fix(#3987): join the agent-status key with a dot so a hive's write grant can be scoped

A KV entry publishes to $KV.<bucket>.<key> and NATS wildcards match whole
.-delimited tokens, so a /-joined {hive}/{agent} key is a single token: the
only expressible write grants are one exact subject per agent (needs a roster
in the auth responder, which Policy::hive_name argues against) or a bucket-wide
wildcard that lets any hive overwrite any other hive's agents.

Joining with a dot puts the hive in its own token, so hive_subjects can grant
$KV.agent-status.<hive>.* — every agent of one hive and nothing else, the same
containment hive-status already has.

The grant lands with the bucket-open pair (STREAM.INFO + STREAM.CREATE):
open_or_create resolves the bucket before it writes, so alone the publish
subject is unreachable and the sweep fails one step later instead.

Verified the client accepts a dotted key rather than assuming it: async-nats
0.50.0 VALID_KEY_RE is \A[-/_=.a-zA-Z0-9]+\z and is_valid_key rejects only
empty / leading / trailing dot; the subject is prefix + key verbatim.
This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-09-02 19:56:16 +02:00 committed by mara
commit 3b038425f2
2 changed files with 109 additions and 34 deletions

View file

@ -271,6 +271,31 @@ impl Policy {
swarm_queue_client::wanted::BUCKET
),
]);
// Publishing this hive's agents into the per-agent status bucket, and
// **only its own agents**.
//
// `.*` matches exactly one token, so this is every agent of one hive
// and nothing deeper — `.>` would also admit `<hive>.<agent>.<more>`,
// which `agent_status::split_key` rejects on read anyway; the grant has
// no reason to be wider than the format.
//
// The scoping is only expressible because the key is `.`-joined: a KV
// entry publishes to `$KV.<bucket>.<key>`, and a NATS wildcard matches
// whole tokens, so a key joined by anything else is one token and
// leaves only "one exact subject per agent" (needs a roster in here,
// which `hive_name`'s doc argues against) or a bucket-wide wildcard
// (any hive overwrites any other hive's agents).
//
// `STREAM.INFO` + `CREATE` come along for the same reason they do
// above: `open_or_create` resolves the bucket before it writes, and
// either end may be first on a fresh swarm. Without them the publish
// grant is unreachable — the client times out at bucket open.
let agent_status = Self::agent_status_stream();
subjects.extend([
format!("$JS.API.STREAM.INFO.{agent_status}"),
format!("$JS.API.STREAM.CREATE.{agent_status}"),
format!("$KV.{}.{hive}.*", swarm_queue_client::agent_status::BUCKET),
]);
subjects.extend(
self.extra_hive_subjects
.iter()
@ -338,12 +363,10 @@ impl Policy {
// ephemeral consumer whose subject carries no name.
//
// Deliberately **no `$KV.<bucket>.…` subject**: that is the write
// side, and writing is what picks a key layout. Who publishes agent
// status, and under which key, is still open — so granting a write
// subject here would answer a question this change has no business
// answering. Reading needs none of it: a KV read is a `DIRECT.GET`,
// and the `.>` form is bucket-wide rather than per-key, so nothing
// below encodes a layout.
// side, and the controller only reads this bucket. The hive gets a
// write grant scoped to its own agents (see `hive_subjects`); a
// reader holding one could forge any agent's status on any hive.
// Reading needs none of it — a KV read is a `DIRECT.GET`.
let agent_status = Self::agent_status_stream();
subjects.extend([
format!("$JS.API.STREAM.INFO.{agent_status}"),
@ -391,26 +414,54 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn no_grant_encodes_an_agent_status_key_layout() {
// Who writes agent status, and under which key, is undecided. A `$KV.`
// subject is the write side and would answer that by implication, so
// NOBODY gets one for this bucket until the layout is settled.
fn the_reader_gets_no_write_subject_for_the_agent_status_bucket() {
// The controller reads this bucket and never writes it. A `$KV.`
// subject here would let a reader forge any agent's status on any
// hive — the containment `hive_subjects` establishes is only worth
// anything if the other role cannot bypass it.
let bucket = swarm_queue_client::agent_status::BUCKET;
let prefix = format!("$KV.{bucket}.");
let p = policy();
for (who, subjects) in [
("reader", p.reader_subjects()),
("hive", p.hive_subjects("alpha")),
let subjects = policy().reader_subjects();
assert!(
!subjects.iter().any(|s| s.starts_with(&prefix)),
"the reader was granted a {prefix}* subject"
);
// Control: the prefix test does fire on a bucket the reader
// legitimately writes, so the pass above is about agent-status rather
// than about a matcher that never matches anything.
let wanted = format!("$KV.{}.", swarm_queue_client::wanted::BUCKET);
assert!(subjects.iter().any(|s| s.starts_with(&wanted)));
}
#[test]
fn a_hive_may_write_only_its_own_agents_status_keys() {
let bucket = swarm_queue_client::agent_status::BUCKET;
let subjects = policy().hive_subjects("alpha");
let s = Policy::agent_status_stream();
for want in [
// Without these the write subject is unreachable: `open_or_create`
// resolves the bucket first and times out before it publishes.
format!("$JS.API.STREAM.INFO.{s}"),
format!("$JS.API.STREAM.CREATE.{s}"),
format!("$KV.{bucket}.alpha.*"),
] {
assert!(subjects.contains(&want), "hive alpha is missing {want}");
}
// The scoping is the point, so pin what must NOT be there: a
// bucket-wide wildcard in any of its spellings, and another hive's
// slice. `.*` matches one token; `.>` would match deeper than the key
// format ever produces.
for forbidden in [
format!("$KV.{bucket}.>"),
format!("$KV.{bucket}.*"),
format!("$KV.{bucket}.alpha.>"),
format!("$KV.{bucket}.beta.*"),
] {
assert!(
!subjects.iter().any(|s| s.starts_with(&prefix)),
"{who} was granted a {prefix}* subject, which picks a key layout"
!subjects.contains(&forbidden),
"hive alpha was granted {forbidden}, which reaches past its own agents"
);
}
// Control: the prefix test does fire on a bucket that legitimately has
// write grants, so a pass above is about agent-status, not the matcher.
let wanted = format!("$KV.{}.", swarm_queue_client::wanted::BUCKET);
assert!(p.reader_subjects().iter().any(|s| s.starts_with(&wanted)));
}
#[test]