bao: disable the unused approle auth method, declaratively

No Rust ever minted a secret_id; approle was dead attack surface. The
bootstrap step's check-then-enable case becomes check-then-disable: if
approle is mounted, `bao auth disable approle`; otherwise a no-op.

Disabling costs `delete`+`sudo` on `sys/auth/approle`, not
`create`/`update` — verified against `bao auth disable -output-policy`
on a live dev store. The bootstrap policy grant is narrowed to match.

nix/module-eval/bao-grants.nix pins the new shape: the bootstrap policy
may disable approle, and the granter's role unit never enables it.

docs/getting-started/setup.md

@@ -112,8 +112,9 @@ The token file is `services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.bootstrapTokenFile`, which
 all-local names for you. On a store host that isn't all-local, set it and
 rebuild first.
 
-`swarm-bao-granter-role` runs **on the host**. It enables the cert, approle
-and oidc auth methods, writes the `bao-granter` policy, and creates the
+`swarm-bao-granter-role` runs **on the host**. It enables the cert and oidc
+auth methods (and disables `approle` if an older store still has it mounted),
+writes the `bao-granter` policy, and creates the
 `bao-granter` role, which accepts the leaf
 `/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/granter.pem`. Every
 `swarm-bao-*-policy` unit then logs in with that leaf. The controller's unit

nix/host-modules/bao-bootstrap-policy.hcl

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 # not grant.
 
 # The auth mounts. Reading `sys/auth` is how the unit checks, and `sudo` is
-# what enabling one costs.
+# what enabling or disabling one costs.
 path "sys/auth" {
   capabilities = ["read"]
 }
@@ -23,8 +23,11 @@ path "sys/auth/cert" {
   capabilities = ["create", "update", "sudo"]
 }
 
+# Nothing mints an approle secret_id; the bootstrap step disables the mount
+# rather than enabling it. `delete` is what `bao auth disable` costs, not
+# `create`/`update` (verified with `bao auth disable -output-policy`).
 path "sys/auth/approle" {
-  capabilities = ["create", "update", "sudo"]
+  capabilities = ["delete", "sudo"]
 }
 
 path "sys/auth/oidc" {

nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix

@@ -2687,9 +2687,11 @@ in
             *) bao auth enable cert ;;
           esac
 
+          # Nothing mints a secret_id; disabled rather than left unmounted,
+          # since a store from before this change may already have it.
           case "$mounted" in
-            *'"approle/"'*) ;;
-            *) bao auth enable approle ;;
+            *'"approle/"'*) bao auth disable approle ;;
+            *) ;;
           esac
 
           # The UI's OIDC login; `swarm-bao-operator-viewer-policy` writes its

nix/module-eval/bao-grants.nix

@@ -200,8 +200,9 @@ let
   # One `bao …` invocation → the path and capabilities it needs, as
   # `bao <cmd> -output-policy` reports them. Path-specific `sudo` (bao's
   # root-protected paths, e.g. `pki/root` for a delete) does not follow from
-  # the verb, so only `auth enable` is checked for it. A verb not listed here
-  # needs a path no grant has, so it fails the case until it is taught.
+  # the verb, so only `auth enable`/`auth disable` are checked for it. A verb
+  # not listed here needs a path no grant has, so it fails the case until it
+  # is taught.
   baoCallNeeds =
     words:
     let
@@ -234,6 +235,11 @@ let
       need "sys/auth" [ "read" ]
     else if a 0 == "auth" && a 1 == "enable" then
       need "sys/auth/${a 2}" (cu ++ [ "sudo" ])
+    else if a 0 == "auth" && a 1 == "disable" then
+      need "sys/auth/${a 2}" [
+        "delete"
+        "sudo"
+      ]
     else if a 0 == "write" then
       need (a 1) cu
     else if a 0 == "read" then
@@ -1286,6 +1292,24 @@ let
         ]
         && grantFor bootstrapGrants "sys/policies/acl/swarm-controller" == null;
     }
+    {
+      # Nothing mints a secret_id, so the bootstrap policy's approle grant is
+      # for tearing the mount down, not standing it up: `delete`+`sudo`
+      # (verified against `bao auth disable -output-policy`), not
+      # `create`/`update`. The granter's unit disables an existing mount and
+      # never enables one.
+      name = "the bootstrap policy may disable approle, and the granter's unit never enables it";
+      ok =
+        let
+          g = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-granter-role.script;
+        in
+        (grantFor bootstrapGrants "sys/auth/approle").caps == [
+          "delete"
+          "sudo"
+        ]
+        && lib.hasInfix "bao auth disable approle" g
+        && !(lib.hasInfix "bao auth enable approle" g);
+    }
     {
       # The controller's whole reach on any PKI mount: one role's issue
       # endpoint. It cannot rewrite the role, sign a CSR of its choosing or
@@ -1409,9 +1433,9 @@ let
         && grantFor bootstrapGrants "sys/auth/oidc" != null;
     }
     {
-      # Asked before attempted, like the cert and approle mounts, so re-running
-      # the step on a store that has the mount is a no-op; listed, or the UI's
-      # login page shows no OIDC tab.
+      # Asked before attempted, like the cert mount, so re-running the step
+      # on a store that has the mount is a no-op; listed, or the UI's login
+      # page shows no OIDC tab.
       name = "the granter's role unit enables the oidc mount once, listed on the UI's login page";
       ok =
         let