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credentials docs: trim the page to what an operator running a swarm needs

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- table cells: cut to what the credential is, where it comes from and what the operator does
- prose sections: cut the matrix-prefix, appservice-token and leaf-delivery sections; trimmed revocation and retry notes to their operator-visible effect
- progressive enhancement section: removed (contributor rules)
- intro: cut to the store, the on-disk certificate and the column meanings
- docs index: drop the "progressive-enhancement rule" clause from the credentials.md entry in docs/README.md
- matrix rows: one sentence saying the name `main` is reserved
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atlas 2026-10-22 07:49:43 +02:00
commit 5fe71fd056
2 changed files with 62 additions and 180 deletions
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2
docs/README.md
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@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ declarations.
[`networking/snapshot-store.md`](networking/snapshot-store.md). [`networking/snapshot-store.md`](networking/snapshot-store.md).
- **Who mints each credential, who reads it, and how does it rotate — and - **Who mints each credential, who reads it, and how does it rotate — and
where's that shape headed?** → [`swarm/credentials.md`](swarm/credentials.md) where's that shape headed?** → [`swarm/credentials.md`](swarm/credentials.md)
(current state, target state, and the progressive-enhancement rule); (current state and target state);
[`swarm/secrets.md`](swarm/secrets.md) for where each file lives today. [`swarm/secrets.md`](swarm/secrets.md) for where each file lives today.
- **How does the secret store come up, who writes its grants, how's it - **How does the secret store come up, who writes its grants, how's it
sealed?** → [`swarm/bao.md`](swarm/bao.md). sealed?** → [`swarm/bao.md`](swarm/bao.md).

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docs/swarm/credentials.md
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@ -2,112 +2,63 @@
<!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO --> <!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO -->
The swarm's credential store is bao. This page describes the shape every The swarm's credential store is bao. This page lists each credential: who
credential is meant to have — who mints it, who reads it, and how it renews mints it, who reads it, and how it renews. It describes the target, not what's
— not what's on disk today. [`secrets.md`](secrets.md) remains the map of on disk today; [`secrets.md`](secrets.md) maps the files that exist right now.
the files that exist right now; this page replaces it, and `secrets.md` gets
deleted, once the swarm's credential path matches what's described below.
<!-- vale write-good.Passive = YES --> <!-- vale write-good.Passive = YES -->
**Public material is a value.** The store hands a certificate or a public **Store secrets stay off disk.** A process pulls a value from the store at
nkey to every client that connects, so it's a fine place for that material. runtime and holds it in memory only.
Nothing below is about those.
**No secret the store holds is ever written to disk.** That's the invariant, **The mTLS client certificate is the only credential on disk.** Each
and everything else in this page follows from it. A value pulled from the identity (an agent, a hive, a swarm-level service) has one. It's what logs a
store — bao — lives in the memory of the process that asked for it and principal in to the store, so you place a hive's or service's certificate by
nowhere else: not in a state directory, not in a bind-mounted file, not in a hand. The nix option for it takes a path to the certificate, never its bytes,
systemd credential, not in a rendered config, not for a moment before a unit because a literal in a nix expression lands in the world-readable nix store.
deletes it. The target isn't a shorter list of secret files. It's the store, A hive hands each agent its certificate; the agent pulls everything else
plus one file per identity. itself.
**Those files are mTLS client certificates, one per identity, and they're In the table, **automatic re-mint** is something replacing the stored value
the only credential on disk.** Each has to be a file, and the reason is the without an operator. **Automatic re-pull** is the reader picking up a replaced
whole asymmetry: the certificate is what authenticates a principal to the value without a restart. ✅ means it happens today, ❌ means it doesn't, and
store, so it's the one credential nothing can fetch from the store. the rest of the cell says how.
Something has to exist on disk before the first request, or there's nothing
to make the request with. Every identity — an agent, a hive, a swarm-level
service — needs one; a host running several holds several, and its only
power is to ask the store for the rest.
`swarm-bao.nix:529-533` states the rule for the nix option that carries it:
this is _"the credential an operator places by hand"_, and _"a path, never a
value."_ A literal in a nix expression lands in the nix store —
world-readable and permanent — so that option takes a path to the
certificate on disk, never the certificate's bytes.
