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swarm: revoke an agent's queue credential when it is declared destroyed

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A per-agent queue credential is minted at agent creation and nothing has
ever removed it. An agent declared destroyed loses its container and
keeps its credential: a bearer secret recovered from a snapshot or a
stale capture still authenticates as that agent, so the set of usable
credentials only grows.

Delete the path the mint published, on the one transition that ends an
agent's life. It mirrors step 3 of `mint_and_verify` and no other step:
the leaf, the ACL document and the cert role are what a hive uses to
collect an agent's secrets and are re-minted on every run of the mint.

Every version, not the newest. The mint rewrites the path when the
principal it names needs correcting, so KV v2's plain delete would leave
the identical secret readable at ?version=N. That is a separately-ACL'd
path, hence the second stanza in the controller's grant -- `delete` on
metadata discloses nothing, and `update` on the data path already lets
this principal destroy any agent credential's usability.

The destroy is not blocked by a failed revocation: the declaration is
already published and refusing the call would leave an operator with an
agent they cannot tear down. The failure is logged at error instead,
naming the agent, since a silent orphan is the fault being removed.
This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-09-23 11:56:30 +02:00 • committed by mara
commit 8caf688ee4
5 changed files with 229 additions and 12 deletions
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26
nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix
View file

@ -362,18 +362,16 @@ let
# ../module-eval.nix cannot read them, and a heredoc would make the HCL's
# indentation a function of this file's.
#
# The last grant is a different kind from the others: they let the controller
# bootstrap hives, this lets it write an agent's credentials. Two things about
# it do not read as they look.
#
# `secret/data/` is KV v2's ACL prefix, not part of the path the code passes:
# `swarm-secret-client` writes `swarm/agents/<agent>/...` under mount
# `secret`, and the engine inserts `data/`. Matching the code's spelling
# literally would grant nothing.
#
# `read` too: `mint_and_verify` reads a credential back before writing so a
# re-run keeps the value a live agent already holds instead of rotating it —
# the read is required, not incidental.
# The credential-write grant below (unlike the bootstrap ones above it) has
# three things about its paths that do not read as written. `secret/data/` is
# KV v2's ACL prefix, not part of the path the code passes:
# `swarm-secret-client` writes `swarm/agents/<agent>/...` under mount `secret`,
# and the engine inserts `data/` — matching the code's spelling literally would
# grant nothing. `read` is required too: `mint_and_verify` reads a credential
# back before writing so a re-run keeps the value a live agent already holds
# instead of rotating it. `metadata/` is the revocation half: `delete` on
# `data/` only soft-deletes the newest version, and `+` being one path segment
# keeps this to the queue leaf alone.
#
# The swarm appservice token and its own OIDC client secret, read-only: it
# uses both and writes neither. matrix-ctl publishes the token
@ -402,6 +400,10 @@ let
capabilities = ["create", "read", "update"]
}
path "${credentialMountPath}/metadata/swarm/agents/*" {
capabilities = ["delete"]
}
path "${credentialMountPath}/data/${swarmAppserviceTokenLeaf}" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}