agent ui: answer questions inline from the per-agent page

loose-ends question rows get a textarea + send button; the operator
answers as operator by POSTing to the core dashboard's
/answer-question route, not the per-agent socket — keeps the
operator-authority path off the agent's own socket. cross-origin POST
needs a CORS shim on that route for now; drops out once the gateway
makes the page same-origin.

also splits deployment/ops/boundaries/gateway work into TODO-ops.md.
This commit is contained in:
müde 2026-05-20 10:01:12 +02:00
parent f8795dc029
commit 56e7eb6e73
5 changed files with 221 additions and 8 deletions

119
TODO-ops.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
# Hyperhive — deployment, ops & boundaries
Tracking the deployment-shape + operational-hardening work:
container network isolation, the unifying gateway, the
operator-vs-agent trust boundary, and process privilege
separation.
These items interlock. Today "the operator surface" and "the
agent surface" are a *convention*, not a boundary — nothing
stops a container from curling the core daemon on
`localhost:<port>`, or another agent's web UI. The gateway,
network isolation, and privsep together turn that convention
into an enforced boundary. Sequencing matters; see the order at
the bottom.
## The boundary we're building toward
Two principals, two paths:
- **Operator** — reaches every UI (the dashboard + every
per-agent page) through the gateway, on one origin.
Operator-authority actions (approve / deny, answer-as-operator,
lifecycle POSTs) are served by the core daemon and only
reachable via the gateway.
- **Agent** — speaks only for itself, only over its per-agent
unix socket. The socket's identity *is* the agent (see
`docs/conventions.md`, "identity = socket"). An agent must not
be able to reach the core daemon's HTTP surface, another
agent's socket, or another agent's web UI.
Design rule that falls out of this: **operator-authority
actions never get a per-agent-socket entry point.** They live on
the core backend. Worked example — answering an
operator-targeted question is a `POST /answer-question/{id}` on
the core dashboard, *never* an `AgentRequest` variant. If it
were a per-agent-socket request, an agent could `curl` its own
socket and spoof an operator answer. The per-agent web UI POSTs
cross-origin to the core for these (see the inline-answer
feature — the loose-ends section on each agent page).
## Workstreams
### 1. Container network isolation
Today containers share the host network namespace, so a
container can reach `localhost:<core-port>`, the dashboard, and
every other agent's web port. **Until this changes, nothing
below is actually enforced** — the operator/agent split is on
the honour system.
- Give each container a private veth / bridge with no route to
the host's loopback-bound services.
- The per-agent unix socket stays the only host-bound channel
(it already is the intended one).
- Open question: the per-agent web UI still needs to be
reachable *by the operator's browser* — that is what the
gateway is for (below). The container itself should not be
able to reach the gateway or the core daemon.
### 2. Unifying gateway / reverse proxy
(Moved here from TODO.md "Dashboard".)
Today every agent's web UI is reached at
`<host>:<per-agent-port>/`, so operators juggle a port list.
Stand up nginx (or similar) terminating one domain that fans
requests to `/agent/<name>/...` out to each container's web
port, and `/` to the main dashboard. Touches: a NixOS module on
the host, the dashboard's per-agent link rendering, and the
per-agent web server's base-path handling (currently assumes
root). Lets bookmarks survive port reshuffles and unblocks
per-agent stats links being relative URLs instead of hard-coded
ports.
Boundary payoff: once the dashboard and the per-agent pages are
same-origin behind the gateway, the cross-origin CORS shim on
`POST /answer-question/{id}` (added with the inline-answer
feature) can be deleted — the per-agent page's POST becomes a
plain same-origin request. Grep for `with_cors` /
`Access-Control-Allow-Origin` in `hive-c0re/src/dashboard.rs`
and remove it when this lands.
The gateway is also the natural home for auth, if/when the
operator surface ever needs it.
### 3. Privsep the core daemon from the web UI
(Moved here from TODO.md "Security".)
hive-c0re runs as root (it has to — `nixos-container` create /
start / destroy, the meta git repo, every per-agent bind
mount). The HTTP server lives in the same process, so every
read-endpoint (`/api/state-file`, `/api/journal/{name}`,
`/api/agent-config/{name}`) is one allow-list bug away from
serving arbitrary host files. Split it: keep the privileged
daemon doing lifecycle + git + ipc, run the web UI as an
unprivileged user that talks to the daemon over a unix socket
with a narrow request surface (`ReadAgentStateFile { agent,
rel_path }` etc.). The unprivileged process can't read
`/etc/shadow` even if every check in `get_state_file` is
bypassed — it doesn't have the bits. Container-lifecycle POSTs
(`/restart`, `/destroy`, etc.) become forwarded RPCs the
privileged side authorises on its terms.
Cheaper once the harness/state split lands (see TODO.md "Split
harness-internal state from agent-visible state") — the
unprivileged web server then only needs read access to
`/agents/<n>/state/`, not `/agents/<n>/harness/`.
## Suggested sequencing
1. **Gateway** first — pure ergonomics win, unblocks
same-origin, no behavioural risk.
2. **Network isolation** next — the step that makes the
operator/agent boundary *real*. Everything before it is
honour-system.
3. **Privsep** last — defence in depth on the core process
itself; valuable independent of the other two, but the
biggest refactor.

