hive-c0re: scrub manager-surface cookies + SetParent doc fix (#715 batch 7)

This commit is contained in:
damocles 2026-05-31 17:42:57 +02:00 committed by mara
commit 2bdb8c7d51
5 changed files with 37 additions and 37 deletions

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@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ impl Approvals {
Ok(()) Ok(())
} }
/// Withdraw a pending approval (closes #250). Returns the now-updated /// Withdraw a pending approval. Returns the now-updated
/// row so the caller can emit `ApprovalResolved` with the right /// row so the caller can emit `ApprovalResolved` with the right
/// kind / agent / sha. Errors if the approval isn't pending — once /// kind / agent / sha. Errors if the approval isn't pending — once
/// it's approved/denied/failed/cancelled, the resolution is final. /// it's approved/denied/failed/cancelled, the resolution is final.
@ -329,8 +329,7 @@ impl Approvals {
/// deserialize. A single malformed / unknown-kind row must never blank /// deserialize. A single malformed / unknown-kind row must never blank
/// the whole list: `collect::<Result<Vec>>()` is all-or-nothing, so one /// the whole list: `collect::<Result<Vec>>()` is all-or-nothing, so one
/// bad row used to make `pending()` / `recent_resolved()` error out /// bad row used to make `pending()` / `recent_resolved()` error out
/// wholesale — the dashboard then rendered an empty approvals queue /// wholesale — the dashboard then rendered an empty approvals queue.
/// (issue #160, an unhandled `init_config` kind poisoning every read).
fn collect_lenient(rows: impl Iterator<Item = rusqlite::Result<Approval>>) -> Vec<Approval> { fn collect_lenient(rows: impl Iterator<Item = rusqlite::Result<Approval>>) -> Vec<Approval> {
rows.filter_map(|r| match r { rows.filter_map(|r| match r {
Ok(a) => Some(a), Ok(a) => Some(a),
@ -435,7 +434,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test] #[test]
fn init_config_approval_round_trips() { fn init_config_approval_round_trips() {
// Regression for #160: an `init_config` row used to fail // Regression test: an `init_config` row used to fail
// deserialization (row_to_approval matched only apply_commit + // deserialization (row_to_approval matched only apply_commit +
// spawn), erroring out the whole `pending()` query — every // spawn), erroring out the whole `pending()` query — every
// approval then vanished from the dashboard. // approval then vanished from the dashboard.
@ -465,9 +464,9 @@ mod tests {
#[test] #[test]
fn mark_cancelled_transitions_pending_row() { fn mark_cancelled_transitions_pending_row() {
// #250: manager withdraws a pending approval. Row leaves // Manager withdraws a pending approval. Row leaves pending(),
// pending(), shows up in recent_resolved() with the cancelled // shows up in recent_resolved() with the cancelled status + a
// status + a "cancelled by <who>" note. // "cancelled by <who>" note.
let (_dir, _path, db) = open_temp(); let (_dir, _path, db) = open_temp();
let id = db let id = db
.submit_kind( .submit_kind(