**The hive hands an agent an identity, never a secret.** Its hive passes an
agent container an mTLS certificate, and from then on the agent authenticates
to the store under its own name, pulling what it needs when it needs it. No
process reads a secret on another principal's behalf: the principal that
needs a value is the principal that authenticates for it.
**Per secret, the target specifies minter, reader, and renewal strategy.**
Those three are the contract, and the reader is a process pulling a store
path at runtime — not a path on disk, and not a unit whose job is to turn a
store value into a file. A renewal cell may never read `NONE`: state the
strategy for every credential, including the mTLS leaf.
Renewal is two columns. **Automatic re-mint** is something replacing the
stored value without an operator. **Automatic re-pull** is the reader picking up
a replaced value without a restart. ✅ or ❌ says which exist today, and the rest
of the cell says how.
<!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO --> <!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO -->
| store path | minter | reader — pulls at runtime, holds in memory | automatic re-mint | automatic re-pull | | store path | minter | reader | automatic re-mint | automatic re-pull |
| ----------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | ----------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/main` | `swarm-controller`, with the swarm's appservice token, at agent creation and in a five-minute pass | the agent container itself, under the certificate its hive passed in | ✅ the pass re-mints when the stored token is missing, unknown to the homeserver, or someone else's | ✅ `hive-matrix-daemon` exits when the homeserver rejects its token, and a five-minute timer restarts it, which reads the store again | | `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/main` | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation and every 5 minutes | the agent | ✅ when missing or rejected by the homeserver | ✅ the daemon restarts within 5 minutes of a rejection |
| `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/<account>` | `swarm-controller` | the agent container itself, under the certificate its hive passed in | must be stated | ✅ a secondary that didn't come up at start, or whose token the homeserver rejected, is read from the store again two minutes later, then at doubling waits up to sixteen minutes, without restarting the daemon or its other accounts; one that's up and then rejected ends its sync loop, the daemon exits and its timer restarts it | | `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/<account>` | `swarm-controller`, from a credential you hand it | the agent | must be stated | ✅ retried within 2 to 16 minutes after a rejection |
| `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix-recovery/<account>` | `swarm-controller`, a random passphrase for every account listed under the agent's `matrix/`, in a five-minute pass | the agent container itself, under the certificate its hive passed in, when `hive-matrix-daemon` brings the account up | ❌ never replaced: the account's server-side key backup opens only with the passphrase it was enabled with, so the pass writes only to an empty path | ❌ read when the account comes up; an account whose passphrase lands later turns backup on at the next daemon start | | `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix-recovery/<account>` | `swarm-controller`, a random passphrase per account | the agent | ❌ never replaced: the account's key backup opens only with this passphrase | ❌ read when the account comes up |
| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-token` | `swarm-matrix-ctl`, inside the `hive-matrix` container, once | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate | ❌ `swarm-matrix-ctl` mints it once; the container keeps its copy and republishes it when the store's differs | ✅ the controller reads it on every five-minute matrix pass | | `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-token` | `swarm-matrix-ctl` in `hive-matrix`, once | `swarm-controller` | ❌ minted once | ✅ read every 5 minutes |
| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/oidc/client` | authelia, at its first boot; `swarm-secret-publish` copies it in | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate, at start and on refusal | ❌ authelia mints it once. A re-mint is republished by `swarm-secret-publish`'s path unit | ✅ read at start and held in memory; read again when authelia refuses it, at most once per backoff of 5 s doubling to 5 min while the store holds the refused value | | `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/oidc/client` | authelia, first boot | `swarm-controller` | ❌ minted once; `swarm-secret-publish` republishes a re-mint | ✅ re-read when authelia refuses it |
| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/forge/token` | the forge's `forgejo-swarm-controller-account`, in the `hive-forge` container, once, under the forge publisher's certificate with a write-only grant; it then revokes its earlier tokens | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate, at start and on refusal | ❌ the forge mints it once and keeps only the token's name in the container, at `/var/lib/forgejo/swarm-controller-token-name`; deleting that file mints a new token on the unit's next start | ✅ the controller reads it at start, and in the background with backoff until it first finds it. When the forge answers 401 it reads it again and sends the request once more with the new token, at most once per backoff of 5 s doubling to 5 min while the store holds the refused value | | `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/forge/token` | the forge, once | `swarm-controller` | ❌ minted once; delete `/var/lib/forgejo/swarm-controller-token-name` in the forge container to mint a new one | ✅ re-read on a 401 |
| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/grafana/token` | `swarm-bao-grafana-controller-token` on Grafana's host, under Grafana's certificate: a token for the `swarm-controller` Viewer service account, minted with Grafana's admin password | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate, on the first `/api/alerts` request and again when Grafana refuses it | ✅ a timer starts the unit again 10 minutes after each run; it keeps a stored token Grafana accepts, and mints a new one when Grafana answers 401 or the store holds none | ✅ the controller holds the token in memory; when Grafana answers 401 it reads the store once more and retries the request | | `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/grafana/token` | `swarm-bao-grafana-controller-token` on Grafana's host | `swarm-controller` | ✅ every 10 minutes, when Grafana refuses it or none is stored | ✅ re-read on a 401 |
| `swarm/agents/<agent>/bao-mtls` | the store's agent PKI mount (`deploy.bao.agentPkiMountPath`), which generates the key, at `swarm-controller`'s request at agent creation | `hive-c0re`, under the hive's own certificate, when it writes the agent's container config; then `hive-agent-bao-identity` in the agent container, under the leaf it holds | ✅ `swarm-controller`'s five-minute pass re-issues a live agent's leaf once it's past half its validity (45 of 90 days, read from the certificate itself) | ✅ `hive-agent-bao-identity` re-reads it every 10 minutes and swaps a new leaf into `/run/hive-agent-bao-identity/`, which every store login in the container presents. It reads under the leaf it holds, so it renews only while that leaf is valid | | `swarm/agents/<agent>/bao-mtls` | the store's agent PKI mount (`deploy.bao.agentPkiMountPath`), at agent creation | `hive-c0re`, then the agent | ✅ re-issued every 5 minutes once past half its 90-day validity | ✅ the agent re-reads every 10 minutes; it renews only while its current leaf is valid |
| `swarm/agents/<agent>/queue` | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation | `hive-agent` in the agent container, under the agent's own certificate, held in memory — the identity it presents to the swarm queue, naming that one agent rather than its hive; `swarm-logs` and `swarm-metrics` in the agent container, under the same certificate, on every query, as the bearer they present at the log and metrics stores; `swarm-nats-auth` and `swarm-logs-auth`, each under its own certificate, and `swarm-metrics-agent-auth` under `swarm-metrics-auth`'s, to check a presented secret | ✅ `swarm-controller`'s five-minute pass re-mints a live agent's secret once it's 45 days old by `minted_at` on the stored object; a secret with no `minted_at` gets one stamped, value unchanged. The pass skips agents declared `Destroyed` — declaring an agent destroyed deletes every version of the path instead, the undo of the mint rather than another one | ✅ `hive-agent` reads the path before its first connect and again on every reconnect attempt, so a reconnect after a re-mint presents the new secret. An open connection keeps the secret it connected with for at most an hour, until the server closes it at its user JWT's expiry; after a revocation the agent keeps retrying under the queue client's backoff. `swarm-logs` and `swarm-metrics` read it on every query and once more after a 401. `swarm-logs-auth` keeps granting a secret it verified for `deploy.victorialogs.authVerdictTtl` (60 s by default) without reading the path, so a replaced or deleted secret still works at the log store for up to that long; `swarm-metrics-agent-auth` likewise at the metrics store, for `deploy.victoriametrics.agentAuthVerdictTtl` | | `swarm/agents/<agent>/queue` | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation | the agent; the queue, log and metrics auth services | ✅ re-minted at 45 days; skipped for `Destroyed` agents, whose path is deleted | ✅ read on every reconnect; an open connection keeps the old secret for up to an hour; the log and metrics stores honour a replaced secret for up to `deploy.victorialogs.authVerdictTtl` and `deploy.victoriametrics.agentAuthVerdictTtl` (60 s by default) |
