swarm-bao: agent certificates issued by a store-generated agent CA
An agent's store identity was signed in swarm-controller's memory by a CA a controller-host unit generated on disk, and the listener never trusted that CA. Agent leaves now come from the store itself: a `pki-agents` PKI mount whose root openbao generates internally, so the agent CA's key never exists outside the store. - swarm-bao-agent-pki (new, store host, as the bao granter): enables and tunes the mount, generates the root once (guarded on an empty issuer list, no replace branch), upserts the `swarm-agent` role (client certificates named `hive-agent-*` only, 90 days), caches the CA at /var/lib/swarm-bao-tls/agent-ca.pem and composes the listener bundle. - The listener's tls_client_ca_file is a new listener-client-ca.pem (client-ca.pem, then the agent CA). Host cert-auth roles still pin client-ca.pem, so an agent leaf satisfies no host role. swarm-bao-certs composes the same bundle before openbao starts. - openbao reads tls_client_ca_file only at start, so when the bundle changed after openbao started, swarm-bao-agent-pki restarts openbao.service in the container; under `seal = "shamir"` it prints the step instead. Once swarm-bao-certs has a cached CA, later boots start openbao with it and do not restart. - The controller policy gains exactly `update` on pki-agents/issue/swarm-agent. mint_and_verify now asks that role for the leaf (the store generates the key), writes the agent's cert-auth role pinning the issuing CA bao returned, and writes the agent's policy as render_agent alone: the hive-shared queue credential stanza is gone. - deploy.bao.agentPkiRoleName (must start `swarm-`, asserted with the other pki role names); swarm-controller gets SWARM_CONTROLLER_AGENT_PKI_MOUNT/_ROLE from the deploy.bao options. Deleted: swarm-controller-agent-ca and its options (agentCaFile, agentCaKeyFile), env, LoadCredential entries and assertion; agent_identity's Authority, rcgen signing and validity window; the rcgen and time dependencies of swarm-controller (rcgen leaves the workspace); policy::render_agent_with_queue and its tests. The CN-prefix assertion policy.rs said was owed is not: agent and host roles pin different CAs. Migration is re-creating each agent after deploy; that overwrites the stale role and policy. Closes #4756
This commit is contained in:
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parent
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commit
6170e74a31
16 changed files with 894 additions and 925 deletions
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@ -356,6 +356,9 @@ let
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# The swarm appservice token, read-only: the controller creates agents'
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# matrix accounts with it and never writes it. matrix-ctl mints and publishes
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# it (`matrixCtlPolicyText` below).
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#
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# The agent PKI grant is its only path on that mount: it can ask the one role
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# for a certificate, not write that role or reach the issuer.
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controllerPolicyText = ''
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path "auth/cert/certs/hive-*" {
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capabilities = ["create", "update", "read", "delete"]
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@ -380,6 +383,10 @@ let
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path "${credentialMountPath}/data/${swarmAppserviceTokenLeaf}" {
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capabilities = ["read"]
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}
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path "${agentPkiMountPath}/issue/${agentPkiRoleName}" {
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capabilities = ["update"]
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}
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'';
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# The identity that copies authelia's minted OIDC client secrets into the
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@ -489,7 +496,9 @@ let
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#
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# ⚠️ NOT bao's own client-auth PKI. That one is ./glue-bao-tls.nix's
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# self-signed CA under `/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki`, and it stays outside the
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# store permanently: bao cannot issue the credential that opens bao.
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# store permanently: bao cannot issue the credential a host opens bao with.
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# Agent leaves come from `agentPkiMountPath`, requested by a principal that
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# has already logged in.
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#
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# The mount's own root is generated into it by the bootstrap unit below and
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# its private key never leaves — `root/generate/internal` keeps it inside
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@ -500,13 +509,6 @@ let
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# and has to spell it the same way.
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servicesPkiMountPath = baoDeploy.servicesPkiMountPath;
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# The PKI mount agent client certificates are issued from. Its root is
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# generated inside the store, so the agent CA's key never exists outside it.
