fix: declare the agent socket dir's owner in tmpfiles, not by chown after

/run/hive-agent/<name> was 0777 root root in steady state, not just during
first spawn. A directory without the sticky bit lets any user unlink files
in it, and the gateway container has all of /run/hive-agent bind-mounted
in, so anything that could reach the path could delete an agent's
agent.sock, bind its own, and receive that agent's todos from hive-c0re.

Two mechanisms were writing the dir and undoing each other: the tmpfiles.d
entry wrote 0777 root root, then hive-c0re round-tripped through hive-priv's
ChownSocketDir to narrow it. `d` re-asserts mode and owner on every apply
and the file is regenerated on any agent's spawn or destroy, so every such
event reset every agent's dir back to world-writable.

SyncAgentTmpfiles now carries each agent's container uid/gid and the entry
declares the answer: 0751 <uid> <gid>. Three principals need the dir and no
two share a group -- the harness binds its sockets (owner rwx), hive-c0re
dials agent.sock and the gateway's nginx dials web.sock (both only need
traverse, and both sockets are already 0666).

Deletes ChownSocketDir and ChmodSocketDir, both priv_client wrappers, the
either/or in host_config with its two swallowed warn!s, and the now-dead
socket_dir_path -- two verbs off the privileged helper's surface and one
round-trip off every agent spawn.

Also makes the two tmpfiles rules for /run/hive-agent itself agree: the
gateway module said hive-core, the generated file said root, and which won
depended on the order systemd read them in.
This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-08-04 00:25:29 +02:00 committed by mara
commit 3fc1588e83
8 changed files with 110 additions and 103 deletions

View file

@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ use hive_priv_sock::{BindMount, CredentialMount};
use crate::coordinator::{AgentPaths, HiveEnv};
use super::{
AGENT_PREFIX, CONTAINER_RUNTIME_MOUNT, CONTAINER_SHARED_MOUNT, agent_uid_gid,
bridge_gateway_ip, container_claude_mount, container_name, validate,
AGENT_PREFIX, CONTAINER_RUNTIME_MOUNT, CONTAINER_SHARED_MOUNT, bridge_gateway_ip,
container_claude_mount, container_name, validate,
};
/// Re-apply the per-container host-side config: nspawn flags (bind
@ -289,16 +289,11 @@ async fn set_nspawn_flags(
let socket_dir = crate::agent_sockets::agent_dir_for(agent_name);
std::fs::create_dir_all(&socket_dir)
.with_context(|| format!("create {}", socket_dir.display()))?;
// Chown to the agent user so the non-root harness can bind(2) here.
// Falls back to 0777 on first spawn when uid lookup returns None
// (container /etc/passwd not yet rendered).
if let Some((uid, gid)) = agent_uid_gid(agent_name) {
if let Err(e) = crate::priv_client::chown_socket_dir(agent_name, uid, gid).await {
tracing::warn!(%agent_name, error = ?e, "chown socket dir failed");
}
} else if let Err(e) = crate::priv_client::chmod_socket_dir(agent_name, 0o777).await {
tracing::warn!(%agent_name, error = ?e, "chmod socket dir failed");
}
// Ownership is NOT repaired here. The dir's owner + mode are declared by
// the tmpfiles.d entry (`SyncAgentTmpfiles`), which is the mechanism that
// re-applies on every boot and every spawn — so a chown made here was
// silently reverted the next time any agent was spawned or destroyed.
// This `create_dir_all` only covers the window before that sync lands.
binds.push(BindMount {
host_path: socket_dir.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
container_path: socket_dir.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),