| `swarm/agents/<agent>/forge-token` | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation and in a pass every 5 minutes over every agent with a store identity | the agent container itself, under its own certificate, fetched to `/run/hive-agent-forge-token/token` | ✅ the controller re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes) | ✅ the agent re-fetches on a 10-minute timer | | `swarm/agents/<agent>/forge-token` | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation and every 5 minutes | the agent | ✅ when missing or no longer matching the forge | ✅ every 10 minutes |
| `swarm/agents/<agent>/forge/<label>` | `swarm-controller`, when an operator links an external forge account in the swarm UI | `hive-agent-forge-accounts` in the agent container, under the agent's own certificate, into `<state>/forge-<label>-token` and `forge-<label>.json` | ❌ an operator's token; replaced only by deleting it and linking the label again | ✅ the agent re-fetches on a 2-minute timer | | `swarm/agents/<agent>/forge/<label>` | `swarm-controller`, when you link an external forge account in the swarm UI | the agent | ❌ your token; delete it and link the label again | ✅ every 2 minutes |
| `swarm/agents/<agent>/github-token` | `swarm-controller`, when an operator links a GitHub account in the swarm UI | `hive-agent-github-token` in the agent container, under the agent's own certificate, into `<state>/github-token` | ❌ an operator's token; replaced only by deleting it and linking it again | ✅ the agent re-fetches on a 2-minute timer, and `hive-github-notify` re-reads the file on every poll | | `swarm/agents/<agent>/github-token` | `swarm-controller`, when you link a GitHub account in the swarm UI | the agent | ❌ your token; delete it and link again | ✅ every 2 minutes |
| `swarm/agents/<agent>/claude-credentials` | `swarm-claude-login`, under its own certificate, when an operator logs the agent in from its card in the swarm UI; a new version per login | `hive-agent` in the agent container, under the agent's own certificate, into `~/.claude/.credentials.json`, only while the agent waits for a login and only a version newer than the one it installed last | ❌ an operator's login; a relogin writes a new version | ✅ the waiting agent reads the store every 30 seconds | | `swarm/agents/<agent>/claude-credentials` | `swarm-claude-login`, when you log the agent in from its card; one version per login | the agent, while it waits for a login | ❌ log in again | ✅ every 30 seconds while waiting |
| `swarm/hives/<hive>/matrix/sender-token` | `swarm-controller`, with the swarm's appservice token, for every hive in its directory in a five-minute pass | `swarm-controller` under its own certificate, before it decides whether to mint, and hive-c0re's `stored_sender_token()`, under the hive's own certificate | ✅ the controller's pass re-mints when the stored token is missing, unknown to the homeserver, or someone else's | ✅ hive-c0re's matrix sweep reads the store every run and overwrites its token file when the store's token differs | | `swarm/hives/<hive>/matrix/sender-token` | `swarm-controller`, every 5 minutes | `swarm-controller` and the hive | ✅ when missing or rejected by the homeserver | ✅ the hive re-reads on every sweep |
| `swarm/hives/<hive>/forge/token` | `swarm-controller`, with the forge's admin API, for every hive in its directory in a five-minute pass | `swarm-controller` under its own certificate, before it decides whether to mint, and hive-c0re's `forge::reader_token()`, under the hive's own certificate | ✅ the controller's pass re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes) | ✅ hive-c0re reads the store on every forge read | | `swarm/hives/<hive>/forge/token` | `swarm-controller`, every 5 minutes | `swarm-controller` and the hive | ✅ when missing or no longer matching the forge | ✅ read on every forge call |
| `swarm/hives/<hive>/queue/agent` | authelia | `swarm-bao-queue-agent` on the hive's host, under its own per-hive certificate; no agent's policy reaches it | must be stated | must be stated | | `swarm/hives/<hive>/queue/agent` | authelia | `swarm-bao-queue-agent` on the hive's host | must be stated | must be stated |
| `swarm/hives/<hive>/oidc/client` | authelia, at its first boot; `swarm-secret-publish` copies it in | hive-c0re, under the hive's own certificate, when it first connects to the queue | ❌ authelia mints it once. A re-mint is republished by `swarm-secret-publish`'s path unit | ✅ read until the first connect succeeds, retried with a backoff of up to five minutes while it's missing; then held in memory and read again when authelia refuses it | | `swarm/hives/<hive>/oidc/client` | authelia, first boot; `swarm-secret-publish` copies it in | the hive | ❌ minted once; `swarm-secret-publish` republishes a re-mint | ✅ re-read when authelia refuses it |