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
//! `hivectl` — operator-facing host CLI for hyperhive (#655). //! `hivectl` — operator-facing host CLI for hyperhive.
//! //!
//! Sibling binary to the `hive-c0re` daemon. Where `hive-c0re`'s //! Sibling binary to the `hive-c0re` daemon. Where `hive-c0re`'s
//! subcommands focus on the broker / approval / topology surface //! subcommands focus on the broker / approval / topology surface
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
//! starting with manual user provisioning on the bundled forge + //! starting with manual user provisioning on the bundled forge +
//! matrix containers when c0re's automatic boot-time sweep is //! matrix containers when c0re's automatic boot-time sweep is
//! inappropriate (recovery, debugging, single-shot reprovisioning, //! inappropriate (recovery, debugging, single-shot reprovisioning,
//! verifying the registration token path post-#644). //! verifying the registration token path).
//! //!
//! Verbs read configuration off the same on-disk paths c0re uses //! Verbs read configuration off the same on-disk paths c0re uses
//! (`/var/lib/hyperhive/forge-core-token`, //! (`/var/lib/hyperhive/forge-core-token`,
@ -69,11 +69,11 @@ enum ForgeCmd {
/// When `<name>` is **not** an agent (a human or any other /// When `<name>` is **not** an agent (a human or any other
/// non-container account), creates the forgejo user and prints the /// non-container account), creates the forgejo user and prints the
/// freshly-minted token to stdout — no `/var/lib/hyperhive/agents/` /// freshly-minted token to stdout — no `/var/lib/hyperhive/agents/`
/// directory is created for the user (#662). /// directory is created for the user.
/// ///
/// Without `--password` / `--password-stdin` a random throwaway is /// Without `--password` / `--password-stdin` a random throwaway is
/// used (fine for agents — they auth by token via tea / hive-forge). /// used (fine for agents — they auth by token via tea / hive-forge).
/// Set a password to log into the forge web UI afterwards (#663). /// Set a password to log into the forge web UI afterwards.
/// `--password` is idempotent: re-running with the same value sets /// `--password` is idempotent: re-running with the same value sets
/// the same password (covers password resets on already-created /// the same password (covers password resets on already-created
/// accounts since `forgejo admin user create` silently no-ops once /// accounts since `forgejo admin user create` silently no-ops once
@ -111,21 +111,20 @@ enum MatrixCmd {
/// When `<name>` is **not** an agent (a human or any other /// When `<name>` is **not** an agent (a human or any other
/// non-container account), registers the matrix user and prints /// non-container account), registers the matrix user and prints
/// the freshly-minted access token to stdout — no /// the freshly-minted access token to stdout — no
/// `/var/lib/hyperhive/agents/` directory is created for the user /// `/var/lib/hyperhive/agents/` directory is created for the user.
/// (#662).
/// ///
/// Without `--password` / `--password-stdin` a random throwaway is /// Without `--password` / `--password-stdin` a random throwaway is
/// used (fine for agents — they auth by `access_token`, never by /// used (fine for agents — they auth by `access_token`, never by
/// password). Set a password to log into a matrix web client /// password). Set a password to log into a matrix web client
/// afterwards (#663). /// afterwards.
CreateUser { CreateUser {
/// Matrix localpart. For agents: the container/agent name. /// Matrix localpart. For agents: the container/agent name.
/// For humans: any matrix localpart — `mara`, `damocles`, etc. /// For humans: any matrix localpart — `mara`, `damocles`, etc.
name: String, name: String,
/// Set the account password to this string instead of a random /// Set the account password to this string instead of a random
/// throwaway. Use this for operator accounts that need to log /// throwaway. Use this for operator accounts that need to log
/// into matrix web clients via `m.login.password` (#663). /// into matrix web clients via `m.login.password`. Mutually
/// Mutually exclusive with `--password-stdin`. WARNING: the /// exclusive with `--password-stdin`. WARNING: the
/// password is visible in shell history + process listings; /// password is visible in shell history + process listings;
/// prefer `--password-stdin` for anything sensitive. /// prefer `--password-stdin` for anything sensitive.
#[arg(long)] #[arg(long)]

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@ -84,8 +84,9 @@ enum Cmd {
Deny { id: i64 }, Deny { id: i64 },
/// Move an agent in the topology tree. Set `--parent` to a new /// Move an agent in the topology tree. Set `--parent` to a new
/// parent agent name; pass `--root` to promote the agent to root /// parent agent name; pass `--root` to promote the agent to root
/// (no parent). Refuses cycles, unknown agents, and any attempt /// (no parent). Refuses cycles and unknown agents. The manager
/// to reparent the manager. /// is reparentable like any other agent — its privileges come
/// from the privileged MCP socket, not its tree position.
SetParent { SetParent {
child: String, child: String,
/// New parent agent name. Mutually exclusive with `--root`. /// New parent agent name. Mutually exclusive with `--root`.