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# A mount of its own because the services mount holds exactly one issuer; a
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# root apart from ./glue-bao-tls.nix's CA because that is what keeps an
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# agent's certificate from satisfying any host role.
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agentPkiMountPath = baoDeploy.agentPkiMountPath;
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# Subject of the root generated into that mount. A label for a human reading
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# a chain, not an identity anything authenticates against — same fall-through
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# ./swarm-ca.nix:29-37 uses, and for the same reason: a hive that has set
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@ -594,6 +596,77 @@ let
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}
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'';
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# The PKI mount agent client certificates are issued from. Its root is
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# generated inside the store, so the agent CA's key never exists outside it.
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# A mount of its own because the services mount holds exactly one issuer; a
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# root apart from ./glue-bao-tls.nix's CA because that is what keeps an
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# agent's certificate from satisfying any host role.
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agentPkiMountPath = baoDeploy.agentPkiMountPath;
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agentPkiRoleName = baoDeploy.agentPkiRoleName;
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# Every common name the agent role issues for: `swarm_secret_client`'s
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# `policy::AGENT_PREFIX`, which names each agent's cert-auth role and
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# policy too. Outside it the role refuses, so the controller cannot obtain
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# a certificate for any other name.
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agentCnGlob = "hive-agent-*";
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# The anchor every agent's cert-auth role pins by value, so it is never
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# replaced by a deploy. 262800h like `servicesPkiRootTtl`, and for the same
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# reason: the mount is tuned to it before generation, or bao clamps it.
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agentPkiRootTtl = "262800h";
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# The agent leaf's window, pinned on the role. Nothing re-issues a leaf
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# before it ends; an operator re-runs agent creation.
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agentPkiLeafTtl = "2160h";
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# The agent CA's certificate, cached on this host by `swarm-bao-agent-pki`,
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# so `swarm-bao-certs` can compose the listener's bundle before the store
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# is up. Public material.
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agentCaCachePath = "${tlsDir}/agent-ca.pem";
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# What the listener verifies client certificates against: `client-ca.pem`
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# first, then the agent CA. A file of its own because every host cert-auth
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# role pins `client-ca.pem`: with the agent CA in that file, every leaf the
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# controller can request would satisfy every host role.
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listenerClientCaPath = "${tlsDir}/listener-client-ca.pem";
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# Writes `listenerClientCaPath` from `clientCaPath` and, when it parses, the
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# cached agent CA. The file is replaced only when its bytes change, so its
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# mtime says when the listener's trust last changed; `swarm-bao-agent-pki`
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# restarts openbao on exactly that. Refuses, leaving the current file, when
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# the result would not begin with `client-ca.pem`: host logins depend on it.
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composeListenerBundle = ''
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compose_listener_bundle() {
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if [ ! -s ${clientCaPath} ]; then
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echo "${clientCaPath} is missing or empty; not composing the listener bundle" >&2
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return 1
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fi
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local tmp
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tmp="$(mktemp -p ${tlsDir} .listener-client-ca.XXXXXX)"
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cat ${clientCaPath} > "$tmp"
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if [ -s ${agentCaCachePath} ]; then
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if openssl x509 -noout -in ${agentCaCachePath} >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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printf '\n' >> "$tmp"
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cat ${agentCaCachePath} >> "$tmp"
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else
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echo "${agentCaCachePath} does not parse; the listener will not trust agent certificates" >&2
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fi
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fi
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if ! cmp -s -n "$(stat -c %s ${clientCaPath})" ${clientCaPath} "$tmp"; then
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rm -f "$tmp"
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echo "the composed listener bundle does not begin with ${clientCaPath}; leaving the current one" >&2
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return 1
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fi
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if cmp -s "$tmp" ${listenerClientCaPath}; then
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rm -f "$tmp"
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else
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chmod 0644 "$tmp"
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mv -f "$tmp" ${listenerClientCaPath}
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echo "wrote ${listenerClientCaPath}"
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fi
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}
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'';
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# ── the four principals that used to share the hive's own leaf ─────────────
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#
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# 🩸 Each of the four reads exactly ONE path in the store, and until this
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@ -760,7 +833,7 @@ let
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tls_key_file = serverKeyCredentialPath;
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}
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// lib.optionalAttrs (baoDeploy.clientCaFile != null) {
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tls_client_ca_file = clientCaPath;
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tls_client_ca_file = listenerClientCaPath;
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tls_require_and_verify_client_cert = true;
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};
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@ -1251,7 +1324,9 @@ in
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⚠️ NOT the store's own client-auth PKI. That one is
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./glue-bao-tls.nix's self-signed CA on disk, and it stays outside the
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store permanently — bao cannot issue the credential that opens bao.
