back out bypassPermissions: claude refuses it under root uid
claude-code rejects --dangerously-skip-permissions / defaultMode= bypassPermissions when running as root, which all hyperhive containers do. revert to the previous explicit allow-list plumbing (per-flavor list spliced into permissions.allow + --tools enable list), keep TodoWrite out of the built-in allow set, and keep the deny list (TodoWrite, WebFetch, WebSearch, Task) as belt-and-braces in case anything sneaks past the allow gate.
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3 changed files with 82 additions and 27 deletions
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@ -597,23 +597,86 @@ impl ServerHandler for ManagerServer {}
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/// tools as `mcp__<this>__<tool>` (e.g. `mcp__hyperhive__send`).
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pub const SERVER_NAME: &str = "hyperhive";
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/// Which hyperhive MCP surface to advertise — sub-agent (short tool
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/// list) or manager (full lifecycle surface). Threaded through the
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/// system-prompt renderer and the per-flavor web UI dispatch; tool
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/// gating itself now lives in `claude-settings.json`'s
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/// `permissions.{defaultMode, deny}`, not here.
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/// Built-in claude tools the turn loop enables via `--tools`. Anything not
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/// in this list literally doesn't exist in the session (claude won't even
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/// try to call it). Web egress (`WebFetch`/`WebSearch`) and nested agents
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/// (`Task`) are intentionally omitted for now; `Bash` is allowed pending a
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/// finer-grained allow-list system for shell command patterns. Edit later
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/// as our trust model evolves.
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pub const ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS: &[&str] =
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&["Bash", "Edit", "Glob", "Grep", "Read", "TodoWrite", "Write"];
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/// Which MCP tool surface to advertise via `--allowedTools`. The agent
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/// list is the strict subset of the manager list, so we just thread the
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/// flavor through.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
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pub enum Flavor {
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Agent,
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Manager,
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}
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/// MCP tools claude is allowed to call without prompting. Mirrors the
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/// hyperhive surface so a new tool added in the corresponding `#[tool_router]`
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/// impl needs to be listed here too.
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#[must_use]
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pub fn allowed_mcp_tools(flavor: Flavor) -> Vec<String> {
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let names: &[&str] = match flavor {
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Flavor::Agent => &["send", "recv", "ask_operator"],
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Flavor::Manager => &[
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"send",
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"recv",
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"request_spawn",
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"kill",
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"start",
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"restart",
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"update",
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"request_apply_commit",
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"ask_operator",
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],
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};
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let mut out: Vec<String> = names
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.iter()
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.map(|t| format!("mcp__{SERVER_NAME}__{t}"))
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.collect();
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// Extra MCP servers declared via `hyperhive.extraMcpServers` in
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// the agent's NixOS config. Each entry maps its `allowedTools`
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// pattern list to `mcp__<server>__<pattern>` so claude can call
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// them without per-tool operator approval. `["*"]` (the default)
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// expands to `mcp__<server>__*` — every tool from that server.
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for (server, spec) in load_extra_mcp() {
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if server == SERVER_NAME {
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continue;
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}
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for pat in spec.allowed_tools {
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out.push(format!("mcp__{server}__{pat}"));
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}
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}
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out
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}
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/// Combined allow-list passed to `--allowedTools` (auto-approve) — covers
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/// both the built-ins and the MCP surface.
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#[must_use]
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pub fn allowed_tools_arg(flavor: Flavor) -> String {
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let mut all: Vec<String> = ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS
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.iter()
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.map(|s| (*s).to_owned())
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.collect();
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all.extend(allowed_mcp_tools(flavor));
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all.join(",")
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}
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/// Built-in tools list for `--tools` (which built-ins exist in this
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/// session). Same as `ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS` but joined comma-separated.
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#[must_use]
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pub fn builtin_tools_arg() -> String {
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ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS.join(",")
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}
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/// Where the NixOS module writes the per-agent extra-MCP spec (see
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/// `nix/templates/harness-base.nix`). Each entry becomes an additional
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/// `mcpServers.<key>` block in the rendered claude config; the
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/// `allowedTools` field is parsed for back-compat but no longer wired
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/// anywhere — under `bypassPermissions` every MCP tool auto-approves
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/// unless listed in `permissions.deny`.
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/// `mcpServers.<key>` block in the rendered claude config + a
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/// `mcp__<key>__<tool>` pattern in `--allowedTools`.
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const EXTRA_MCP_PATH: &str = "/etc/hyperhive/extra-mcp.json";
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/// Where the NixOS module writes the per-agent send allow-list (see
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@ -673,7 +736,6 @@ struct ExtraMcpServer {
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env: std::collections::BTreeMap<String, String>,
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#[serde(default = "default_allowed_tools")]
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#[serde(rename = "allowedTools")]
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#[allow(dead_code)] // back-compat: superseded by `permissions.deny`
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allowed_tools: Vec<String>,
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}
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@ -22,13 +22,9 @@ use crate::mcp;
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/// to read and edit; we ship it via `include_str!`. We turn off claude's
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/// in-session auto-compaction and its cross-session auto-memory because
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/// hyperhive owns those concerns (`/compact` on overflow, notes
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/// persistence under `/state`). `permissions.defaultMode =
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/// bypassPermissions` skips the per-tool approval prompt entirely;
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/// `permissions.deny` keeps a short list of tools we don't want claude
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/// reaching for (web egress, nested agents, the ephemeral todo list).
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/// Unknown keys are silently ignored by claude-code; if a key gets
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/// renamed we'll spot it because the corresponding behavior will start
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/// firing mid-turn again.
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/// persistence under `/state`). Unknown keys are silently ignored by
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/// claude-code; if a key gets renamed we'll spot it because the
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/// corresponding behavior will start firing mid-turn again.
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const CLAUDE_SETTINGS: &str = include_str!("../prompts/claude-settings.json");
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/// Regex-ish marker claude-code emits when context overflows. Same string
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@ -85,10 +81,7 @@ pub async fn write_mcp_config(socket: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf> {
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/// Drop the static `--settings` JSON next to the MCP config so we can
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/// pass a path (`--settings <file>`) instead of an ever-growing inline
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/// blob — the CLI argv has a finite length budget. The file carries
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/// `permissions.defaultMode = bypassPermissions` + a small `deny` list,
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/// so everything not in `deny` auto-approves without a per-flavor allow
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/// list.
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/// blob — the CLI argv has a finite length budget.
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pub async fn write_settings(socket: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf> {
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let parent = socket.parent().unwrap_or_else(|| Path::new("/run/hive"));
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tokio::fs::create_dir_all(parent).await.ok();
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@ -252,7 +245,11 @@ async fn run_claude(prompt: &str, files: &TurnFiles, bus: &Bus) -> Result<bool>
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cmd.arg("--system-prompt-file").arg(&files.system_prompt);
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cmd.arg("--mcp-config")
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.arg(&files.mcp_config)
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.arg("--strict-mcp-config");
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.arg("--strict-mcp-config")
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.arg("--tools")
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.arg(mcp::builtin_tools_arg())
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.arg("--allowedTools")
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.arg(mcp::allowed_tools_arg(files.flavor));
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let mut child = cmd
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.stdin(Stdio::piped())
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.stdout(Stdio::piped())
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