hive-c0re/hive-sh4re: remove the ask/answer wire protocol + core routing

This commit is contained in:
damocles 2026-08-30 01:18:17 +02:00
commit 2850270829
23 changed files with 177 additions and 851 deletions

View file

@ -208,37 +208,12 @@ pub(crate) async fn dispatch_shared(
}
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::Wake { from, body } => handle_wake(coord, agent, from, body),
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::Recent { limit } => handle_recent(coord, agent, *limit),
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::Ask {
question,
options,
multi,
ttl_seconds,
to,
} => crate::questions::handle_ask(
coord,
agent,
question,
options,
*multi,
*ttl_seconds,
to.as_ref().map(hive_types::Ident::as_str),
)
.map_or_else(
|message| hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err { message },
|id| hive_core_agent_sock::Response::QuestionQueued { id },
),
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::Answer { id, answer } => {
crate::questions::handle_answer(coord, agent, *id, answer).map_or_else(
|message| hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err { message },
|()| hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Ok,
)
}
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::SetStatus { text } => handle_set_status(coord, text),
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::GetAgentMeta { name } => {
handle_get_agent_meta(coord, agent, name.as_ref()).await
}
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::CancelLooseEnd { kind, id } => {
crate::questions::handle_cancel_loose_end(coord, agent, *kind, *id).map_or_else(
handle_cancel_loose_end(coord, agent, *kind, *id).map_or_else(
|message| hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err { message },
|()| hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Ok,
)
@ -790,6 +765,97 @@ fn handle_get_loose_ends(coord: &Arc<Coordinator>, agent: &str, target: Option<&
}
}
/// Handle `CancelLooseEnd` from a per-agent socket. Dispatches by kind, each
/// with its own auth check: reminder cancels are handled entirely in-container
/// (this arm should be unreachable in practice, kept only so the match stays
/// exhaustive) and approval cancels require the `approvals` tool-group (the
/// grantable capability) AND ownership — the canceller must be the approval's
/// submitter — so no positional / hardcoded privilege and no cross-agent
/// cancellation. (The operator's cancel-anything path is a separate handler.)
fn handle_cancel_loose_end(
coord: &Arc<Coordinator>,
canceller: &str,
kind: hive_sh4re::inbox::CancelLooseEndKind,
id: i64,
) -> Result<(), String> {
match kind {
hive_sh4re::inbox::CancelLooseEndKind::Reminder => {
// Reminders are now agent-local (in-container store) — the
// agent-mcp `cancel_loose_end` tool branches on this kind and
// dials the agent's own socket directly, never forwarding to
// hive-c0re. This arm should be unreachable in practice; kept
// only so the match stays exhaustive.
Err(format!(
"reminder {id}: reminders are handled locally by the agent, \
not by hive-c0re"
))
}
hive_sh4re::inbox::CancelLooseEndKind::Approval => {
// Withdrawing an approval needs the grantable `approvals`
// tool-group (held by any approval-submitting orchestrator)
// AND ownership: only the agent that submitted the approval
// may withdraw it. Without the ownership check, any
// approvals-group agent could cancel any other's approval by
// id. A NULL submitter (legacy row predating the column) is
// treated as operator-initiated (no agent tracking predates
// the column).
check_can_cancel_approval(canceller)?;
let submitter = coord
.approvals
.submitter_of(id)
.map_err(|e| format!("{e:#}"))?
.unwrap_or_else(|| "operator".to_owned());
if submitter != canceller {
return Err(format!(
"cancel_loose_end: approval {id} was submitted by {submitter}, \
not {canceller}; only the submitting agent can withdraw it"
));
}
let approval = coord
.approvals
.mark_cancelled(id, canceller)
.map_err(|e| format!("{e:#}"))?;
tracing::info!(%id, %canceller, agent = %approval.agent, "approval cancelled");
let sha_short = approval
.fetched_sha
.as_deref()
.map(|s| s[..s.len().min(12)].to_owned());
coord.emit_approval_resolved(crate::coordinator::ApprovalResolved {
id: approval.id,
agent: approval.agent.as_str(),
approval_kind: approval.kind.as_str(),
sha_short,
status: "cancelled",
note: approval.note,
description: approval.description,
});
Ok(())
}
}
}
/// Capability guard on the `Approval` cancel arm: the caller must hold the
/// `approvals` tool-group (the grantable capability for approval-submitting
/// orchestrators), checked server-side via `tool_groups::groups_for`. Pulled
/// out so the auth check has its own focused unit test — exercising the full
/// `handle_cancel_loose_end` flow would need a `Coordinator` fixture (broker +
/// sqlite). Keys on a grantable capability, not a positional / hardcoded
/// privilege.
fn check_can_cancel_approval(canceller: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
const APPROVALS_GROUP: &str = "approvals";
if crate::tool_groups::groups_for(canceller)
.iter()
.any(|g| g == APPROVALS_GROUP)
{
Ok(())
} else {
Err(
"cancel_loose_end: cancelling approval rows requires the `approvals` tool group"
.to_owned(),
)
}
}
/// Resolve the target agent name for a *named* `GetLooseEnds` query. Rules:
///
/// - `None` (or `Some(caller)`) → the caller's own threads (always allowed).
@ -1077,43 +1143,18 @@ async fn handle_get_logs(agent: &str, lines: Option<u32>) -> Response {
}
}
/// On `Ask { ttl_seconds: Some(n) }`, sleep n seconds and then try to
/// resolve the question with `[expired]`. If the operator (or any
/// other path) already answered it, `answer()` returns Err and we
/// no-op silently. Otherwise fire a `QuestionAnswered` helper event
/// with `answerer = "ttl-watchdog"` so the asker can distinguish a
/// real answer from a deadline trip without parsing the answer text.
const TTL_SENTINEL: &str = "[expired]";
/// Synthetic `answerer` label used when the ttl watchdog resolves a
/// question instead of a real human / agent. Lives in a distinct
/// namespace from agent names + the operator so the asker can pattern
/// match `event.answerer == "ttl-watchdog"`.
const TTL_ANSWERER: &str = "ttl-watchdog";
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
pub fn spawn_question_watchdog(coord: &Arc<Coordinator>, id: i64, ttl_secs: u64) {
let coord = coord.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(ttl_secs)).await;
// Watchdog has its own answerer label so the authorisation
// check in `answer()` permits it for any target. We bypass
// the public `answer()` path by calling it with the operator
// identity, since the operator is always permitted; the
// event we fire carries the real watchdog label for observers.
if let Ok((question, asker, _target)) =
coord
.questions
.answer(id, TTL_SENTINEL, hive_sh4re::manager::OPERATOR_RECIPIENT)
{
tracing::info!(%id, %asker, "question expired (ttl)");
coord.notify_agent(
&asker,
&hive_sh4re::manager::HelperEvent::QuestionAnswered {
id,
question,
answer: TTL_SENTINEL.to_owned(),
answerer: TTL_ANSWERER.to_owned(),
},
);
}
});
#[test]
fn approval_cancel_rejects_callers_without_the_approvals_group() {
// A caller that doesn't hold the `approvals` tool-group must not be
// able to cancel approval rows even if it invents an id. The guard is
// server-side so client cooperation is irrelevant — and it keys on a
// grantable capability (the tool-group), not on any agent name.
// `groups_for` of a name with no tool_groups.json entry is empty.
let err = check_can_cancel_approval("nobody-with-no-groups").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.contains("approvals` tool group"), "{err}");
}
}