>.allowedTCPPorts = [ 80 443 ]` — lets isolated agents reach nginx on the host (shared netns) |
| Forge URL | `HIVE_FORGE_URL` flips from `http://127.0.0.1:3000` to `http://forge.<domain>` — agents resolve via dnsmasq, nginx proxies to forgejo |
| c0re signal | `HIVE_NETWORK_ISOLATION=1`, `HIVE_NETWORK_BRIDGE`, `HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET` in `systemd.services.hive-c0re.environment` |
`HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET` is the host-side bridge IP + prefix (e.g.
@ -148,7 +120,7 @@ address arithmetic.
### What the Rust side does
`hive-c0re` reads `HIVE_NETWORK_ISOLATION` and, when set, passes
`hive-c0re` reads `HIVE_NETWORK_ISOLATION` and passes
`PRIVATE_NETWORK=1`, `LOCAL_ADDRESS=<deterministic-ip>`,
`HOST_ADDRESS=<bridge-ip>`, and `HOST_BRIDGE=<bridgeName>` via
`lifecycle::set_nspawn_flags` when creating or updating containers. Each
@ -171,21 +143,17 @@ but no path off the bridge subnet (no internet, no `api.anthropic.com`).
nixos-container copies the **host's** `/etc/resolv.conf` into the container
at every start. The host resolver (e.g. `127.0.0.53` from systemd-resolved,
or a LAN router) is unreachable from a private netns and isn't
authoritative for the hive's own zones, so it must be replaced with the
bridge dnsmasq (the gateway IP). Because the copy happens on every start, a
authoritative for the hive's own zones, so it is replaced with the
bridge dnsmasq at boot. Because the copy happens on every start, a
declarative `environment.etc."resolv.conf"` would be clobbered — so the
wiring is runtime:
- `hive-priv` drops a marker file (`/etc/hyperhive-bridge-dns`, carrying the
gateway IP) into the container's `/etc` **only when isolated**, removing
it otherwise — so one shared container toplevel behaves correctly in both
netns modes.
gateway IP) into each container's `/etc`.
- the `hyperhive-isolated-dns` oneshot (harness-base.nix), gated on that
marker, rewrites `/etc/resolv.conf` to `nameserver <gateway-ip>` at boot.
It is ordered `before` the harness (`hive-ag3nt`), the matrix daemon, and
`tea-login` so the resolver is correct before the first DNS lookup; it's
an instant no-op in shared-netns mode (the marker is absent, so
`ConditionPathExists` skips it).
`tea-login` so the resolver is correct before the first DNS lookup.
**Why isolation is safe**: all hive-c0re communication goes
through unix domain sockets (`/run/hive/mcp.sock` for agent requests,
@ -200,19 +168,6 @@ against a compromised agent reaching the c0re dashboard HTTP at
`127.0.0.1`). Agents have no legitimate reason to reach the dashboard over
loopback — the hive-c0re admin socket is a UDS, not TCP.
### Prerequisites before flipping on
- All agents must have `hyperhive.web.useUnixSocket = true`. Agents that
still bind TCP on `0.0.0.0:<port>` will be reachable at their bridge IP
from other agents on the same subnet — defeating the isolation goal. The
gateway routes via unix sockets so gateway reach is unaffected.
### Migration behaviour
Containers are destroyed and re-created when the flag flips. Agent state
under `/agents/<name>/state/` is bind-mounted and survives; the container
rootfs is recreated cleanly from the nix store.
## Cross-references
- `docs/gateway.md` — vhost map + the gateway container's other duties