swarm-nats: forward the queue container's journal to the swarm collector
The swarm-nats container now runs its own otel collector, which reads the
container's journal and pushes it to the swarm collector at
https://<swarm.otel.domain>/swarm-nats, authenticated as the queue's
existing OIDC client (swarm.nats.clientId). Records carry
service.name=nats and no hive label.
The collector lives in a reusable container module,
nix/container-modules/swarm-journal-forwarder.nix, which follows
swarm-bao's forwarder: a journald receiver over /var/log/journal with
merge and a file_storage cursor, an otlphttp exporter with an
oauth2client authenticator that requests its own client id as audience,
self-metrics on a loopback telemetry port, and the client secret handed
in through LoadCredential. Unlike swarm-bao, the secret is fetched inside
the container by swarm-journal-forwarder-oidc.service, under the
container's own store identity (the swarm-nats-auth leaf, which already
holds a read grant on secret/swarm/services/swarm-nats/oidc/client).
The fetch retries until the store answers, and the collector restarts
until the file exists. A 10-minute timer re-reads the secret and restarts
the collector when it changed.
The swarm collector's authenticated producer route was hard-wired to
swarm-bao. It is now rendered from swarm.otel.serviceProducers
(internal), one receiver, oidc authenticator, gateway location and
pipeline entry per service: swarm-bao (port 4391, unchanged names) and
swarm-nats (port 4392). The reserved-fragment and port-collision
assertions cover every entry.
The queue's OIDC client registration gains its own id as audience and
RS256-signed access tokens, which the receiver verifies offline.
swarm-nats drops --link-journal=host, so its journal stays in the guest
where the forwarder reads it, as swarm-bao did in 44009dc51. The new
swarm.nats.otel.telemetryPort (8891) keeps the forwarder off the
collectors' 8888-8890 in the shared host netns, with an assertion.
module-eval-nats-authelia gains four cases: the container's forwarder
and fetch unit on the store host and on a queue-only host, the
responder role's read grant, the swarm collector's swarm-nats receiver
on a host without the queue, and the client registration.
Part of #4499
Part of #5342
This commit is contained in:
parent
b66a09f65b
commit
40a2bd047b
9 changed files with 660 additions and 105 deletions
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@ -39,6 +39,14 @@ in
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# responder calls, works either way, so the token endpoint's
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# `unauthorized_client` is the only place a wrong kind shows.
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kind = "machine";
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# The queue container's journal forwarder mints its token as this
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# client, for the swarm collector's `oidc/swarm-nats` receiver, which
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# accepts this audience alone (`serviceProducers` in
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# ./swarm-otel-service.nix).
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audience = [ natsCfg.clientId ];
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# That receiver verifies the token offline against `/jwks.json`;
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# authelia's default opaque handle fails there.
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accessTokenSignedResponseAlg = "RS256";
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}
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];
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};
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@ -107,6 +107,24 @@ in
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'';
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};
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otel.telemetryPort = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.port;
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default = 8891;
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description = ''
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Loopback port the journal forwarder inside the queue's container
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serves its own metrics on (refused and dropped records, exporter
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failures).
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⚠️ Not 8888, 8889 or 8890: the hive collector, the swarm collector
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and the store's forwarder bind those
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({option}`services.hyperhive.otel.telemetryPort`,
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{option}`services.hyperhive.swarm.otel.telemetryPort`,
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{option}`services.hyperhive.swarm.bao.otel.telemetryPort`), and this
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container shares the host netns with them when co-located. The second
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collector to bind a port dies with `bind: address already in use`.
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'';
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};
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clientId = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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default = "swarm-nats";
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@ -25,6 +25,16 @@ let
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machine = "swarm-nats";
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# The container's journal forwarder pushes to its own receiver on the swarm
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# collector, the route `serviceProducers.swarm-nats` in
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# ./swarm-otel-service.nix declares, by the collector's gateway name. The
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# port suffix is elided on 443, as in ./swarm-bao.nix.