| `swarm/services/<clientId>/oidc/client` | authelia | that service's own reader, under its own certificate — the queue responder's under `swarm-nats-auth`'s, the homeserver's under `swarm-matrix-ctl`'s, the forge's under `swarm-forge-publisher`'s, the review classifier's under `swarm-review-classifier`'s, the notification router's under `swarm-notify-router`'s, the CI runner's, Grafana's, the log store's, the metrics store's, the forge's and the homeserver's journal forwarders' under `swarm-ci-runner`'s, `swarm-grafana-oidc`'s, `swarm-logs-auth`'s, `swarm-metrics-auth`'s, `swarm-forge-publisher`'s and `swarm-matrix-ctl`'s, authelia's journal forwarder's under `swarm-secret-publisher`'s; the bao UI's by the store's granter | must be stated | must be stated | | `swarm/services/<clientId>/oidc/client` | authelia | that service | must be stated | must be stated |
| `swarm/services/ci-runner/registration-token` | `swarm-controller`, from the forge's admin API, at start and in a five-minute pass; its grant on the path is write-only | `swarm-bao-ci-runner` on the runner's host, under the runner's own certificate, into a file under the host's `/run` that only `swarm-ci-runner-register` in the runner's container loads; no other principal's policy reads it | ❌ the forge hands out one token until an admin resets it; the controller writes a reset token within five minutes | ✅ `swarm-bao-ci-runner` reads it at boot, on deploy and every ten minutes, and restarts the runner when the value changed | | `swarm/services/ci-runner/registration-token` | `swarm-controller`, from the forge, at start and every 5 minutes | `swarm-bao-ci-runner` on the runner's host | ❌ the forge keeps one token until an admin resets it; the controller then writes the new one within 5 minutes | ✅ every 10 minutes; restarts the runner on a change |
| `swarm/services/<grafana client id>/metrics/bearer` | `swarm-bao-grafana-metrics-bearer` on Grafana's host, under Grafana's certificate, when the store holds none | `swarm-metrics-auth` on the metrics store's host, under its own certificate, at most once a minute (every three seconds while the store fails), to check the bearer Grafana's datasource presents at the store's read API, and `swarm-logs-grafana-auth` on the log store's host, under `swarm-logs-auth`'s certificate, to check the same bearer at the log store's query API | ❌ nothing re-mints it; an operator deletes it and restarts `swarm-bao-grafana-metrics-bearer` | ✅ `swarm-metrics-auth` reads it again once its copy is a minute old. ❌ Grafana reads its file copy only as it starts; the bearer unit restarts Grafana when the copy changes | | `swarm/services/<grafana client id>/metrics/bearer` | `swarm-bao-grafana-metrics-bearer` on Grafana's host, when none is stored | `swarm-metrics-auth` and `swarm-logs-grafana-auth` | ❌ delete it and restart `swarm-bao-grafana-metrics-bearer` | ✅ the auth services re-read within a minute; ❌ Grafana restarts when its copy changes |
| `swarm/services/review-classifier/anthropic-api-key` | the operator, by hand in the store's UI, field `api_key` | `swarm-review-classifier` in its container, under its own certificate, at the start of every API key run; held for that run and handed to `claude`'s environment only; no other principal's policy reads it | ❌ an operator's key; replaced by writing a new one | ✅ read on every run, so a written or removed key takes effect on the next run | | `swarm/services/review-classifier/anthropic-api-key` | you, in the store's UI, field `api_key` | `swarm-review-classifier` | ❌ write a new key | ✅ read on every run |
| `swarm/services/review-classifier/acp-provider` | the operator, by hand in the store's UI, field `api_key` | `swarm-review-classifier` in its container, under its own certificate, at the start of every ACP run; held for that run and handed to `opencode`'s environment only; no other principal's policy reads it | ❌ an operator's key; replaced by writing a new one | ✅ read on every run, so a written or removed key takes effect on the next run | | `swarm/services/review-classifier/acp-provider` | you, in the store's UI, field `api_key` | `swarm-review-classifier` | ❌ write a new key | ✅ read on every run |
| `swarm/services/review-classifier/forge/token` | `swarm-controller`, with the forge's admin API, for its `review-classifier` account, at start and in a five-minute pass; the secret publisher's policy denies it | `swarm-controller` under its own certificate, before it decides whether to mint, and on every review it posts as the account; the classifier service's policy doesn't read it | ✅ the controller's pass re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes) | ✅ the controller reads the store on every review it posts | | `swarm/services/review-classifier/forge/token` | `swarm-controller`, at start and every 5 minutes | `swarm-controller` | ✅ when missing or no longer matching the forge | ✅ read on every review |
