docs: clear write-good.Passive hits in docs/trust-boundary/security.md
2 genuine passive-voice rewrites (actor named — a caller, the
hard-coded unit name); 5 false positives left untouched — a
definitional/classificatory statement ('an agent is trusted code'),
a predicate-adjective state description ('is privileged'), two
quoted-literal framing phrases ('can the agent be stopped...', 'the
whole hive is affected'), and the already-established 'is tracked as
a TODO' pattern.
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@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ this gap.
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⚠️ **`ReloadGatewayNginx` acts on a host unit, so nothing implicitly
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scopes it.** Its containment is the unit name hard-coded in `hive-priv`:
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a caller can't name the unit, so the verb can't be steered at another
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a caller can't name the unit, so it can't steer the verb at another
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service. **A privileged verb needs something bounding what it can act
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on; when that isn't a namespace, it has to be a constant the caller
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can't supply.**
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@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ matching the agent-name convention (char-validated) or the known
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sibling service containers (`hive-forge`, `hive-matrix`, `hive-ci`),
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and rejects arbitrary container names. `hive-gateway` is a host unit,
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not a container, so it's not in this list — see `ReloadGatewayNginx`
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above for how its access is scoped instead.
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above for how the hard-coded unit name scopes its access instead.
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**Socket-activated** — systemd starts `hive-priv` on the first
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incoming connection (`LISTEN_FDS=1`); it's not running between calls.
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