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store permanently — bao cannot issue the credential a host opens bao
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with. Agent certificates come from
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{option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.agentPkiMountPath`.
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'';
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};
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@ -1269,6 +1344,17 @@ in
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'';
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};
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agentPkiRoleName = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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default = "swarm-agent";
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description = ''
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Role on {option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.agentPkiMountPath`
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agent client certificates are issued through. It issues client
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certificates named `hive-agent-*` and nothing else, and swarm-controller
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may call its `issue` endpoint and no other path on the mount.
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'';
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};
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servicesPkiRoleName = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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default = "swarm-services";
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@ -1859,13 +1945,18 @@ in
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# else, so a role named otherwise is a 403 at deploy time.
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assertion =
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!haveGranter
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|| (lib.hasPrefix "swarm-" servicesPkiRoleName && lib.hasPrefix "swarm-" natsPkiRoleName);
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|| (
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lib.hasPrefix "swarm-" servicesPkiRoleName
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&& lib.hasPrefix "swarm-" natsPkiRoleName
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&& lib.hasPrefix "swarm-" agentPkiRoleName
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);
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message = ''
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services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.servicesPkiRoleName
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(${servicesPkiRoleName}) and
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(${servicesPkiRoleName}),
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services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.natsPkiRoleName (${natsPkiRoleName})
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must both start with `swarm-`: the bao granter that writes them may
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write pki roles under that prefix only.
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and services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.agentPkiRoleName
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(${agentPkiRoleName}) must all start with `swarm-`: the bao granter
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that writes them may write pki roles under that prefix only.
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'';
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}
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];
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@ -1929,6 +2020,7 @@ in
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"swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc-policy"
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"swarm-bao-services-issuer-policy"
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"swarm-bao-nats-tls-policy"
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"swarm-bao-agent-pki"
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];
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# 🚫 No `swarm.otel.scrapeTargets.bao` entry any more, and its absence is
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@ -2119,7 +2211,11 @@ in
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description = "deliver the swarm secret store's server certificate";
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before = [ "container@${cfg.machine}.service" ];
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requiredBy = [ "container@${cfg.machine}.service" ];
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path = [ pkgs.coreutils ];
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path = [
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pkgs.coreutils
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pkgs.diffutils
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pkgs.openssl
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];
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serviceConfig = {
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Type = "oneshot";
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RemainAfterExit = true;
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@ -2155,6 +2251,12 @@ in
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exit 1
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fi
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install -m 0644 ${lib.escapeShellArg baoDeploy.clientCaFile} ${tlsDir}/client-ca.pem
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# Composed here as well as by `swarm-bao-agent-pki` so that openbao
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# starts already trusting the cached agent CA, and so the file it
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# refuses to start without exists before the store's first run.
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${composeListenerBundle}
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compose_listener_bundle
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'';
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};
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@ -2734,6 +2836,170 @@ in
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'';
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};
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# The agent PKI mount: its root, its one role, the host's copy of the
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# root's certificate, and the listener's trust in it.