View file

@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
> for the operator is not. Use that as a hint when picking up items,
> not a hard rule.
**Deployment / ops / boundaries:** the unifying gateway, container
network isolation, the operator-vs-agent trust boundary, and process
privsep are tracked separately in [`TODO-ops.md`](TODO-ops.md).
## Architecture / Features
- Shared space for all agents to access documents/files without manager routing
@ -23,13 +27,8 @@
## Dashboard
- **Unified URL scheme via reverse proxy**: today every agent's web UI is reached at `<host>:<per-agent-port>/`, so operators juggle a port list. Stand up nginx (or similar) terminating one domain that fans requests to `/agent/<name>/...` out to each container's web port, and to `/` for the main dashboard. Touches: a NixOS module on the host, the dashboard's per-agent link rendering, and the per-agent web server's base-path handling (currently assumes root). Lets bookmarks survive port reshuffles and unblocks per-agent stats links being relative URLs instead of hard-coded ports.
- **Delivered-reminder rollup on the per-agent stats page**: surface attempt / success / failure counts for reminders this agent fired (in the existing `/stats` page). Needs an `AgentRequest::ReminderRollup { since_secs }` / matching `ManagerRequest::ReminderRollup` RPC so the agent can pull the counts from the host's broker DB (the reminders table is host-owned; agent state doesn't have them). Deferred from the initial stats page so the first cut stays self-contained to data the agent already owns.
## Security
- **Privsep the dashboard from the privileged daemon**: hive-c0re runs as root (it has to — `nixos-container` create / start / destroy, the meta git repo, every per-agent bind mount). The HTTP server lives in the same process, so every read-endpoint (`/api/state-file`, `/api/journal/{name}`, `/api/agent-config/{name}`) is one allow-list bug away from serving arbitrary host files. Split the architecture: keep the privileged daemon doing lifecycle + git + ipc, run the web UI as an unprivileged user that talks to the daemon over a unix socket with a narrow request surface (`ReadAgentStateFile { agent, rel_path }` etc.). The unprivileged process can't read `/etc/shadow` even if every check in `get_state_file` is bypassed — it doesn't have the bits. Container-lifecycle POSTs (`/restart`, `/destroy`, etc.) become forwarded RPCs the privileged side authorises on its terms.
## Harness Ergonomics (agent-side wishlist)
Filed by damocles, who actually lives in this thing. Loosely ranked by

View file

@ -151,6 +151,42 @@ pre.diff {
.agent-inbox .inbox-sep { color: var(--muted); }
.agent-inbox .inbox-body { color: var(--fg); white-space: pre-wrap; word-break: break-word; }
.agent-inbox .answer-form {
grid-column: 1 / -1;
display: flex;
gap: 0.4em;
align-items: flex-start;
margin-top: 0.25em;
}
.agent-inbox .answer-form textarea {
flex: 1;
font-family: inherit;
font-size: inherit;
background: var(--bg);
color: var(--fg);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: 3px;
padding: 0.3em;
resize: vertical;
}
.agent-inbox .answer-form button {
font-family: inherit;
font-size: inherit;
background: var(--bg-elev);
color: var(--fg);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: 3px;
padding: 0.3em 0.7em;
cursor: pointer;
white-space: nowrap;
}
.agent-inbox .answer-form button:hover:not(:disabled) {
border-color: var(--purple);
color: var(--purple);
}
.agent-inbox .answer-form button:disabled { opacity: 0.5; cursor: default; }
.agent-inbox .answer-status { color: var(--muted); align-self: center; }
.last-turn {
color: var(--muted);
font-size: 0.8em;

