turn loop: tool whitelist (no web/task), no skip-permissions
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CLAUDE.md
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CLAUDE.md
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@ -156,17 +156,38 @@ docs/damocles-migration.md options for moving damocles onto hyperhive
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marks them `failed` with note `"agent state dir missing"` so they fall out
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of `pending`. They stay in sqlite for audit.
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## Agent MCP surface
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## Agent MCP surface + turn loop
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The harness ships an embedded MCP server (rmcp 1.7) that claude can launch
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via `--mcp-config`. Subcommand: `hive-ag3nt mcp`. Tools:
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- `send(to, body)` — message a peer or the operator.
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- `recv()` — drain one inbox message.
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The harness ships an embedded MCP server (rmcp 1.7) that claude launches as
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a stdio child via `--mcp-config`. Subcommand: `hive-ag3nt mcp`. Tools:
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- `mcp__hyperhive__send(to, body)` — message a peer or the operator.
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- `mcp__hyperhive__recv()` — drain one inbox message.
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Both translate to `AgentRequest::Send`/`Recv` against the agent's own
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`/run/hive/mcp.sock` (the existing hyperhive socket). The MCP surface is
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just claude's view of that socket — same authority, friendlier protocol.
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The turn loop in `hive-ag3nt serve` writes
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`/run/hive/claude-mcp-config.json` at boot pointing at
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`/proc/self/exe mcp` (the running hive-ag3nt binary's nix store path).
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Each turn invokes:
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```
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claude --print --mcp-config <path> --tools <builtins> --allowedTools <builtins+mcp> <prompt>
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```
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**Tool whitelist** (see `ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS` in `hive-ag3nt::mcp`):
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- Allowed built-ins: `Bash`, `Edit`, `Glob`, `Grep`, `NotebookEdit`, `Read`,
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`TodoWrite`, `Write`.
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- Denied by omission: `WebFetch`, `WebSearch`, `Task` — no external egress
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or nested-agent spawning until we have a real policy story.
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- Allowed MCP tools: `mcp__hyperhive__send`, `mcp__hyperhive__recv`.
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`Bash` is on the allow-list "for now" — pending a finer-grained allow-list
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system for command patterns (`Bash(git *)`-style). When that lands, the
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`builtin_tools_arg` shape will probably change to a setting / hooks
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combo per claude-code's permissions plumbing.
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Manager will get its own subcommand later with `request_spawn`, `kill`,
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`request_apply_commit` added to the TOOLS list.
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@ -373,6 +394,19 @@ with `./agent.nix` plus an inline module that sets
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`environment.etc."gitconfig".text` (committer identity = the agent's name) and
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`systemd.services.hive-ag3nt.environment.HIVE_PORT`/`HIVE_LABEL`.
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## Security backlog
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- **Unprivileged containers (userns mapping).** Today the nspawn container
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runs as a fully privileged root. Goal: `PrivateUsersChown=yes` (or the
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nixos-container equivalent) so uid 0 inside maps to an unprivileged uid
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on the host, and a container-root compromise lands the attacker on an
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ordinary user account, not the host's root. Requires per-agent state
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dirs to be chown'd to that uid on the host side.
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- **Bash command allow-list.** Replace the blanket `Bash` allow with a
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pattern allow-list (`Bash(git *)`, `Bash(nix build .*)`, etc.) per
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claude-code's `--allowedTools` extended grammar. Likely lives in
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`agent.nix` so each agent can scope its own shell surface.
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## Polish backlog
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Not phased — pick when relevant:
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