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@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ pub fn start(coord: Arc<Coordinator>) -> Result<()> {
} }
let listener = UnixListener::bind(&socket) let listener = UnixListener::bind(&socket)
.with_context(|| format!("bind manager socket {}", socket.display()))?; .with_context(|| format!("bind manager socket {}", socket.display()))?;
// 0666 so the in-container hm1nd user (post-#658) can connect; // 0666 so the in-container hm1nd user (non-root) can connect;
// the bind source dir is manager-only on host. See agent_server.rs. // the bind source dir is manager-only on host. See agent_server.rs.
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _; use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
std::fs::set_permissions(&socket, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o666)) std::fs::set_permissions(&socket, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o666))
@ -116,8 +116,9 @@ async fn dispatch(req: &ManagerRequest, coord: &Arc<Coordinator>) -> ManagerResp
// Resolve magic-recipient sentinels (currently `<parent>`) // Resolve magic-recipient sentinels (currently `<parent>`)
// against topology.json; no-op for ordinary names. The // against topology.json; no-op for ordinary names. The
// manager has no parent in topology, so `<parent>` // manager has no parent in topology, so `<parent>`
// resolves to OPERATOR_RECIPIENT — matching mara's // resolves to OPERATOR_RECIPIENT — the "no parent → tell
// "no parent → tell the operator" rule (#692). // the operator" fallback. See `docs/conventions.md::
// Recipient sentinels`.
let resolved = crate::topology::resolve_recipient(MANAGER_AGENT, to); let resolved = crate::topology::resolve_recipient(MANAGER_AGENT, to);
match coord.broker.send(&Message { match coord.broker.send(&Message {
from: MANAGER_AGENT.to_owned(), from: MANAGER_AGENT.to_owned(),
@ -502,7 +503,7 @@ async fn dispatch(req: &ManagerRequest, coord: &Arc<Coordinator>) -> ManagerResp
} }
} }
ManagerRequest::SetStatus { text } => { ManagerRequest::SetStatus { text } => {
// #720: cap length + reject multi-line so a confused caller // Cap length + reject multi-line so a confused caller
// can't dump a multi-paragraph session report into the // can't dump a multi-paragraph session report into the
// dashboard chip. // dashboard chip.
if let Err(message) = crate::limits::check_status_text(text) { if let Err(message) = crate::limits::check_status_text(text) {
@ -533,10 +534,10 @@ async fn dispatch(req: &ManagerRequest, coord: &Arc<Coordinator>) -> ManagerResp
} }
ManagerRequest::GetAgentMeta { name } => { ManagerRequest::GetAgentMeta { name } => {
let target = name.as_deref().unwrap_or(MANAGER_AGENT); let target = name.as_deref().unwrap_or(MANAGER_AGENT);
// #432: gate status on the target's running state so a // Gate status on the target's running state so a stopped
// stopped container's stale on-disk status doesn't leak // container's stale on-disk status doesn't leak through.
// through. Also surface `running` itself so callers can // Also surface `running` itself so callers can tell
// tell (e.g. "iris is down" vs "iris has no status set"). // (e.g. "iris is down" vs "iris has no status set").
let (status_text, status_set_at, running) = let (status_text, status_set_at, running) =
crate::container_view::read_agent_status_live(target).await; crate::container_view::read_agent_status_live(target).await;
let role = if target == MANAGER_AGENT { let role = if target == MANAGER_AGENT {
@ -676,7 +677,7 @@ async fn submit_apply_commit(
.approvals .approvals
.set_fetched_sha(id, &sha) .set_fetched_sha(id, &sha)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("persist fetched_sha: {e:#}"))?; .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("persist fetched_sha: {e:#}"))?;
// #317 pre-flight gates: both reject the apply before approval if // Pre-flight gates: both reject the apply before approval if
// the agent's flake state would inflate meta's lock with duplicates // the agent's flake state would inflate meta's lock with duplicates
// or lie about what nix will fetch. Both checks independently read // or lie about what nix will fetch. Both checks independently read
// `<tag>:flake.lock` via git — they don't share state. Order matters // `<tag>:flake.lock` via git — they don't share state. Order matters
@ -889,8 +890,8 @@ async fn handle_fire_schedule_now(
} }
} }
/// Authorize + dispatch a `EditSchedule` patch (#474). Same /// Authorize + dispatch a `EditSchedule` patch. Same ownership
/// ownership rules as `CancelSchedule` — the manager can edit /// rules as `CancelSchedule` — the manager can edit
/// schedules it owns + any owned by an agent in its subtree. /// schedules it owns + any owned by an agent in its subtree.
/// Forwards the partial payload to /// Forwards the partial payload to
/// `ScheduledPrompts::update` which enforces the cancelled-row / /// `ScheduledPrompts::update` which enforces the cancelled-row /

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@ -209,11 +209,11 @@ pub fn handle_cancel_loose_end(
} }
/// Manager-only guard on the `Approval` cancel arm. Pulled out so /// Manager-only guard on the `Approval` cancel arm. Pulled out so
/// the auth check has its own focused unit test (argus nit on #508) /// the auth check has its own focused unit test — testing the full
/// — testing the full `handle_cancel_loose_end` flow would need a /// `handle_cancel_loose_end` flow would need a `Coordinator` fixture
/// `Coordinator` fixture (broker + sqlite + in-memory questions), /// (broker + sqlite + in-memory questions), which we don't have
/// which we don't have today. The check is a single string compare, /// today. The check is a single string compare, so a function-level
/// so a function-level test gives the same coverage with no harness. /// test gives the same coverage with no harness.
fn check_approval_canceller_is_manager(canceller: &str) -> Result<(), String> { fn check_approval_canceller_is_manager(canceller: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
if canceller != hive_sh4re::MANAGER_AGENT { if canceller != hive_sh4re::MANAGER_AGENT {
return Err("cancel_loose_end: only the manager can cancel approval rows".to_owned()); return Err("cancel_loose_end: only the manager can cancel approval rows".to_owned());
@ -227,9 +227,9 @@ mod tests {
#[test] #[test]
fn approval_cancel_rejects_sub_agent_callers() { fn approval_cancel_rejects_sub_agent_callers() {
// Argus nit on #508: sub-agents must not be able to cancel // Sub-agents must not be able to cancel approval rows even
// approval rows even if they invent an id. The guard is // if they invent an id. The guard is server-side so client
// server-side so client cooperation is irrelevant. // cooperation is irrelevant.
let err = check_approval_canceller_is_manager("bitburner").unwrap_err(); let err = check_approval_canceller_is_manager("bitburner").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.contains("only the manager"), "{err}"); assert!(err.contains("only the manager"), "{err}");
// Bonus: empty / operator strings also rejected (only the // Bonus: empty / operator strings also rejected (only the