matrix: back up agents' room keys with a controller-minted recovery passphrase
An agent's matrix encryption keys lived only in its local crypto store, so `destroy --purge` or a primary-account token reset lost every encrypted room's history with no way back (#5022). swarm-controller now mints a random passphrase (32 bytes from the kernel's CSPRNG, base64url) for every account listed under each agent's `matrix/` directory, at `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix-recovery/<account>`, in a five-minute pass. The write is a cas=0 create after a read; a path that holds anything is never replaced, and a create that loses a race counts as done. The controller's existing `data/swarm/agents/*` grant covers the write and the agent's own `agents/<agent>/*` read grant covers the read, so no policy changes. hive-matrix-daemon reads the passphrase when it brings an account up, after cross-signing: with no backup on the homeserver it enables recovery with it (backup + secret storage); with one there it recovers, which imports the backup key and the self-signing key, and room keys then download through `BackupDownloadStrategy::OneShot`. No passphrase yet logs at INFO and the account comes up without backup; any failure logs WARN and never stops the daemon. Recovery runs after `ensure_cross_signing`, not before: on a new account cross-signing must exist locally for `enable` to export it into secret storage, and on an existing identity `bootstrap_cross_signing_if_needed` is a no-op, leaving `recover` to import and sign. Part of #5022 (S1+S2, with the S4 docs).
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@ -16,7 +16,11 @@ keeps its state, purging it doesn't.**
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destroy --purge`) is `DESTR0Y` plus wiping all of it — config
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history, claude credentials, `/state/` notes, everything. **No
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undo.** Only reach for this when you actually want the agent gone
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for good.
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for good. The agent's matrix encryption keys go with the state dir,
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but an account whose key backup is on (see
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[matrix](../integrations/matrix.md)) gets them back from its
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homeserver when it next comes up, so its encrypted history stays
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readable.
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Beyond that:
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