| `swarm/services/builder/forge/token` | `swarm-controller`, with the forge's admin API, for its `builder` account (read on every config repo through the `hives` team), at start and in a five-minute pass; the secret publisher's policy denies it | `swarm-builder` in its container, under its own certificate, on every build; held for that build and handed to `git` through the environment only; `swarm-controller` under its own certificate, before it decides whether to mint | ✅ the controller's pass re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes) | ✅ the builder reads the store on every build | | `swarm/services/builder/forge/token` | `swarm-controller`, at start and every 5 minutes | `swarm-builder`, `swarm-controller` | ✅ when missing or no longer matching the forge | ✅ read on every build |
| `swarm/services/ci-metrics/forge/token` | `swarm-controller`, with the forge's admin API, for its `ci-metrics` account (read on the Actions unit of every organisation's repos through a `ci-metrics` team in each), at start and in a five-minute pass; the secret publisher's policy denies it | `swarm-ci-metrics` on its host, under its own certificate, once per pass; `swarm-controller` under its own certificate, before it decides whether to mint | ✅ the controller's pass re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes) | ✅ the poller reads the store on every pass | | `swarm/services/ci-metrics/forge/token` | `swarm-controller`, at start and every 5 minutes | `swarm-ci-metrics`, `swarm-controller` | ✅ when missing or no longer matching the forge | ✅ read on every pass |
| _(not in the store)_ a hive's mTLS leaf | the store's own PKI, or an operator placing it by hand | its own client, off disk — the exception above, because it's what makes every other row's pull possible | must be stated | must be stated | | _(not in the store)_ a hive's mTLS leaf | the store's PKI, or you by hand | the hive itself, from disk | must be stated | must be stated |
<!-- vale write-good.Passive = YES --> <!-- vale write-good.Passive = YES -->
**Two rows share the `matrix/` prefix and have different minters, on The name `main` belongs to the swarm's own homeserver account, which the
purpose.** An agent's `main` account is on the swarm's own homeserver, and controller mints, so the controller rejects any account you link under it.
`swarm-controller` creates it with the swarm's appservice token. Every other
account under that prefix is somewhere else entirely, and an operator hands
the controller a credential for it. The operator-facing route refuses the
name `main` for exactly this reason: two writers, one name, and that refusal
is what keeps them apart.
**The swarm's appservice token sits under `controller/`, the one kind no
hive's policy reads.** Its sender is the homeserver's admin. Under
`agents/`, `hives/` or `services/` every hive could read it. matrix-ctl may
write and read that one leaf; the controller may only read it.
**An agent's mTLS leaf is in the store; a hive's isn't, and the difference
isn't an inconsistency.** The rule the exception protects is that nothing
can fetch from the store the credential it would need in order to fetch. A
hive's leaf is that credential, so it can only come off disk. The _hive_,
which already holds one, reads an agent's — so publishing it costs nothing
and buys the property this page asks for: the swarm mints it, the hive only
carries it, and no hive ever needs the capability to mint an identity.
`swarm-controller` proves the leaf it publishes before the creation job
reports success, by logging in with it and reading the row back.
`swarm-controller` checks every forge token itself: it looks at every agent `swarm-controller` checks every forge token itself: it looks at every agent
that has a store identity at start and every five minutes. For any whose that has a store identity at start and every five minutes. For any whose
@ -127,88 +78,19 @@ the swarm UI.
⚠️ **Re-create existing agents before deploying a hive-side change that makes a ⚠️ **Re-create existing agents before deploying a hive-side change that makes a
container require a credential it may not have.** A container whose store container require a credential it may not have.** A container whose store
identity is absent doesn't start (`nix/agent-modules/bao.nix` exits 1), so identity is absent doesn't start, so create the identities first, setting any
create the identities first, setting any newly paused agent `up` as above. newly paused agent `up` as above.
**Revoking an agent's queue credential.** Declaring an agent `destroyed` — **Revoking an agent's queue credential.** Declaring an agent `destroyed` —
`PUT /api/hives/{hive}/agents/{agent}/state` — deletes `PUT /api/hives/{hive}/agents/{agent}/state` — deletes
`swarm/agents/<agent>/queue` and every version it ever held, right after the `swarm/agents/<agent>/queue` and every version it held. An open queue
declaration lands. The credential is a bearer secret, so a soft delete would connection closes within an hour. An agent recreated under the same name gets a
leave the same value readable at an older version number; the controller fresh secret. It leaves the agent's mTLS leaf alone. If the store refuses the
removes the path's metadata, which takes the versions with it. delete, `swarm-controller` logs an `error` naming the agent and the teardown
continues; declare the agent destroyed again to re-run the revocation.