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swarmOtelCfg = config.services.hyperhive.swarm.otel;
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gatewayPortSuffix = lib.optionalString (
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config.services.hyperhive.gateway.httpsPort != 443
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) ":${toString config.services.hyperhive.gateway.httpsPort}";
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forwarderEndpoint = "https://${swarmOtelCfg.domain}${gatewayPortSuffix}/${machine}";
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tlsCfg = config.services.hyperhive.deploy.hive-controller.tls;
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gatewayCfg = config.services.hyperhive.gateway;
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caTrust = import ./lib/hive-ca-trust.nix { inherit lib tlsCfg gatewayCfg; };
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@ -38,7 +48,12 @@ let
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caBundleModule = caTrust.trustBundle {
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inherit pkgs;
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name = machine;
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consumers = [ "swarm-nats-auth" ];
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consumers = [
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"swarm-nats-auth"
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# Go: `SSL_CERT_FILE` replaces its trust store, for the swarm
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# collector's and authelia's names.
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"opentelemetry-collector"
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];
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};
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# Where the responder's credentials live *inside* the container, and the
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# host path that resolves to. Two names for one location, because the
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@ -575,6 +590,40 @@ in
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both options.
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'';
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}
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{
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# The forwarder's route and the receiver behind it are two
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# declarations of one fact; a mismatch is a 404 or a 401 on an export
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# that looks healthy.
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assertion = (swarmOtelCfg.serviceProducers.${machine}.clientId or null) == cfg.clientId;
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message = ''
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services.hyperhive.swarm.otel.serviceProducers has no entry
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"${machine}" with clientId "${cfg.clientId}", so the swarm
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collector has no receiver for the queue container's journal
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forwarder. Declare it in swarm-otel-service.nix.
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'';
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}
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{
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assertion =
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let
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ports = [
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cfg.port
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cfg.monitorPort
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cfg.metricsPort
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cfg.otel.telemetryPort
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config.services.hyperhive.otel.telemetryPort
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swarmOtelCfg.telemetryPort
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config.services.hyperhive.swarm.bao.otel.telemetryPort
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];
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in
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lib.length (lib.unique ports) == lib.length ports;
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message = ''
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services.hyperhive.swarm.nats.otel.telemetryPort
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(${toString cfg.otel.telemetryPort}) collides with another port in
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the host netns: the queue's own ports, or the telemetry port of the
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hive collector, the swarm collector or the store's forwarder. Pick
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a free port.
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'';
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}
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];
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# Open the client port on the bridge, so agent containers can reach
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@ -601,9 +650,8 @@ in
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containers.swarm-nats = {
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autoStart = true;
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ephemeral = false;
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# Journal files on the host, not inside the container: nixpkgs hardcodes
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# --link-journal=try-guest, and EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS expands after it.
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extraFlags = [ "--link-journal=host" ];
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# No `--link-journal=host`: the journal stays in the guest, where the
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# container's own forwarder reads it (../container-modules/swarm-journal-forwarder.nix).
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inherit privateNetwork;
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# The public trust bundle (empty when the gateway is not self-signed)
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# and the queue's own TLS leaf, both read-only.
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@ -618,19 +666,49 @@ in
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{
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imports = [
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../container-modules/swarm-container.nix
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../container-modules/swarm-journal-forwarder.nix
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(import ../container-modules/swarm-container-resolver.nix {
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inherit (networkCfg) bridgeIp;
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# The responder introspects authelia BY NAME on every auth
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# request, and a responder that cannot resolve it denies
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# every client — so it must not start before the resolver
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# file exists.
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dnsConsumers = [ "swarm-nats-auth.service" ];
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#
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# The forwarder and its secret fetch dial the swarm collector,
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# authelia and the store by name too.