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#
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# ⚠️ This unit RESTARTS openbao. openbao reads `tls_client_ca_file` only
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# when a listener is built, at start: neither SIGHUP nor a reload re-reads
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# it. So when the listener bundle changed after openbao last started,
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# openbao is restarted here, which drops every client for the restart and
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# the unseal. `swarm-bao-certs` composes the same bundle before every
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# later start, so this happens when the agent CA first appears (or is
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# replaced by a re-initialised store), not per boot. Under `shamir` a
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# restart needs a human unseal, so there it prints the step instead.
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#
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# `after` the granting units so a restart does not cut their writes off.
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systemd.services.swarm-bao-agent-pki = lib.mkIf haveGranter {
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description = "set up the swarm agent PKI mount and make the store's listener trust it";
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after = [
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"container@${cfg.machine}.service"
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"swarm-bao-controller-policy.service"
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"swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy.service"
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"swarm-bao-matrix-ctl-policy.service"
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"swarm-bao-matrix-token-policy.service"
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"swarm-bao-queue-agent-policy.service"
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"swarm-bao-grafana-oidc-policy.service"
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"swarm-bao-otel-oidc-policy.service"
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"swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc-policy.service"
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"swarm-bao-services-issuer-policy.service"
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"swarm-bao-nats-tls-policy.service"
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]
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++ granterAfter;
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requires = [ "swarm-bao-pki.service" ];
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wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
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path = [
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baoCli
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pkgs.coreutils
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pkgs.diffutils
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pkgs.openssl
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];
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environment = granterEnv;
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# Same unseal wait as its siblings above.
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startLimitBurst = 2880;
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startLimitIntervalSec = 90000;
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serviceConfig = {
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Type = "oneshot";
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RemainAfterExit = true;
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Restart = "on-failure";
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RestartSec = 30;
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};
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script = ''
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set -euo pipefail
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${granterLogin}
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# Asked rather than attempted: `secrets enable` errors on a path
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# already in use.
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mounts="$(bao secrets list -format=json)"
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case "$mounts" in
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*'"${agentPkiMountPath}/"'*) ;;
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*) bao secrets enable -path=${agentPkiMountPath} pki ;;
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esac
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# Before generation, on every run: an untuned mount silently clamps
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# the root to 768h (see the services mount above).
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bao secrets tune -max-lease-ttl=${agentPkiRootTtl} ${agentPkiMountPath}
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# Generated once, ever. Every agent's cert-auth role pins this root
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# by value, so a second one locks every agent out; there is no
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# replace branch, and the granter holds no delete on the root. The
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# mount's own issuer list is the guard, for the reason the services
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# root gives: `{}` is the only answer that means "none".
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if issuers="$(bao list -format=json ${lib.escapeShellArg "${agentPkiMountPath}/issuers"})"; then
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echo "the ${agentPkiMountPath} mount already has an issuer — leaving it alone"
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elif [ "$issuers" = '{}' ]; then
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echo "generating the swarm agent CA into the ${agentPkiMountPath} mount"
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# `max_path_length=0`: this CA signs leaves only.
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bao write -field=issuing_ca ${lib.escapeShellArg "${agentPkiMountPath}/root/generate/internal"} \
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common_name=${lib.escapeShellArg "swarm-bao-agent-ca ${servicesPkiRootLabel}"} \
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issuer_name=swarm-agent-ca \
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ttl=${agentPkiRootTtl} \
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max_path_length=0 \
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key_type=rsa \
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key_bits=4096 >/dev/null
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else
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echo "could not list the ${agentPkiMountPath} issuers — not generating a root over one that may exist" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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# Upserted every run. The whole narrowing of what the controller can
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# obtain: client certificates, named `hive-agent-*`, nothing else.
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# `allow_localhost` and `server_flag` are on by default in bao, so
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# they are turned off here, not left out. No `issuer_ref`: the mount
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# holds one issuer, which is its default.
