diff --git a/swarm-nats-auth/src/policy.rs b/swarm-nats-auth/src/policy.rs
index 9b7f2006..68829ff9 100644
--- a/swarm-nats-auth/src/policy.rs
+++ b/swarm-nats-auth/src/policy.rs
@@ -150,6 +150,28 @@ impl Policy {
         format!("KV_{}", self.bucket)
     }
 
+    /// What *any* `JetStream` client must be able to ask before it can do
+    /// anything at all, bucket-specific or not.
+    ///
+    /// Both were measured from the server's own refusals, not reasoned about:
+    /// a grant carrying every bucket-specific subject and neither of these
+    /// cannot even create the bucket — the client times out on `$JS.API.INFO`
+    /// long before it reaches a subject that was granted.
+    ///
+    /// - `$JS.API.INFO` — account-level `JetStream` info, requested on connect.
+    /// - `$JS.API.STREAM.NAMES` — how a client finds the stream backing a
+    ///   bucket. It lets a client enumerate stream names in the account, which
+    ///   in an account holding one bucket discloses a name both ends already
+    ///   share.
+    ///
+    /// 🩸 Earlier measurements missed both, because they either granted
+    /// `$JS.API.>` wholesale or ran against a bucket the *setup* had already
+    /// created while unscoped. A minimum established against an existing
+    /// bucket is not the minimum for making one.
+    fn jetstream_minimum() -> [String; 2] {
+        ["$JS.API.INFO".to_owned(), "$JS.API.STREAM.NAMES".to_owned()]
+    }
+
     /// Creating the bucket, which **both** ends need.
     ///
     /// `swarm_queue_client::status::open_or_create` is called by the hive that
@@ -168,11 +190,12 @@ impl Policy {
     }
 
     fn hive_subjects(&self, hive: &str) -> Vec<String> {
-        let mut subjects = vec![
+        let mut subjects = Self::jetstream_minimum().to_vec();
+        subjects.extend([
             format!("$JS.API.STREAM.INFO.{}", self.stream()),
             self.create(),
             format!("$KV.{}.{hive}", self.bucket),
-        ];
+        ]);
         subjects.extend(
             self.extra_hive_subjects
                 .iter()
@@ -183,7 +206,8 @@ impl Policy {
 
     fn reader_subjects(&self) -> Vec<String> {
         let stream = self.stream();
-        vec![
+        let mut subjects = Self::jetstream_minimum().to_vec();
+        subjects.extend([
             format!("$JS.API.STREAM.INFO.{stream}"),
             self.create(),
             // The `.>` form specifically: the bare `$JS.API.DIRECT.GET.<stream>`
@@ -194,7 +218,8 @@ impl Policy {
             // reader without this can get a key it already knows and discover
             // nothing.
             format!("$JS.API.CONSUMER.CREATE.{stream}.>"),
-        ]
+        ]);
+        subjects
     }
 }
 
@@ -281,6 +306,24 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn every_grant_carries_the_jetstream_minimum() {
+        // 🩸 Found by the shipping gate, not by any unit test: a grant with
+        // every bucket-specific subject and neither of these cannot create the
+        // bucket at all. The client times out on `$JS.API.INFO` before it
+        // reaches anything that was granted, and a NATS denial looks like a
+        // hang from the client side — the server log is what named them.
+        for client in ["hive-alpha", "swarm-controller"] {
+            let p = policy().permissions(client).expect("admitted");
+            for required in ["$JS.API.INFO", "$JS.API.STREAM.NAMES"] {
+                assert!(
+                    p.publish.iter().any(|s| s == required),
+                    "{client} is missing {required}, so it cannot use JetStream at all"
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn both_ends_may_create_the_bucket_but_not_reshape_it() {
         // 🩸 The bug the subject measurements could not see: they ran against