diff --git a/nix/host-modules/swarm-authelia.nix b/nix/host-modules/swarm-authelia.nix
index 4ca3e807..fd047d03 100644
--- a/nix/host-modules/swarm-authelia.nix
+++ b/nix/host-modules/swarm-authelia.nix
@@ -75,6 +75,102 @@ let
     "storage-encryption"
   ]
   ++ lib.optional oidcEnabled "oidc-hmac";
+
+  # Per-client material lives beside the rest of authelia's state, one
+  # file per half: the relying party needs the PLAINTEXT, authelia keeps
+  # only a DIGEST. Splitting them is what lets the clients file below be
+  # re-rendered on every boot from a secret that was minted once.
+  clientsDir = "${stateDir}/oidc-clients";
+  clientsFile = "${stateDir}/oidc-clients.yml";
+
+  # Rendered at RUNTIME, not evaluated: the digest is read from disk by
+  # the script, so nothing secret ever enters a nix expression (and
+  # therefore the store). Everything else here is public metadata that
+  # nix is the right place for.
+  renderClient = c: ''
+    printf -- '      - client_id: %s\n' ${lib.escapeShellArg c.id}
+    printf -- '        client_name: %s\n' ${lib.escapeShellArg c.description}
+    printf -- "        client_secret: '%s'\n" "$(cat ${lib.escapeShellArg "${clientsDir}/${c.id}.digest"})"
+    printf -- '        authorization_policy: one_factor\n'
+    printf -- '        scopes: [openid, profile, email, groups]\n'
+    printf -- '        redirect_uris:\n'
+    ${lib.concatMapStrings (u: ''
+      printf -- '          - %s\n' ${lib.escapeShellArg u}
+    '') c.redirectUris}
+  '';
+
+  # The OIDC half of the first-boot generator, kept out of the script
+  # body so neither is read through the other's indentation.
+  oidcGenScript = lib.optionalString oidcEnabled ''
+    # The issuer key is the one secret here that is NOT interchangeable
+    # with a random blob: it *signs* id tokens, and every relying party
+    # verifies them against the public half served at `/jwks.json`. A
+    # symmetric secret cannot do that, so this one is an RSA pair.
+    #
+    # Rotating it invalidates every token already issued, which is why
+    # it is generated once and left alone — same reason as the session
+    # and storage keys above.
+    issuer=${lib.escapeShellArg stateDir}/oidc-issuer.key
+    if [ ! -s "$issuer" ]; then
+      openssl genrsa -out "$issuer" 4096
+      echo "generated $issuer"
+    fi
+    chmod 0600 "$issuer"
+
+    # Each client's secret, minted once and kept as two files: the
+    # plaintext its relying party authenticates with, and the digest
+    # authelia compares against. The two live in different containers,
+    # so neither side can generate it alone — this is the only place
+    # that sees both.
+    #
+    # `--random` is why no plaintext ever reaches an argv: authelia
+    # generates the password itself and prints it beside its digest,
+    # so nothing has to be handed to a second process on a command
+    # line.
+    clients=${lib.escapeShellArg clientsDir}
+    mkdir -p "$clients"
+    chmod 0700 "$clients"
+
+    mint() {
+      sec="$clients/$1.secret"
+      dig="$clients/$1.digest"
+      if [ -s "$sec" ] && [ -s "$dig" ]; then
+        chmod 0600 "$sec" "$dig"
+        return
+      fi
+      out=$(authelia crypto hash generate pbkdf2 --variant sha512 --random)
+      printf '%s' "$out" | sed -n 's/^Random Password: *//p' > "$sec"
+      printf '%s' "$out" | sed -n 's/^Digest: *//p' > "$dig"
+      chmod 0600 "$sec" "$dig"
+      # Fail closed. An empty secret is a client that can never
+      # authenticate, and it surfaces three layers away as an opaque
+      # 401 from the token endpoint — refusing to start is by far the
+      # cheaper failure to diagnose.
+      if [ ! -s "$sec" ] || [ ! -s "$dig" ]; then
+        echo "authelia crypto hash generate produced no secret/digest for $1" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+      echo "minted client secret for $1"
+    }
+
+    ${lib.concatMapStrings (c: ''
+      mint ${lib.escapeShellArg c.id}
+    '') cfg.oidc.clients}
+
+    # Re-rendered every boot, deliberately: the secret is minted once,
+    # but the metadata around it (a new redirect URI, a renamed client)
+    # comes from nix and has to be able to change without disturbing
+    # the secret. Written through a temp file so a crash mid-write
+    # cannot leave authelia half a file to parse.
+    {
+      printf -- 'identity_providers:\n'
+      printf -- '  oidc:\n'
+      printf -- '    clients:\n'
+      ${lib.concatMapStrings renderClient cfg.oidc.clients}
+    } > ${lib.escapeShellArg "${clientsFile}.tmp"}
+    chmod 0600 ${lib.escapeShellArg "${clientsFile}.tmp"}
+    mv ${lib.escapeShellArg "${clientsFile}.tmp"} ${lib.escapeShellArg clientsFile}
+  '';
 in
 {
   options.services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia = {
@@ -318,7 +414,17 @@ in
             wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
             before = [ "${unitName}.service" ];
             requiredBy = [ "${unitName}.service" ];
-            path = [ pkgs.coreutils ] ++ lib.optional oidcEnabled pkgs.openssl;
+            # `cfg.package` is here for its CLI, not its daemon: the
+            # client secrets are minted with `authelia crypto hash
+            # generate`, which is the only way to produce a digest in
+            # the exact form authelia will later verify.
+            path = [
+              pkgs.coreutils
+            ]
+            ++ lib.optionals oidcEnabled [
+              pkgs.openssl
+              cfg.package
+            ];
             serviceConfig = {
               Type = "oneshot";
               RemainAfterExit = true;
@@ -344,23 +450,7 @@ in
                               fi
                               chmod 0600 "$p"
                             done
-              ${lib.optionalString oidcEnabled ''
-                # The issuer key is the one secret here that is NOT
-                # interchangeable with a random blob: it *signs* id
-                # tokens, and every relying party verifies them against
-                # the public half served at `/jwks.json`. A symmetric
-                # secret cannot do that, so this one is an RSA pair.
-                #
-                # Rotating it invalidates every token already issued,
-                # which is why it is generated once and left alone —
-                # same reason as the session and storage keys above.
-                issuer=${lib.escapeShellArg stateDir}/oidc-issuer.key
-                if [ ! -s "$issuer" ]; then
-                  openssl genrsa -out "$issuer" 4096
-                  echo "generated $issuer"
-                fi
-                chmod 0600 "$issuer"
-              ''}
+              ${oidcGenScript}
 
                             # A users database that exists and parses, with nobody in
                             # it. authelia refuses to start without one, and the
@@ -379,6 +469,13 @@ in
             enable = true;
             package = cfg.package;
 
+            # Merged at RUNTIME alongside the nix-generated config, which
+            # is the whole reason the client digests can exist at all:
+            # `settings` below is rendered into the world-readable nix
+            # store, and a client secret's digest may not go there.
+            # Empty (and inert) on a hive with no clients declared.
+            settingsFiles = lib.optional oidcEnabled clientsFile;
+
             secrets = {
               jwtSecretFile = "${stateDir}/jwt.key";
               sessionSecretFile = "${stateDir}/session.key";