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bao write ${lib.escapeShellArg "${agentPkiMountPath}/roles/${agentPkiRoleName}"} \
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allowed_domains=${lib.escapeShellArg agentCnGlob} \
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allow_glob_domains=true \
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allow_bare_domains=false \
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allow_subdomains=false \
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allow_wildcard_certificates=false \
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allow_localhost=false \
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allow_any_name=false \
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allow_ip_sans=false \
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enforce_hostnames=true \
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server_flag=false \
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client_flag=true \
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code_signing_flag=false \
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email_protection_flag=false \
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key_usage=DigitalSignature \
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key_type=ec \
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key_bits=256 \
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ttl=${agentPkiLeafTtl} \
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max_ttl=${agentPkiLeafTtl}
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ca="$(bao read -field=certificate ${lib.escapeShellArg "${agentPkiMountPath}/cert/ca"})"
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if ! openssl x509 -noout <<<"$ca" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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echo "the ${agentPkiMountPath} CA that bao returned does not parse — not caching it" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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tmp="$(mktemp -p ${tlsDir} .agent-ca.XXXXXX)"
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printf '%s\n' "$ca" > "$tmp"
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if cmp -s "$tmp" ${agentCaCachePath}; then
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rm -f "$tmp"
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else
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chmod 0644 "$tmp"
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mv -f "$tmp" ${agentCaCachePath}
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echo "wrote ${agentCaCachePath}"
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fi
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${composeListenerBundle}
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compose_listener_bundle
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machine=${lib.escapeShellArg cfg.machine}
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if ! systemctl --machine="$machine" is-active --quiet openbao.service; then
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echo "openbao in $machine is not running; it reads ${listenerClientCaPath} when it starts"
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exit 0
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fi
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started="$(systemctl --machine="$machine" show --timestamp=us+utc -p ActiveEnterTimestamp --value openbao.service)"
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started_us="$(date -u -d "$started" +%s%6N)"
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written_us="$(stat -c %.6Y ${listenerClientCaPath} | tr -d .)"
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if [ "$written_us" -le "$started_us" ]; then
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echo "openbao started after ${listenerClientCaPath} last changed; nothing to pick up"
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exit 0
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fi
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# Fail closed: host logins go through this file too.
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if [ ! -s ${listenerClientCaPath} ] \
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|| ! cmp -s -n "$(stat -c %s ${clientCaPath})" ${clientCaPath} ${listenerClientCaPath} \
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|| ! openssl x509 -noout -in ${listenerClientCaPath} >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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echo "${listenerClientCaPath} is empty, unparseable or does not begin with ${clientCaPath}; not restarting openbao" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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''
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+ (
|
||||
if baoDeploy.seal == "pkcs11" then
|
||||
''
|
||||
echo "${listenerClientCaPath} changed after openbao started; restarting openbao in $machine (it unseals itself)"
|
||||
systemctl --machine="$machine" restart openbao.service
|
||||
''
|
||||
else
|
||||
''
|
||||
echo "${listenerClientCaPath} changed after openbao started. A restart seals a ${baoDeploy.seal} store, so it is left to you, as root on this host:" >&2
|
||||
echo " systemctl --machine=$machine restart openbao.service # then unseal" >&2
|
||||
''