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dnsConsumers = [
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"swarm-nats-auth.service"
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"opentelemetry-collector.service"
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"swarm-journal-forwarder-oidc.service"
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];
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})
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caBundleModule
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];
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services.hyperhive.swarmContainer = { inherit privateNetwork; };
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# Authenticated as the queue's own OIDC client, whose secret the
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# responder's store identity already reads: one identity for the
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# whole container.
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services.hyperhive.swarmJournalForwarder = {
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enable = true;
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# The scrape job's name, so the queue's logs and metrics carry one
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# `service.name`.
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serviceName = "nats";
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endpoint = forwarderEndpoint;
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inherit (cfg) clientId;
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tokenUrl = "${toString autheliaUrl}/api/oidc/token";
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telemetryPort = cfg.otel.telemetryPort;
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store = {
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package = baoDeploy.package;
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addr = "https://${baoCfg.domain}:${toString baoCfg.port}";
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secretPath = "secret/swarm/services/${cfg.clientId}/oidc/client";
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clientCertFile = inContainer "bao-client.pem";
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clientKeyFile = inContainer "bao-client-key.pem";
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caFile = if authStoreFiles ? "bao-ca.pem" then inContainer "bao-ca.pem" else null;
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};
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};
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services.nats = {
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enable = true;
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@ -166,6 +166,48 @@ in
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'';
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};
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serviceProducers = lib.mkOption {
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internal = true;
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type = lib.types.attrsOf (
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lib.types.submodule {
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options = {
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clientId = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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description = ''
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The producer's OAuth2 client id: the one audience its
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receiver's `oidc/<name>` authenticator accepts, and the one
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the forwarder requests.
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'';
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};
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port = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.port;
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description = ''
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Loopback port of the producer's receiver on the collector's
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host. In the port-collision assertion with every other
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receiver there.
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'';
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};
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};
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}
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);
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default = { };
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description = ''
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Swarm services whose own container forwards to this collector, keyed
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by the route name: each gets a receiver `otlp/<name>`, an
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authenticator `oidc/<name>` and a gateway location
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`https://''${domain}/<name>/`, and its records land in the swarm
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tier's pipelines with no `hive` label.
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A receiver per producer because an `oidc` authenticator checks one
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audience, and each service mints its token as its own client.
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Declared below for every host, under no `enable`: the collector's
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host renders the receiver whether or not the service runs there.
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Every name must contain a fragment of
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`nix/reserved-hive-fragments.nix`, so no hive can own its components.
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'';
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};
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storeProducerName = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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readOnly = true;
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@ -346,6 +388,20 @@ in
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};
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};
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config.services.hyperhive.swarm.otel.serviceProducers = {
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# The forwarder in ./swarm-bao.nix.
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${cfg.storeProducerName} = {
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clientId = baoCfg.otel.clientId;
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port = cfg.storeProducerPort;
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};
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# The forwarder in ./swarm-nats.nix, which addresses this route by the
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# queue container's name.
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swarm-nats = {
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clientId = hyperhiveCfg.swarm.nats.clientId;
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port = lib.mkDefault 4392;
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};
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};
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# Not under any `enable`: see `publishedScrapeTargets` for why every host
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# declares every entry.
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#
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@ -41,21 +41,21 @@ let
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# both sites) is the only way the two can't drift apart.
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swarmTierName = cfg.producerName;
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# The SECOND swarm-tier producer: the collector inside the secret store's
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# container (`swarm-bao.nix`). It gets an owner of its own rather than
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# pushing into `swarmTierName`'s route, because the audience that route
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# checks is `swarm-controller`'s own client id — one identity per principal,
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# so a second principal brings its own client, its own audience and
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# therefore its own authenticator and receiver.
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# The other swarm-tier producers: the forwarder inside each swarm service's
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# own container (`serviceProducers` in ./swarm-otel-service.nix). Each gets
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# an owner of its own rather than pushing into `swarmTierName`'s route,
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# because the audience that route checks is `swarm-controller`'s own client
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# id — one identity per principal, so each principal brings its own client,
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# its own audience and therefore its own authenticator and receiver.