The revocation reaches an open queue connection within an hour. The user JWT A failed store login retries every 30 seconds for a day. When a later attempt
`swarm-nats-auth` issues at connect expires an hour after issue, nats-server lands a changed value, the service that loaded it restarts. If the fetch unit
then closes the connection, and the reconnect presents a secret the store no can't compare file times it logs `cannot compare the mtime of <path> … —
longer holds. leaving <unit> as it is` at `err`, and the service keeps the old value until
the next timer tick.
An agent recreated under the same name draws a fresh secret, because the
mint keeps an existing value only when it finds one at that path
(`agent_identity::mint_and_verify`, step 3) and the revocation left nothing
to find.
Two things this deliberately doesn't do. It doesn't touch the agent's mTLS
leaf, its ACL document or its cert-auth role — the mint rewrites all three on
every run, so a re-created agent gets new ones regardless. And it doesn't
fail the destroy: the declaration is already published by the time the
revocation runs, so a store that refuses the delete gets a `swarm-controller`
log line at `error` naming the agent, and the teardown continues. Declare the
agent destroyed again to re-run the revocation.
**Who reads that row, and what happens to it.** `hive-c0re` reads it every
time it writes an agent's container configuration
(`lifecycle::agent_identity`), stages the certificate and its key `0600`
outside every bind-mounted tree, and passes both to the container as systemd
credentials — the same mechanism, and for the same mode reason, as the
per-hive queue secret. A bind mount would hand the agent's unprivileged user
a file it lacks the rights to open; the container manager reads a credential
as root and re-exposes it under the consuming unit's own user.
Inside the container, `hive-agent-bao-identity.service` logs in with that
certificate and reads this row back before reporting success, so an agent
locked out of its own identity says so at boot rather than at whichever pull
needed the store first. It keeps a live copy of the pair in `/run/hive-agent-bao-identity/`,
which every unit in the container that logs in to the store presents, and
re-runs every 10 minutes: a leaf the controller re-issued replaces that copy
once a login with it succeeds. The unit exists whenever
`services.hyperhive.agent.bao.addr` has a value, which the hive's meta flake
sets from its own store address — the same all-or-nothing gate the per-hive
queue credential beside it uses, and the reason the delivery above never lands
in a container with nothing to read it. It fails loudly where the hive-side
readers treat a missing value as a normal state, which is deliberate: a
missing queue secret means a swarm whose publisher has yet to run, while a
refused certificate means an agent that believes it reaches the store and
never does.
Both kinds of unit retry a failed login every 30 seconds for a day
(`nix/host-modules/lib/store-retry.nix`). A unit ordered after one waits for a
single attempt, not for the retries: an attempt that fails ends that start, so
the dependent starts with whatever is already on disk. When a later attempt
lands a changed value, the homeserver, Grafana and collector readers restart
the service that loaded it (`nix/host-modules/lib/refresh-consumer.nix`).
When the fetch unit can't read the credential file's mtime or the service's start time, it logs `cannot compare the mtime of <path> … — leaving <unit> as it is` at `err` in its own journal, and the service keeps running on the old value until the next timer tick.
## Progressive enhancement
New functionality has to match this shape immediately — no PR introducing a
credential gets a pass on any of the rules below. A PR can move existing
functionality step by step, as long as each individual step moves toward the
target shape; a step that doesn't isn't allowed just because it's existing.
A pull request that touches a credential can't:
- add a minter outside the swarm's existing mint path
- persist a store-provided secret to disk — a state directory, a bind mount,
a rendered config
- add a credential whose renewal strategy is `NONE` — state the strategy,
even if it's "operator reissues and restarts the reader"
- read a secret on another principal's behalf and hand it over — the
principal that needs the value authenticates for it
- give a host or container an out-of-band credential that isn't the store
mTLS leaf — one out-of-band credential per principal is the whole point of
the store
While the swarm's credential path is still moving to this shape, a PR that
moves a secret into bao may leave its renewal strategy unresolved, provided
it opens a follow-up issue to settle renewal. That's a migration-era
allowance, not a standing exception to the renewal-strategy rule above.