hive-c0re: scrub manager-surface cookies + SetParent doc fix (#715 batch 7)

hive-c0re/src/approvals.rs

@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ impl Approvals {
         Ok(())
     }
 
-    /// Withdraw a pending approval (closes #250). Returns the now-updated
+    /// Withdraw a pending approval. Returns the now-updated
     /// row so the caller can emit `ApprovalResolved` with the right
     /// kind / agent / sha. Errors if the approval isn't pending — once
     /// it's approved/denied/failed/cancelled, the resolution is final.
@@ -329,8 +329,7 @@ impl Approvals {
 /// deserialize. A single malformed / unknown-kind row must never blank
 /// the whole list: `collect::<Result<Vec>>()` is all-or-nothing, so one
 /// bad row used to make `pending()` / `recent_resolved()` error out
-/// wholesale — the dashboard then rendered an empty approvals queue
-/// (issue #160, an unhandled `init_config` kind poisoning every read).
+/// wholesale — the dashboard then rendered an empty approvals queue.
 fn collect_lenient(rows: impl Iterator<Item = rusqlite::Result<Approval>>) -> Vec<Approval> {
     rows.filter_map(|r| match r {
         Ok(a) => Some(a),
@@ -435,7 +434,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn init_config_approval_round_trips() {
-        // Regression for #160: an `init_config` row used to fail
+        // Regression test: an `init_config` row used to fail
         // deserialization (row_to_approval matched only apply_commit +
         // spawn), erroring out the whole `pending()` query — every
         // approval then vanished from the dashboard.
@@ -465,9 +464,9 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn mark_cancelled_transitions_pending_row() {
-        // #250: manager withdraws a pending approval. Row leaves
-        // pending(), shows up in recent_resolved() with the cancelled
-        // status + a "cancelled by <who>" note.
+        // Manager withdraws a pending approval. Row leaves pending(),
+        // shows up in recent_resolved() with the cancelled status + a
+        // "cancelled by <who>" note.
         let (_dir, _path, db) = open_temp();
         let id = db
             .submit_kind(

hive-c0re/src/bin/hivectl.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! `hivectl` — operator-facing host CLI for hyperhive (#655).
+//! `hivectl` — operator-facing host CLI for hyperhive.
 //!
 //! Sibling binary to the `hive-c0re` daemon. Where `hive-c0re`'s
 //! subcommands focus on the broker / approval / topology surface
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 //! starting with manual user provisioning on the bundled forge +
 //! matrix containers when c0re's automatic boot-time sweep is
 //! inappropriate (recovery, debugging, single-shot reprovisioning,
-//! verifying the registration token path post-#644).
+//! verifying the registration token path).
 //!
 //! Verbs read configuration off the same on-disk paths c0re uses
 //! (`/var/lib/hyperhive/forge-core-token`,
@@ -69,11 +69,11 @@ enum ForgeCmd {
     /// When `<name>` is **not** an agent (a human or any other
     /// non-container account), creates the forgejo user and prints the
     /// freshly-minted token to stdout — no `/var/lib/hyperhive/agents/`
-    /// directory is created for the user (#662).
+    /// directory is created for the user.
     ///
     /// Without `--password` / `--password-stdin` a random throwaway is
     /// used (fine for agents — they auth by token via tea / hive-forge).
-    /// Set a password to log into the forge web UI afterwards (#663).
+    /// Set a password to log into the forge web UI afterwards.
     /// `--password` is idempotent: re-running with the same value sets
     /// the same password (covers password resets on already-created
     /// accounts since `forgejo admin user create` silently no-ops once
@@ -111,21 +111,20 @@ enum MatrixCmd {
     /// When `<name>` is **not** an agent (a human or any other
     /// non-container account), registers the matrix user and prints
     /// the freshly-minted access token to stdout — no
-    /// `/var/lib/hyperhive/agents/` directory is created for the user
-    /// (#662).
+    /// `/var/lib/hyperhive/agents/` directory is created for the user.
     ///
     /// Without `--password` / `--password-stdin` a random throwaway is
     /// used (fine for agents — they auth by `access_token`, never by
     /// password). Set a password to log into a matrix web client
-    /// afterwards (#663).
+    /// afterwards.
     CreateUser {
         /// Matrix localpart. For agents: the container/agent name.
         /// For humans: any matrix localpart — `mara`, `damocles`, etc.
         name: String,
         /// Set the account password to this string instead of a random
         /// throwaway. Use this for operator accounts that need to log
-        /// into matrix web clients via `m.login.password` (#663).
-        /// Mutually exclusive with `--password-stdin`. WARNING: the
+        /// into matrix web clients via `m.login.password`. Mutually
+        /// exclusive with `--password-stdin`. WARNING: the
         /// password is visible in shell history + process listings;
         /// prefer `--password-stdin` for anything sensitive.
         #[arg(long)]

hive-c0re/src/main.rs

@@ -84,8 +84,9 @@ enum Cmd {
     Deny { id: i64 },
     /// Move an agent in the topology tree. Set `--parent` to a new
     /// parent agent name; pass `--root` to promote the agent to root
-    /// (no parent). Refuses cycles, unknown agents, and any attempt
-    /// to reparent the manager.
+    /// (no parent). Refuses cycles and unknown agents. The manager
+    /// is reparentable like any other agent — its privileges come
+    /// from the privileged MCP socket, not its tree position.
     SetParent {
         child: String,
         /// New parent agent name. Mutually exclusive with `--root`.

