From 28df69286d7f1ae8a0e38336fb2be7ea4724572f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: iris Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2026 16:28:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] docs(security): document hive-priv privilege separation model --- docs/boundary.md | 7 +++++-- docs/security.md | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/boundary.md b/docs/boundary.md index 95a07ebc..ba3f7b2b 100644 --- a/docs/boundary.md +++ b/docs/boundary.md @@ -51,9 +51,12 @@ Suggested sequencing of the `area:ops` issues: 1. **Gateway** first — pure ergonomics win, unblocks same-origin (lets the cross-origin CORS shim on `/answer-question/{id}` go - away), no behavioural risk. + away), no behavioural risk. ✅ **Done** — nginx gateway in front of + all surfaces; per-agent UIs proxied under `/agent//`. 2. **Network isolation** next — the step that makes the boundary real. Everything before it is honour-system. 3. **Privsep** last — defence in depth on the core process itself; valuable independent of the other two, but the - biggest refactor. + biggest refactor. ✅ **Done** — `hive-c0re` dropped from root to + `hive-core` user; `hive-priv` is the narrow root helper. + See [`docs/security.md`](security.md) for the privilege boundary table. diff --git a/docs/security.md b/docs/security.md index d740f066..4c9ead78 100644 --- a/docs/security.md +++ b/docs/security.md @@ -71,3 +71,53 @@ The proper fix is to enable user namespaces inside nspawn containers (`--private-users=inherit` in `EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS`) so nix can set up its real sandbox and `sandbox-fallback` becomes a true last resort. This requires verifying bind-mount compatibility with user namespace UID mapping and is tracked as a TODO. + +## hive-c0re privilege separation + +### Background + +`hive-c0re` runs as the unprivileged system user `hive-core` +(`/var/lib/hyperhive` owned by `hive-core:hive-core`). It cannot +directly invoke `nixos-container`, `journalctl -M`, or `systemctl +-M hive-gateway` — those require root. `hive-priv` fills this gap. + +### hive-priv + +`hive-priv` is a minimal privileged helper that runs as root, socket-activated +at `/run/hive/priv.sock` (mode `0660`, group `hive-core` — only the +`hive-core` user can connect). `hive-c0re` calls it via `priv_client` +for every operation that genuinely requires root. + +**Narrow interface** — `PrivRequest` variants map 1:1 to specific +known operations; there is no arbitrary command pass-through: + +| Operation | What it runs | +|-----------|-------------| +| `StartContainer` / `StopContainer` / `KillContainer` | `nixos-container start/stop/kill ` | +| `CreateContainer` / `UpdateContainer` | `nixos-container create/update --flake ` | +| `DestroyContainer` | `nixos-container destroy ` | +| `ListContainers` | `nixos-container list` | +| `ReadContainerJournal` | `journalctl -M -n [filters...]` | +| `ReloadGateway` | `systemctl -M hive-gateway reload/start/reset-failed nginx` | +| `AddBindMount` / `RemoveBindMount` | `systemctl set-property` or `machinectl bind` | +| `WriteAgentForgeToken` / `WriteAgentMatrixToken` | write `0600` credential file into agent state | +| `SetNetworkIsolation` | manage per-container network isolation flags | + +**Container allowlist** — every request is validated against an +allowlist before any operation: only names matching `h-` (the +standard agent prefix), the manager container, or the known sibling +service containers (`hive-gateway`, `hive-forge`, `hive-matrix`, +`hive-ci`) are accepted. Arbitrary container names are rejected. + +**Socket-activated** — systemd starts `hive-priv` on the first +incoming connection (`LISTEN_FDS=1`); it is not running between calls. +The `ProtectSystem=strict` + `ReadWritePaths` sandbox limits filesystem +writes to only the paths `hive-priv` legitimately needs. + +### Privilege boundary summary + +| Component | Runs as | Privilege needed for | +|-----------|---------|----------------------| +| `hive-c0re` | `hive-core` | broker, HTTP dashboard, scheduling, approvals | +| `hive-priv` | `root` | container lifecycle, journal reads, bind mounts, cred writes | +| `hive-ag3nt` (per-container) | per-agent user | turn execution, MCP serving |