|
||||
);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
# The CA bind source is written at runtime by a host unit, so the
|
||||
# container has to start after it — otherwise nspawn sets up a mount
|
||||
# over a file that does not exist yet.
|
||||
|
|
@ -2754,7 +3020,8 @@ in
|
|||
# /var, systemd owns `${stateDir}` through `StateDirectory=`, and
|
||||
# binding over it is what breaks the unit.
|
||||
bindMounts = {
|
||||
# Read-only: `swarm-bao-certs` on the host is the only writer, and
|
||||
# Read-only: host units write it (`swarm-bao-certs`, and
|
||||
# `swarm-bao-agent-pki` for the agent CA and the listener bundle), and
|
||||
# the store has no reason to modify its own identity.
|
||||
${tlsDir} = {
|
||||
hostPath = tlsDir;
|
||||
|
|
@ -2985,12 +3252,15 @@ in
|
|||
];
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
# ⚠️ Upstream sets `restartIfChanged = false` on this unit, on
|
||||
# purpose: a restart SEALS the store and disconnects every client.
|
||||
# So a change to the settings above does NOT take effect on
|
||||
# `nixos-rebuild switch` — it lands in the config file and waits.
|
||||
# Restarting is an operator action with an unseal on the far side of
|
||||
# it, which is why nothing here tries to be clever about it.
|
||||
# ⚠️ Upstream sets `restartIfChanged = false` on this unit: a restart
|
||||
# SEALS the store and disconnects every client. The container around
|
||||
# it does restart on `nixos-rebuild switch` whenever its config
|
||||
# (these settings included) changes: nixos-containers sets
|
||||
# `restartTriggers` on `container@${cfg.machine}` and nothing here
|
||||
# overrides its `restartIfChanged`. The only in-place restart of this
|
||||
# unit is `swarm-bao-agent-pki` on the host, once, when the listener's
|
||||
# client-CA bundle changed after openbao started, and only under the
|
||||
# self-unsealing `pkcs11` seal.
|
||||
|
||||
# This container's own journal forwarder, copied from an agent
|
||||
# container's (nix/agent-modules/otel.nix) because every container
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -38,33 +38,6 @@ let
|
|||
# file would be handed to a daemon that cannot use it.
|
||||
haveHiveClientCa = haveBaoIdentity && deployCfg.swarm-controller.hiveClientCaFile != null;
|
||||
|
||||
# The authority this daemon issues AGENT client leaves from — a different
|
||||
# question from `hiveClientCaFile` above, which is the authority it *trusts*
|
||||
# hives by. This one it signs with, so it needs the private key too.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ⚠️ Deliberately NOT the store's own PKI (`glue-bao-tls.nix`'s
|
||||
# `/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki`). A cert-auth role pins its authority by value,
|
||||
# per role, so a role this daemon writes carries whatever authority this
|
||||
# daemon hands it — which is what lets the controller mint from its own CA
|
||||
# on its own host without anything being co-located and without any
|
||||
# existing role changing. `swarm-controller/src/agent_identity.rs`'s module
|
||||
# doc is the long form.
|
||||
agentCaDir = "/var/lib/swarm-controller-agent-ca";
|
||||
|
||||
# No authority named means mint one here. The alternative — leaving agent
|
||||
# identities off until an operator places a CA by hand — is the state where
|
||||
# the whole path is configured and silently does nothing, which is the
|
||||
# failure mode `glue-bao-tls.nix` avoids the same way.
|
||||
selfSignAgentCa = deployCfg.swarm-controller.agentCaFile == null;
|
||||
agentCaCert =
|
||||
if selfSignAgentCa then "${agentCaDir}/ca.pem" else deployCfg.swarm-controller.agentCaFile;
|
||||
agentCaKey =
|
||||
if selfSignAgentCa then "${agentCaDir}/ca-key.pem" else deployCfg.swarm-controller.agentCaKeyFile;
|
||||
|
||||
# Minting an agent's identity means publishing it to the store, so the
|
||||
# authority alone is not enough — same rule `haveHiveClientCa` states.
|
||||
haveAgentCa = haveBaoIdentity && agentCaKey != null;