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#
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# Named after the store's container, so `otlp/swarm-bao` reads as the thing
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# that pushes into it. No `reserved-names.nix` entry is needed for it the
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# way `swarm` has one: the name CONTAINS `swarm`, which
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# Named after the service's container, so `otlp/swarm-bao` reads as the
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# thing that pushes into it. No `reserved-names.nix` entry is needed the way
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# `swarm` has one: each name CONTAINS `swarm`, which
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# `nix/reserved-hive-fragments.nix` forbids as a substring of any hive name,
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# so no hive can ever own these components. The assertion below checks that
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# fragment is still listed rather than trusting it.
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storeProducerName = baoCfg.machine;
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storeClientId = baoCfg.otel.clientId;
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serviceProducers = cfg.serviceProducers;
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serviceProducerNames = lib.attrNames serviceProducers;
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reservedHiveFragments = import ../reserved-hive-fragments.nix;
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# Every `<owner>` no hive may take. Read from `nix/reserved-names.nix`, the
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@ -206,16 +206,16 @@ let
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# `--link-journal=try-guest`, which puts the journal inside the container and
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# leaves the host with a symlink into that container's transient root: a
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# reader here cannot follow it, and it dangles the moment the container
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# stops. Every container block except `swarm-bao` therefore sets
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# stops. Every container block except `swarm-bao` and `swarm-nats` therefore sets
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# `extraFlags = [ "--link-journal=host" ]`, which the invocation expands
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# AFTER the hardcoded flag, so the files land here under their own
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# machine-id subdirectory and are bind-mounted into the guest instead.
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#
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# ⚠️ Drop that flag from one of THOSE containers and this receiver silently
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# stops seeing it — no error, just a unit that never appears in the store.
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# `swarm-bao` is the one exception on purpose: its journal stays inside the
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# container for its own collector instead (see `swarm-bao.nix`), so it was
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# never one of the units this receiver could see either.
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# `swarm-bao` and `swarm-nats` are the exceptions on purpose: their journals
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# stay inside the container for its own collector instead (see
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# `serviceProducers`), so this receiver never sees their units.
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hostJournalDir = "/var/log/journal";
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# Each store's OTLP route, by domain. One binding because the same string is
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@ -380,14 +380,16 @@ in
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# request reaches the receiver, which knows nothing about the
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# path it was found at.
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"/${swarmTierName}/".proxyPass = "http://127.0.0.1:${toString cfg.producerPort}/";
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# The secret store's forwarder, on its own route for its own
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# audience — same trailing slashes, same reason.
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"/${storeProducerName}/".proxyPass = "http://127.0.0.1:${toString cfg.storeProducerPort}/";
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# There is no swarm-wide inbox, and a closed door is the honest
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# description of that. Every other route into this collector
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# belongs to exactly one hive or the swarm-tier producer above.
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# belongs to exactly one hive or one swarm-tier producer.
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"/".return = "404";
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};
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}
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# Each service forwarder, on its own route for its own audience —
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# same trailing slashes, same reason.
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// lib.mapAttrs' (
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name: p: lib.nameValuePair "/${name}/" { proxyPass = "http://127.0.0.1:${toString p.port}/"; }
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) serviceProducers;
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};
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|
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# The identities this tier authenticates against. Stated rather than
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|
|
@ -673,21 +675,21 @@ in
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|||
'';
|
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}
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{
|
||||
# The store forwarder's components are named after a container whose
|
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# name merely CONTAINS the reserved word, so what protects them is
|
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# the substring list rather than the equality one. Same reason the
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# The service forwarders' components are named after containers
|
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# whose names merely CONTAIN the reserved word, so what protects them
|
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# is the substring list rather than the equality one. Same reason the
|
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# assertion above exists: the list lives in another file, and a guard
|
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# whose subject can be edited elsewhere has to assert its own case is
|
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# still covered.
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assertion = lib.any (f: lib.hasInfix f storeProducerName) reservedHiveFragments;
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assertion = lib.all (n: lib.any (f: lib.hasInfix f n) reservedHiveFragments) serviceProducerNames;
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message = ''
|
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nix/reserved-hive-fragments.nix forbids no substring of
|
||||
'${storeProducerName}', which the swarm collector needs kept out of
|
||||
the hive namespace: it names components `<kind>/<owner>`, so a hive
|
||||
called '${storeProducerName}' would replace the secret store
|
||||
nix/reserved-hive-fragments.nix forbids no substring of one of
|
||||
${lib.concatStringsSep ", " serviceProducerNames}, which the swarm
|
||||
collector needs kept out of the hive namespace: it names components
|
||||
`<kind>/<owner>`, so a hive with that name would replace a service
|
||||
forwarder's own receiver and pipeline entry.
|
||||
|
||||
Put the fragment back, or give the store's container a name one of
|
||||
Put the fragment back, or give the service's route a name one of
|
||||
them covers.
|
||||
'';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -776,9 +778,9 @@ in
|
|||
others = [
|
||||
cfg.telemetryPort
|
||||
cfg.producerPort
|
||||
cfg.storeProducerPort
|
||||
otelCfg.collector.port
|
||||
];
|
||||
]
|
||||
++ map (p: p.port) (lib.attrValues serviceProducers);
|
||||
all = derived ++ others;
|
||||
in
|
||||
lib.length (lib.unique all) == lib.length all;
|
||||
|
|
@ -922,15 +924,18 @@ in
|
|||
auth.authenticator = "oidc/${swarmTierName}";
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
# The secret store's forwarder, which is a swarm-tier
|
||||
# producer with a principal of its own — a receiver per
|
||||
# audience, because an `oidc` authenticator checks one.
|
||||
// {
|
||||
"otlp/${storeProducerName}".protocols.http = {
|
||||
endpoint = "127.0.0.1:${toString cfg.storeProducerPort}";
|
||||
auth.authenticator = "oidc/${storeProducerName}";
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Each service forwarder, a swarm-tier producer with a
|
||||
# principal of its own — a receiver per audience, because an
|
||||
# `oidc` authenticator checks one.
|
||||
// lib.mapAttrs' (
|
||||
name: p:
|
||||
lib.nameValuePair "otlp/${name}" {
|
||||
protocols.http = {
|
||||
endpoint = "127.0.0.1:${toString p.port}";
|
||||
auth.authenticator = "oidc/${name}";
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
) serviceProducers
|
||||
# MERGED with the per-hive receivers, never assigned over
|
||||
# them. A plain assignment here would drop every hive's
|
||||
# receiver and still render a valid config that starts
|
||||
|
|
@ -1128,13 +1133,10 @@ in
|
|||
# same reasoning as its receiver above: `otlp/${swarmTierName}`
|
||||
# always exists, so the authenticator it names must too, or an
|
||||
# extension-not-listed startup failure follows every deploy.
|
||||
++ [
|
||||
"oidc/${swarmTierName}"
|
||||
# Unconditional for the same reason, and one level sharper:
|
||||
# the store runs in every swarm, so its forwarder's
|
||||
# receiver is as permanent as the swarm tier's own.
|
||||
"oidc/${storeProducerName}"
|
||||
]
|
||||
++ [ "oidc/${swarmTierName}" ]