View file

@ -22,6 +22,12 @@
return e;
};
// Base URL of the host dashboard (core backend). Set once the first
// /api/state lands. Operator-authority actions (answering a question
// as the operator) POST here rather than to this agent's own socket —
// see TODO-ops.md for why the boundary lives on the core side.
let dashboardBase = '';
// ─── async-form submit (shared with dashboard) ──────────────────────────
document.addEventListener('submit', async (e) => {
const f = e.target;
@ -68,6 +74,7 @@
// ↑ DASHB04RD — back-link to the host dashboard. Opens in a new
// tab to keep the agent page anchored where the operator is.
const dashUrl = `${location.protocol}//${location.hostname}:${dashboardPort}/`;
dashboardBase = dashUrl;
title.append(
el('a', {
href: dashUrl, target: '_blank', rel: 'noopener',
@ -454,6 +461,7 @@
el('span', { class: 'inbox-sep' }, t.asker + ' → ' + target), ' ',
el('span', { class: 'inbox-ts' }, fmtAge(t.age_seconds || 0) + ' ago'),
el('div', { class: 'inbox-body' }, t.question || ''),
buildAnswerForm(t.id),
);
} else if (t.kind === 'reminder') {
// due_at is an absolute unix-seconds value; show time-until-fire
@ -474,6 +482,42 @@
}
}
// Inline "answer as operator" form for a question loose-end. POSTs to
// the host dashboard (core backend), never this agent's socket — the
// core is the only place that can stamp `operator` as the answerer.
function buildAnswerForm(id) {
const wrap = el('div', { class: 'answer-form' });
const ta = el('textarea', { rows: '2', placeholder: 'answer as operator…' });
const btn = el('button', { type: 'button' }, 'send answer');
const status = el('span', { class: 'answer-status' });
btn.addEventListener('click', async () => {
const answer = ta.value.trim();
if (!answer) { status.textContent = 'answer required'; return; }
if (!dashboardBase) { status.textContent = 'dashboard url unknown'; return; }
btn.disabled = true;
status.textContent = 'sending…';
try {
const resp = await fetch(dashboardBase + 'answer-question/' + id, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
body: 'answer=' + encodeURIComponent(answer),
});
if (resp.ok) {
status.textContent = 'answered ✓';
refreshLooseEnds();
} else {
status.textContent = 'failed: ' + (await resp.text());
btn.disabled = false;
}
} catch (err) {
status.textContent = 'failed: ' + err;
btn.disabled = false;
}
});
wrap.append(ta, btn, status);
return wrap;
}
function renderInbox(rows) {
const root = $('inbox-section');
const list = $('inbox-list');

View file

@ -759,6 +759,20 @@ struct AnswerForm {
answer: String,
}
/// Attach a permissive CORS header so the per-agent web UI — served on
/// a different port — can POST an operator answer here and read the
/// result. The dashboard has no auth, so `*` exposes nothing a plain
/// cross-origin form-POST couldn't already reach. This shim disappears
/// once the unifying gateway makes the agent page same-origin; see
/// `TODO-ops.md`.
fn with_cors(mut resp: Response) -> Response {
resp.headers_mut().insert(
axum::http::header::ACCESS_CONTROL_ALLOW_ORIGIN,
axum::http::HeaderValue::from_static("*"),
);
resp
}
async fn post_answer_question(
State(state): State<AppState>,
AxumPath(id): AxumPath<i64>,
@ -766,9 +780,9 @@ async fn post_answer_question(
) -> Response {
let answer = form.answer.trim();
if answer.is_empty() {
return error_response("answer: required");
return with_cors(error_response("answer: required"));
}
match state
let resp = match state
.coord
.questions
.answer(id, answer, hive_sh4re::OPERATOR_RECIPIENT)
@ -794,7 +808,8 @@ async fn post_answer_question(
(StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response()
}
Err(e) => error_response(&format!("answer {id} failed: {e:#}")),
}
};
with_cors(resp)
}
/// Resolve a pending operator question with a sentinel answer when