hive-c0re/src/manager_server.rs

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ pub fn start(coord: Arc<Coordinator>) -> Result<()> {
     }
     let listener = UnixListener::bind(&socket)
         .with_context(|| format!("bind manager socket {}", socket.display()))?;
-    // 0666 so the in-container hm1nd user (post-#658) can connect;
+    // 0666 so the in-container hm1nd user (non-root) can connect;
     // the bind source dir is manager-only on host. See agent_server.rs.
     use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
     std::fs::set_permissions(&socket, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o666))
@@ -116,8 +116,9 @@ async fn dispatch(req: &ManagerRequest, coord: &Arc<Coordinator>) -> ManagerResp
                 // Resolve magic-recipient sentinels (currently `<parent>`)
                 // against topology.json; no-op for ordinary names. The
                 // manager has no parent in topology, so `<parent>`
-                // resolves to OPERATOR_RECIPIENT — matching mara's
-                // "no parent → tell the operator" rule (#692).
+                // resolves to OPERATOR_RECIPIENT — the "no parent → tell
+                // the operator" fallback. See `docs/conventions.md::
+                // Recipient sentinels`.
                 let resolved = crate::topology::resolve_recipient(MANAGER_AGENT, to);
                 match coord.broker.send(&Message {
                     from: MANAGER_AGENT.to_owned(),
@@ -502,7 +503,7 @@ async fn dispatch(req: &ManagerRequest, coord: &Arc<Coordinator>) -> ManagerResp
             }
         }
         ManagerRequest::SetStatus { text } => {
-            // #720: cap length + reject multi-line so a confused caller
+            // Cap length + reject multi-line so a confused caller
             // can't dump a multi-paragraph session report into the
             // dashboard chip.
             if let Err(message) = crate::limits::check_status_text(text) {
@@ -533,10 +534,10 @@ async fn dispatch(req: &ManagerRequest, coord: &Arc<Coordinator>) -> ManagerResp
         }
         ManagerRequest::GetAgentMeta { name } => {
             let target = name.as_deref().unwrap_or(MANAGER_AGENT);
-            // #432: gate status on the target's running state so a
-            // stopped container's stale on-disk status doesn't leak
-            // through. Also surface `running` itself so callers can
-            // tell (e.g. "iris is down" vs "iris has no status set").
+            // Gate status on the target's running state so a stopped
+            // container's stale on-disk status doesn't leak through.
+            // Also surface `running` itself so callers can tell
+            // (e.g. "iris is down" vs "iris has no status set").
             let (status_text, status_set_at, running) =
                 crate::container_view::read_agent_status_live(target).await;
             let role = if target == MANAGER_AGENT {
@@ -676,7 +677,7 @@ async fn submit_apply_commit(
         .approvals
         .set_fetched_sha(id, &sha)
         .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("persist fetched_sha: {e:#}"))?;
-    // #317 pre-flight gates: both reject the apply before approval if
+    // Pre-flight gates: both reject the apply before approval if
     // the agent's flake state would inflate meta's lock with duplicates
     // or lie about what nix will fetch. Both checks independently read
     // `<tag>:flake.lock` via git — they don't share state. Order matters
@@ -889,8 +890,8 @@ async fn handle_fire_schedule_now(
     }
 }
 
-/// Authorize + dispatch a `EditSchedule` patch (#474). Same
-/// ownership rules as `CancelSchedule` — the manager can edit
+/// Authorize + dispatch a `EditSchedule` patch. Same ownership
+/// rules as `CancelSchedule` — the manager can edit
 /// schedules it owns + any owned by an agent in its subtree.
 /// Forwards the partial payload to
 /// `ScheduledPrompts::update` which enforces the cancelled-row /

hive-c0re/src/questions.rs

@@ -209,11 +209,11 @@ pub fn handle_cancel_loose_end(
 }
 
 /// Manager-only guard on the `Approval` cancel arm. Pulled out so
-/// the auth check has its own focused unit test (argus nit on #508)
-/// — testing the full `handle_cancel_loose_end` flow would need a
-/// `Coordinator` fixture (broker + sqlite + in-memory questions),
-/// which we don't have today. The check is a single string compare,
-/// so a function-level test gives the same coverage with no harness.
+/// the auth check has its own focused unit test — testing the full
+/// `handle_cancel_loose_end` flow would need a `Coordinator` fixture
+/// (broker + sqlite + in-memory questions), which we don't have
+/// today. The check is a single string compare, so a function-level
+/// test gives the same coverage with no harness.
 fn check_approval_canceller_is_manager(canceller: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
     if canceller != hive_sh4re::MANAGER_AGENT {
         return Err("cancel_loose_end: only the manager can cancel approval rows".to_owned());
@@ -227,9 +227,9 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn approval_cancel_rejects_sub_agent_callers() {
-        // Argus nit on #508: sub-agents must not be able to cancel
-        // approval rows even if they invent an id. The guard is
-        // server-side so client cooperation is irrelevant.
+        // Sub-agents must not be able to cancel approval rows even
+        // if they invent an id. The guard is server-side so client
+        // cooperation is irrelevant.
         let err = check_approval_canceller_is_manager("bitburner").unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.contains("only the manager"), "{err}");
         // Bonus: empty / operator strings also rejected (only the