|
||||
|
||||
# `swarm_secret_client` reads these spellings explicitly rather than
|
||||
# vaultrs's `VAULT_*` defaults — falling through to those builds a client
|
||||
# with no identity and fails at the TLS handshake, naming neither. `%d` and
|
||||
|
|
@ -88,12 +61,11 @@ let
|
|||
# to put in each hive's cert-auth role.
|
||||
SWARM_CONTROLLER_HIVE_CLIENT_CA_FILE = "%d/hive-client-ca.pem";
|
||||
}
|
||||
// lib.optionalAttrs haveAgentCa {
|
||||
# The authority agent leaves are ISSUED FROM, so unlike every other
|
||||
# `*_CA_FILE` here it comes with a key. `%d` for both: the key is
|
||||
# `0600` and root-owned, and this daemon runs unprivileged.
|
||||
SWARM_CONTROLLER_AGENT_CA_FILE = "%d/agent-ca.pem";
|
||||
SWARM_CONTROLLER_AGENT_CA_KEY_FILE = "%d/agent-ca-key.pem";
|
||||
// lib.optionalAttrs haveBaoIdentity {
|
||||
# Where agent leaves are issued. The store host sets that mount and
|
||||
# role up from the same two options, which keeps the spellings equal.
|
||||
SWARM_CONTROLLER_AGENT_PKI_MOUNT = deployCfg.bao.agentPkiMountPath;
|
||||
SWARM_CONTROLLER_AGENT_PKI_ROLE = deployCfg.bao.agentPkiRoleName;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
# What `swarmctl` needs in order to act on authelia from the host.
|
||||
|
|
@ -663,47 +635,6 @@ in
|
|||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
agentCaFile = lib.mkOption {
|
||||
type = lib.types.nullOr lib.types.str;
|
||||
default = null;
|
||||
example = "/var/lib/swarm-agent-ca/ca.pem";
|
||||
description = ''
|
||||
Authority this daemon **issues** agent client certificates from, so
|
||||
that an agent container can authenticate to the swarm secret store
|
||||
under its own name. Read together with
|
||||
{option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.agentCaKeyFile`,
|
||||
which is the private key it signs with.
|
||||
|
||||
The mirror image of
|
||||
{option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.hiveClientCaFile`:
|
||||
that one is an authority this daemon only *trusts by value*, so it is
|
||||
public material and needs no key. This one signs, so it does.
|
||||
|
||||
Leaving this `null` — the default — makes the module mint a
|
||||
self-signed authority in `${agentCaDir}` on first boot and use that.
|
||||
That is the ordinary shape: the store pins an authority per cert-auth
|
||||
role, by value, so the authority agents are issued from does not have
|
||||
to be the store's own PKI and does not have to live on the store's
|
||||
host. Name a file here only when an operator issues agent leaves from
|
||||
somewhere else; doing so turns the self-signing unit off.
|
||||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
agentCaKeyFile = lib.mkOption {
|
||||
type = lib.types.nullOr lib.types.str;
|
||||
default = null;
|
||||
example = "/var/lib/swarm-agent-ca/ca-key.pem";
|
||||
description = ''
|
||||
Private key for
|
||||
{option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.agentCaFile`.
|
||||
Both or neither — an authority with no key signs nothing, and the
|
||||
daemon refuses to start half-configured rather than looking ready.
|
||||
|
||||
A path, never a value: the key's bytes in a nix expression land in
|
||||
the world-readable nix store, permanently.
|
||||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
queue = {
|
||||
clientSecretFile = lib.mkOption {
|
||||
type = lib.types.str;
|
||||
|
|
@ -734,10 +665,7 @@ in
|
|||
services.hyperhive.swarm.otel.journaldUnits = [
|
||||
"swarm-controller"
|
||||
"swarm-controller-credential"
|
||||
]
|
||||
# Declared only where the unit exists — an entry for a unit that was
|
||||
# never defined is a collector waiting on a journal that never speaks.
|
||||
++ lib.optional (haveAgentCa && selfSignAgentCa) "swarm-controller-agent-ca";
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
users.users.swarm-controller = {
|
||||
isSystemUser = true;
|
||||
|
|
@ -824,18 +752,6 @@ in
|
|||
state directory.
|
||||
'';
|
||||
}
|
||||
{
|
||||
assertion =
|
||||
deployCfg.swarm-controller.agentCaFile == null || deployCfg.swarm-controller.agentCaKeyFile != null;
|
||||
message = ''
|
||||
services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.agentCaFile names an
|
||||
authority but agentCaKeyFile is unset.
