refactor(nix): swarm.peers becomes swarm.hives, a directory of every hive
One attrset describing every hive in the swarm including this one,
identical on every host, with hiveName selecting which entry is us.
"My peers" is derived (swarm.peerHives) rather than declared.
Every field in the old per-host peer list was intrinsic to the hive it
described, never to the pair -- so the list was a directory each host
kept its own copy of. Beyond the deduplication it removes a bug class:
two hosts could hold different endpoints for the same third hive with
nothing to detect the disagreement.
Drops the per-hive caCert. Trust inside a swarm derives from the swarm
root, which every hive chains to. What that genuinely removes is
trusting a hive whose root this swarm does not own -- a cross-swarm
problem that wants a mechanism of its own, not a field that happened to
work.
The matrix container's certificateFiles block goes with it and could
NOT be migrated: that list is read at build time and the swarm root is
a runtime file (its key must never enter the store), so there is no
build-time name to put there. caCert being a nix path was precisely
what made it the build-time distribution channel. Agents are unaffected
-- hive-tls folds the root into the hive trust bundle and the meta
renderer embeds that one file. Tracked separately.
Migration is an assertion plus warnings, not a rename: hives is peers
union {self}, and the set gains a member no existing config has written
down. A rename migrates a name and a default can re-root a meaning;
neither can conjure a new member. The warning explains, the self-entry
assertion stops the build.
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parent
048bdd29a8
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19 changed files with 484 additions and 293 deletions
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@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ nginx inside the gateway container obtains and auto-renews certs via the ACME HT
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Mutual exclusion: `tls.certDir` set together with `tls.acme.enable = true` fails an assertion — pick one external TLS source (or neither, for the self-signed default).
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**Swarm peers**: CA-signed certs are trusted by default — remote hives need no `certFingerprint` in `swarm.peers`.
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**Swarm peers**: CA-signed certs are trusted by default — this hive's entry in `swarm.hives` needs no `certFingerprint`.
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### Self-signed TLS (default)
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@ -232,10 +232,10 @@ security.acme.certs."example.com".group = "nginx";
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or make the key world-readable (`0644`) if your threat model allows it. nginx errors out at startup on a key it can't read — the error is explicit in the journal, not a silent failure.
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**Peer hive config**: when using a CA-signed cert, peer hives can declare this hive without `certFingerprint` in `swarm.peers` — the standard CA bundle validates:
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**Swarm directory entry**: when using a CA-signed cert, this hive's entry needs no `certFingerprint` — the standard CA bundle validates:
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```nix
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services.hyperhive.swarm.peers."example.com" = { }; # no certFingerprint needed
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services.hyperhive.swarm.hives.example = { domain = "example.com"; }; # no certFingerprint needed
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```
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### Fronting with an external TLS terminator
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