fix(#2417): keep 'external' in webhook allow-list so public webhooks still deliver
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1 changed files with 26 additions and 16 deletions
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@ -205,12 +205,15 @@ in
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];
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description = ''
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Extra hosts to add to forgejo's webhook SSRF allow-list
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(`[webhook] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`). The hive gateway host
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(`services.hyperhive.domain`) is ALWAYS included — the config-PR
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and knowledge webhooks target it, and it resolves to a private
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gateway IP that forgejo's default guard would otherwise deny.
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Add entries here to additionally allow webhooks from project
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repos to other hosts (a user's own CI, external services, etc.).
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(`[webhook] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`, a strict whitelist). The list
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always contains the `external` builtin (forgejo's default — all
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public hosts, so webhooks to github/slack/etc. from user repos
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keep working) plus the hive gateway host
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(`services.hyperhive.domain`), which the config-PR and knowledge
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webhooks target and which resolves to a private gateway IP that
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`external` alone would deny. Set this to additionally allow
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webhooks to other hosts (a user's own CI, internal services,
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etc.).
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Entries are forgejo hostmatcher patterns: hostnames, globs,
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IPs/CIDRs, or the builtins `loopback` / `private` / `external`
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@ -440,17 +443,24 @@ in
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# disallowed hosts"). Allow loopback + RFC-1918 sources
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# so an in-hive mirror of the hyperhive repo works.
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migrations.ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = true;
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# Webhook deliveries target the gateway
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# (`https://<hyperhive domain>/webhook/*`), which resolves to a
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# private (RFC-1918) gateway IP. Forgejo's webhook SSRF guard
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# denies private hosts by default, so the config-PR + knowledge
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# webhooks never actually deliver — only the 5-min poll fallback
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# catches config PRs. The gateway host is always allowed (scoping
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# to that one hostname keeps the SSRF surface tighter than the
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# broad `private` builtin); operators extend the list via
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# `forge.webhookAllowedHosts` for webhooks on their own repos.
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# `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is forgejo's webhook SSRF allow-list, and
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# it's a STRICT whitelist (only listed hosts deliver). Its
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# default is the `external` builtin: all public unicast IPs are
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# allowed, private/loopback denied. We must KEEP `external` so
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# user-repo webhooks to public hosts (github, slack, …) keep
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# working, and ADD the hive gateway host on top: the config-PR +
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# knowledge webhooks target `https://<hyperhive domain>/webhook/*`,
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# which resolves to a private (RFC-1918) gateway IP that
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# `external` alone would deny (so they'd only ever be caught by
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# the 5-min poll fallback). Naming the single gateway host is
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# tighter than the broad `private` builtin. Operators append more
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# hosts via `forge.webhookAllowedHosts`.
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webhook.ALLOWED_HOST_LIST = lib.concatStringsSep "," (
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[ hyperhiveDomain ] ++ cfg.webhookAllowedHosts
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[
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"external"
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hyperhiveDomain
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]
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++ cfg.webhookAllowedHosts
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);
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log.LEVEL = "Warn";
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ui = {
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