|
||||
|
||||
The controller does not merely trust this authority, it issues
|
||||
agent client certificates from it, so it needs the private key.
|
||||
Set both, or set neither and let the module mint its own.
|
||||
'';
|
||||
}
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
systemd.services.swarm-controller = {
|
||||
|
|
@ -877,16 +793,7 @@ in
|
|||
++ lib.optional (
|
||||
haveBaoIdentity && deployCfg.bao.serverCaFile != null
|
||||
) "bao-ca.pem:${deployCfg.bao.serverCaFile}"
|
||||
++ lib.optional haveHiveClientCa "hive-client-ca.pem:${deployCfg.swarm-controller.hiveClientCaFile}"
|
||||
# The agent authority, key included — same shape and same reason as
|
||||
# the store identity above: the key is root-owned `0600` and this
|
||||
# daemon runs as `swarm-controller`. `swarm-controller-agent-ca`
|
||||
# below is `requiredBy` this unit, so the files exist by the time
|
||||
# systemd resolves these.
|
||||
++ lib.optionals haveAgentCa [
|
||||
"agent-ca.pem:${agentCaCert}"
|
||||
"agent-ca-key.pem:${agentCaKey}"
|
||||
];
|
||||
++ lib.optional haveHiveClientCa "hive-client-ca.pem:${deployCfg.swarm-controller.hiveClientCaFile}";
|
||||
|
||||
# The placeholder default that makes the above non-fatal.
|
||||
# `LoadCredential=` takes priority over `SetCredential=`, so this is
|
||||
|
|
@ -1059,50 +966,5 @@ in
|
|||
ExecStart = "${pkgs.systemd}/bin/systemctl try-restart swarm-controller.service";
|
||||
};
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
# The authority agent client leaves are issued from, minted here when the
|
||||
# operator named none. Shape copied from ./glue-bao-tls.nix's
|
||||
# `swarm-bao-pki`, including the rule that matters most:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# 🩸 Idempotent on ABSENCE, never on content. Re-issuing this CA would
|
||||
# invalidate every agent leaf already published to the store AND every
|
||||
# cert-auth role that pinned it by value, locking every agent container
|
||||
# in the swarm out at once — on a rebuild that changed nothing an
|
||||
# operator asked for.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# `before` + `requiredBy` rather than `after`: the daemon's
|
||||
# `LoadCredential=` names these files by absolute path, and a
|
||||
# `LoadCredential=` pointing at a file that is not there yet is fatal
|
||||
# (`243/CREDENTIALS`), not a slow start.
|
||||
systemd.services.swarm-controller-agent-ca = lib.mkIf (haveAgentCa && selfSignAgentCa) {
|
||||
description = "mint the authority swarm agents' store certificates are issued from";
|
||||
before = [ "swarm-controller.service" ];
|
||||
requiredBy = [ "swarm-controller.service" ];
|
||||
path = [
|
||||
pkgs.openssl
|
||||
pkgs.coreutils
|
||||
];
|
||||
serviceConfig = {
|
||||
Type = "oneshot";
|
||||
RemainAfterExit = true;
|
||||
};
|
||||
script = ''
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
install -d -m 0700 ${agentCaDir}
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ! -s ${agentCaCert} ]; then
|
||||
# `pathlen:0` — this authority signs leaves and nothing else. An
|
||||
# intermediate under it would be a second issuer for the one name
|
||||
# space the store matches agents by.
|
||||
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -sha256 -days 3650 \
|
||||
-keyout ${agentCaKey} -out ${agentCaCert} \
|
||||
-subj "/CN=swarm-agent-ca ${swarmDomain}" \
|
||||
-addext "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:0" \
|
||||
-addext "keyUsage=critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign"
|
||||
chmod 0600 ${agentCaKey}
|
||||
chmod 0644 ${agentCaCert}
|
||||
fi
|
||||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue