forge: revalidate the core token against the live forge before trusting it

hive-c0re/src/forge.rs

@@ -414,17 +414,82 @@ async fn ensure_config_org_avatar(token: &str) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Outcome of probing whether the persisted core token still works
+/// against the *current* forge. Existence on disk is not validity: a
+/// token minted before a forge rebuild / re-provision is unknown to the
+/// new forge's DB and 401s on every call — which silently breaks the
+/// hive-ci runner-registration prefetch (it reads this same token to
+/// fetch a runner registration token).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+enum CoreTokenCheck {
+    /// Token authenticated successfully — keep using it.
+    Valid,
+    /// Forge explicitly rejected the token (401/403) — re-mint.
+    Invalid,
+    /// Couldn't determine (forge unreachable / 5xx). Don't re-mint on a
+    /// transient: keep the existing token and let a later ensure pass
+    /// re-check once the forge is responsive. Re-minting here would both
+    /// fail (mint needs the forge too) and churn tokens needlessly.
+    Indeterminate,
+}
+
+/// Map the HTTP status of the token-probe call to a [`CoreTokenCheck`].
+/// Pure so the decision logic is unit-testable without a live forge.
+fn classify_core_token_status(status: StatusCode) -> CoreTokenCheck {
+    if status.is_success() {
+        CoreTokenCheck::Valid
+    } else if status == StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED || status == StatusCode::FORBIDDEN {
+        CoreTokenCheck::Invalid
+    } else {
+        CoreTokenCheck::Indeterminate
+    }
+}
+
+/// Probe whether `token` is still accepted by the current forge with a
+/// cheap authenticated `GET /api/v1/user` (covered by the core token's
+/// `read:user` scope). See [`CoreTokenCheck`] for how the outcome is
+/// interpreted.
+async fn check_core_token(token: &str) -> CoreTokenCheck {
+    let url = format!("{FORGE_HTTP}/api/v1/user");
+    match forge_http(reqwest::Method::GET, &url, token, "").await {
+        Ok(status) => classify_core_token_status(status),
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::debug!(
+                error = %e,
+                "forge: core-token probe could not reach forge; treating as indeterminate"
+            );
+            CoreTokenCheck::Indeterminate
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 /// Ensure the bootstrap `core` admin user + a token at
 /// `CORE_TOKEN_PATH`. The token is what hive-c0re uses for forgejo
-/// API calls (org creation now, meta-repo push later). Returns the
-/// token. Idempotent: skips creation when user exists, skips token
-/// when the file is present.
+/// API calls (org creation, meta-repo push, and the hive-ci
+/// runner-registration prefetch). Returns the token.
+///
+/// Idempotent, but validity-aware: when a token file is already present
+/// it is **probed against the current forge** before being trusted. A
+/// token persisted before a forge rebuild / re-provision is stale (the
+/// new forge DB doesn't know it) and would 401 every caller — so on a
+/// definitive rejection the token is re-minted. A merely-unreachable
+/// forge leaves the existing token in place (a later ensure pass
+/// re-checks) rather than churning tokens on a transient.
 async fn ensure_core_user_and_token() -> Result<String> {
     let path = std::path::Path::new(CORE_TOKEN_PATH);
     if let Ok(existing) = std::fs::read_to_string(path) {
         let trimmed = existing.trim().to_owned();
         if !trimmed.is_empty() {
-            return Ok(trimmed);
+            match check_core_token(&trimmed).await {
+                CoreTokenCheck::Valid | CoreTokenCheck::Indeterminate => return Ok(trimmed),
+                CoreTokenCheck::Invalid => {
+                    tracing::warn!(
+                        path = %path.display(),
+                        "forge: persisted core token rejected by forge (stale after rebuild?); \
+                         re-minting"
+                    );
+                }
+            }
         }
     }
     ensure_user_exists("core", true, None).await?;
@@ -868,3 +933,54 @@ pub async fn ensure_all() {
         sync_agent(name, core_token.as_deref()).await;
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::{CoreTokenCheck, classify_core_token_status};
+    use reqwest::StatusCode;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn success_statuses_are_valid() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_core_token_status(StatusCode::OK),
+            CoreTokenCheck::Valid
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_core_token_status(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT),
+            CoreTokenCheck::Valid
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn auth_rejection_statuses_are_invalid() {
+        // The whole point: a stale token (forge rebuilt out from under it)
+        // 401s, and 401/403 are the only outcomes that trigger a re-mint.
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_core_token_status(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED),
+            CoreTokenCheck::Invalid
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_core_token_status(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN),
+            CoreTokenCheck::Invalid
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn transient_and_unexpected_statuses_are_indeterminate() {
+        // Never re-mint on a transient — minting needs the forge too, and
+        // churning tokens on a blip is worse than keeping the existing one.
+        for s in [
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
+            StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+            StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT,
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                classify_core_token_status(s),
+                CoreTokenCheck::Indeterminate,
+                "status {s} should be indeterminate"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}