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docs(otel): say what the agent->collector hop is and is not

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argus on #3280: the receiver has no auth extension - the nixpkgs module
passes settings straight through and nothing wires one on - so
'unauthenticated to a bridge address' means reachable from an agent
container, not presents a credential. The firewall is the whole access
control.

Consequence, stated because it is a choice rather than an oversight:
any agent can push arbitrary OTLP and the collector forwards it under
the operator's credential, including data smuggled out in resource
attributes. That is a different risk from the one the collector fixes,
and strictly smaller than what preceded it - before, every agent held
the credential itself and could do all of that plus use the token
anywhere else. The collector removes the token and keeps the pipe.

Same principle this PR already applies to the availability trade: state
it where the reader is, rather than let it be discovered.
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atlas 2026-08-15 11:33:13 +02:00 • committed by mara
commit 865a1cc9ac
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docs/observability.md
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@ -31,6 +31,27 @@ same host as the agents and restarts on failure, and telemetry is not the
control plane — degraded telemetry is not degraded operation — but the export
no longer survives independently of anything host-side.
### what the agent→collector hop is and isn't
**It has no application-level auth.** The receiver takes any OTLP that reaches
it; what bounds who can reach it is the firewall — `exposeHostPorts` opens the
port on the bridge interface only. So "unauthenticated to a bridge address"
means *reachable from an agent container*, not *presents a credential*.
The consequence, stated because it is a choice rather than an oversight: **any
agent can push arbitrary OTLP, and the collector forwards it upstream under the
operator's credential.** It cannot tell a container's genuine Claude Code stats
from anything else shaped like OTLP arriving on that port — including data
smuggled out in resource attributes on an otherwise-legitimate export.
That is a **different risk from the one the collector fixes**, and strictly
smaller than what preceded it: before, every agent held the upstream credential
itself, so it could do all of the above *and* use the token anywhere else. The
collector removes the token and keeps the pipe. Agents are inside the trust
boundary (`docs/security.md`: capability = accepted risk), so an agent being
able to *send* is an accepted extension of that boundary — but it is not
closed by this design, and nothing here should be read as closing it.
## Options reference
### `services.hyperhive.otel.enable` — bool, default `false`