|
||||
# Unconditional for the same reason: a service forwarder's
|
||||
# receiver exists whether or not the service runs on this host.
|
||||
++ map (n: "oidc/${n}") serviceProducerNames
|
||||
# The push side's authenticators. Same rule as above: one an
|
||||
# exporter names but this list omits is INERT — the collector
|
||||
# starts clean and pushes unauthenticated.
|
||||
|
|
@ -1178,17 +1180,16 @@ in
|
|||
"metrics/${swarmTierName}" = {
|
||||
receivers = [
|
||||
"otlp/${swarmTierName}"
|
||||
# The store forwarder's receiver joins the swarm
|
||||
# tier's pipeline rather than bringing one of its own:
|
||||
# the stamp it needs is `resource/${swarmTierName}`'s
|
||||
# exact stamp — the swarm's name and deliberately no
|
||||
# `hive` — and a second pipeline would be that same
|
||||
# processor under a second name to keep in step. What
|
||||
# a producer is separated FOR is the credential it
|
||||
# proves, and that is the receiver's job, not the
|
||||
# pipeline's.
|
||||
"otlp/${storeProducerName}"
|
||||
]
|
||||
# The service forwarders' receivers join the swarm
|
||||
# tier's pipeline rather than bringing their own: the
|
||||
# stamp they need is `resource/${swarmTierName}`'s exact
|
||||
# stamp — the swarm's name and deliberately no `hive` —
|
||||
# and a second pipeline would be that same processor
|
||||
# under a second name to keep in step. What a producer is
|
||||
# separated FOR is the credential it proves, and that is
|
||||
# the receiver's job, not the pipeline's.
|
||||
++ map (n: "otlp/${n}") serviceProducerNames
|
||||
++ lib.optional (cfg.scrapeTargets != { } || cfg.publishedScrapeTargets != { }) "prometheus";
|
||||
processors = [ "resource/${swarmTierName}" ];
|
||||
exporters = exporterNames;
|
||||
|
|
@ -1227,14 +1228,11 @@ in
|
|||
# `hive` value to put on them.
|
||||
// lib.optionalAttrs collectLogs {
|
||||
"logs/${swarmTierName}" = {
|
||||
# This host's own journal, and the store container's,
|
||||
# which arrives over the receiver above rather than off
|
||||
# a disk — the store's forwarder reads a journal no
|
||||
# reader on another host can see.
|
||||
receivers = [
|
||||
"journald"
|
||||
"otlp/${storeProducerName}"
|
||||
];
|
||||
# This host's own journal, and each service container's,
|
||||
# which arrives over its forwarder's receiver above
|
||||
# rather than off a disk — each forwarder reads a journal
|
||||
# no reader on another host can see.
|
||||
receivers = [ "journald" ] ++ map (n: "otlp/${n}") serviceProducerNames;
|
||||
processors = [
|
||||
"filter/exclude-user-sessions"
|
||||
"resource/${swarmTierName}"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1323,18 +1321,19 @@ in
|
|||
audience = config.services.hyperhive.swarm.controller.queueClientId;
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
# The secret store forwarder's own authenticator. Same shape
|
||||
# Each service forwarder's own authenticator. Same shape
|
||||
# again, and the audience is that principal's own client id
|
||||
# — the self-referential form `swarm-authelia.nix` registers
|
||||
# a hive client under and `swarm-controller` uses above,
|
||||
# read from the option `glue-swarm-bao-otel-oidc-client.nix`
|
||||
# registers so the two ends cannot spell it differently.
|
||||
// {
|
||||
"oidc/${storeProducerName}" = {
|
||||
# read from the option the client's registration reads so
|
||||
# the two ends cannot spell it differently.
|
||||
// lib.mapAttrs' (
|
||||
name: p:
|
||||
lib.nameValuePair "oidc/${name}" {
|
||||
issuer_url = hyperhiveCfg.swarm.authelia.url;
|
||||
audience = storeClientId;
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
audience = p.clientId;
|
||||
}
|
||||
) serviceProducers
|
||||
# The push side. Opposite direction to every `oidc/*` above —
|
||||
# those VALIDATE a token arriving; these OBTAIN one to send.
|
||||
# Hence `oauth2client` rather than `oidc`, and hence a client
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue