fix(#3394): distinguish the caller's bad token from the bridge failing to validate

swarm-authelia-bridge answered one 401 for four causes, including its own
client credentials being rejected by authelia — telling a caller its token
was invalid when the fault was ours. That cost a real diagnostic round-trip,
because the only thing separating the two was a log line inside a container.

Introspection now returns a three-way Verdict, and one classify() maps it to
either admission, a 401 (the caller's credential) or a 503 (ours). Admission
is unchanged: Ok is reachable from exactly one variant.
This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-08-18 00:11:32 +02:00 committed by mara
commit 266e8ac96b
2 changed files with 212 additions and 40 deletions

View file

@ -9,6 +9,15 @@
//! HTTP call are exactly the conditions an attacker would like this to //! HTTP call are exactly the conditions an attacker would like this to
//! fall open under. //! fall open under.
//! //!
//! [`Verdict`] has three variants where admission has two: the extra one
//! carries **whose fault a denial was**, a different question from who is
//! admitted (`main`'s `classify` is the single place that answers the
//! latter). Collapsing them answered `401 missing or invalid bearer token`
//! when *this bridge's own* credentials were the problem — a false
//! accusation pointing away from the fault, in the case most likely right
//! after a config change. `Unavailable` is **not a softer denial**: it
//! denies exactly as hard and only changes the report.
//!
//! Authenticates the introspection call itself with **this bridge's own** //! Authenticates the introspection call itself with **this bridge's own**
//! client credentials (a resource server introspecting a token proves its //! client credentials (a resource server introspecting a token proves its
//! own identity to the `IdP`, per RFC 7662) — a separate authelia machine //! own identity to the `IdP`, per RFC 7662) — a separate authelia machine
@ -16,7 +25,6 @@
use std::time::Duration; use std::time::Duration;
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use serde::Deserialize; use serde::Deserialize;
/// Generous relative to `swarm-nats-auth`'s 1.5s (that one is bounded by /// Generous relative to `swarm-nats-auth`'s 1.5s (that one is bounded by
@ -30,39 +38,71 @@ struct IntrospectionResponse {
active: bool, active: bool,
} }
/// Ask authelia whether `token` is currently valid. `Ok(true)` only on a /// The outcome of asking authelia about a token.
/// 2xx body with `active: true`; every other outcome is `Ok(false)` ///
/// (logged) or `Err` when the call could not be made at all — callers /// Total by construction — there is no `Result` wrapper, because every way
/// must treat both as a denial. /// the call can go wrong is already a variant. A caller that forgets a case
pub async fn is_active( /// does not compile, and there is no error path that could be `?`-ed past
/// into an accidental admission.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Verdict {
/// 2xx with `active: true`. The only admitting outcome.
Active,
/// 2xx with `active: false` — authelia evaluated the token and said no.
/// The **caller's** credential is the problem.
Inactive,
/// The question could not be answered: the request failed, authelia
/// answered non-2xx (which for RFC 7662 means *the introspection call
/// itself* was rejected — an invalid token is a 200 with
/// `active: false`), or the body did not parse. In every case the fault
/// is on **this bridge's** side of the exchange, not the caller's.
Unavailable,
}
/// Ask authelia whether `token` is currently valid.
///
/// Never fails: see [`Verdict`]. Each non-admitting outcome is logged at
/// `warn` with the detail that distinguishes it, since the response the
/// caller gets is deliberately vague.
pub async fn introspect(
http: &reqwest::Client, http: &reqwest::Client,
url: &str, url: &str,
client_id: &str, client_id: &str,
client_secret: &str, client_secret: &str,
token: &str, token: &str,
) -> Result<bool> { ) -> Verdict {
let resp = http let resp = match http
.post(url) .post(url)
.basic_auth(client_id, Some(client_secret)) .basic_auth(client_id, Some(client_secret))
.form(&[("token", token)]) .form(&[("token", token)])
.timeout(INTROSPECTION_TIMEOUT) .timeout(INTROSPECTION_TIMEOUT)
.send() .send()
.await .await
.context("introspection request")?; {
Ok(resp) => resp,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "introspection request failed; cannot validate");
return Verdict::Unavailable;
}
};
let status = resp.status(); let status = resp.status();
if !status.is_success() { if !status.is_success() {
tracing::warn!(%status, "introspection returned non-2xx; denying"); // Most often: this bridge's own client credentials are being
return Ok(false); // rejected by authelia. Logged with the status because that is the
// one thing separating "my secret is stale" from "authelia is
// unwell", and neither is the caller's business.
tracing::warn!(%status, "introspection returned non-2xx; cannot validate");
return Verdict::Unavailable;
} }
let body: IntrospectionResponse = match resp.json().await { match resp.json::<IntrospectionResponse>().await {
Ok(b) => b, Ok(body) if body.active => Verdict::Active,
Ok(_) => Verdict::Inactive,
Err(e) => { Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "introspection body did not parse; denying"); tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "introspection body did not parse; cannot validate");
return Ok(false); Verdict::Unavailable
} }
}; }
Ok(body.active)
} }
#[cfg(test)] #[cfg(test)]
@ -77,4 +117,16 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!no.active); assert!(!no.active);
assert!(serde_json::from_str::<IntrospectionResponse>(r#"{"sub":"someone"}"#).is_err()); assert!(serde_json::from_str::<IntrospectionResponse>(r#"{"sub":"someone"}"#).is_err());
} }
/// A 2xx body whose `active` is false is a *verdict*, not an error —
/// the distinction `Verdict` exists to preserve, asserted at the one
/// place the two are told apart from the wire.
#[test]
fn an_inactive_token_is_a_verdict_not_a_failure() {
let body: IntrospectionResponse = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"active":false}"#).unwrap();
assert!(
!body.active,
"authelia answering `active: false` is authelia working, not authelia failing"
);
}
} }

View file

@ -156,44 +156,102 @@ async fn handle_request(
} }
/// Extract + introspect the bearer token. `Err` carries the response to /// Extract + introspect the bearer token. `Err` carries the response to
/// return outright (401 for anything short of an active token) — kept /// return outright — kept separate from `handle`'s error path, which is
/// separate from `handle`'s error path, which is "the op itself failed," /// "the op itself failed," a different case from "the caller was never let
/// a different case from "the caller was never let in." /// in."
///
/// Anything short of an active token is refused; **which status** depends
/// on whose credential failed, see [`Refusal`].
async fn authorize(state: &AppState, headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<(), Response> { async fn authorize(state: &AppState, headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<(), Response> {
let deny = || {
(
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
Json(BridgeResponse::Error {
message: "missing or invalid bearer token".to_owned(),
}),
)
.into_response()
};
let Some(auth) = headers.get(axum::http::header::AUTHORIZATION) else { let Some(auth) = headers.get(axum::http::header::AUTHORIZATION) else {
return Err(deny()); return Err(refuse(Refusal::Caller));
}; };
let Ok(auth) = auth.to_str() else { let Ok(auth) = auth.to_str() else {
return Err(deny()); return Err(refuse(Refusal::Caller));
}; };
let Some(token) = auth.strip_prefix("Bearer ") else { let Some(token) = auth.strip_prefix("Bearer ") else {
return Err(deny()); return Err(refuse(Refusal::Caller));
}; };
match introspect::is_active( let verdict = introspect::introspect(
&state.http, &state.http,
&state.config.introspection_url, &state.config.introspection_url,
&state.config.client_id, &state.config.client_id,
&state.config.client_secret, &state.config.client_secret,
token, token,
) )
.await .await;
{ classify(verdict).map_err(refuse)
Ok(true) => Ok(()), }
Ok(false) => Err(deny()),
Err(e) => { /// The admission decision, and the only place that makes it.
tracing::warn!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "introspection call failed; denying"); ///
Err(deny()) /// Fail-closed: `Ok(())` is reachable from exactly one variant. Split out
/// of [`authorize`] so the rule is testable without an authelia — and it is
/// the *real* rule, not a restatement of it, because this is the function
/// the request path calls.
fn classify(verdict: introspect::Verdict) -> Result<(), Refusal> {
match verdict {
introspect::Verdict::Active => Ok(()),
introspect::Verdict::Inactive => Err(Refusal::Caller),
introspect::Verdict::Unavailable => Err(Refusal::Bridge),
}
}
/// Whose credential was at fault when a request was refused.
///
/// The distinction is the whole point: these used to be one 401, so a
/// caller whose token was fine was told its token was invalid whenever
/// *this bridge* could not authenticate itself to authelia.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum Refusal {
/// No token, an unusable header, or a token authelia rejected.
Caller,
/// This bridge could not get an answer out of authelia at all, so the
/// request was never evaluated.
Bridge,
}
impl Refusal {
/// `401` for the caller; `503` for us.
///
/// 401 would be wrong for [`Refusal::Bridge`] under RFC 7235 — nothing
/// about the caller's credential was determined — and it is also the
/// least useful thing to say, because a client that believes its token
/// is bad will go and mint a new one, which cannot help.
///
/// 503 rather than 500 because the overwhelmingly common cause is
/// transient by construction: this bridge's own secret is minted on
/// authelia's first boot and delivered by a separate unit, so the
/// window where it is absent closes on its own. A client retrying is
/// doing the right thing.
fn status(self) -> StatusCode {
match self {
Refusal::Caller => StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
Refusal::Bridge => StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
} }
} }
/// Deliberately coarse for [`Refusal::Caller`]: an unauthenticated
/// caller learns that it was refused, never which of the four ways.
/// The `Bridge` message says only that validation could not happen —
/// no status code, no upstream detail, nothing about the secret. The
/// discriminating detail is in this bridge's journal, where it belongs.
fn message(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Refusal::Caller => "missing or invalid bearer token",
Refusal::Bridge => "cannot validate credentials",
}
}
}
fn refuse(refusal: Refusal) -> Response {
(
refusal.status(),
Json(BridgeResponse::Error {
message: refusal.message().to_owned(),
}),
)
.into_response()
} }
async fn handle(state: &AppState, name: String) -> Result<BridgeResponse> { async fn handle(state: &AppState, name: String) -> Result<BridgeResponse> {
@ -265,3 +323,65 @@ async fn generate_password(bin: &std::path::Path) -> Result<String> {
) )
}) })
} }
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{Refusal, StatusCode, classify, introspect::Verdict};
/// Fail-closed, asserted per variant rather than as one negation:
/// splitting blame out of a single denial is exactly the change that
/// could have widened admission, so each refusing variant is named on
/// its own line.
#[test]
fn only_an_active_token_is_admitted() {
assert_eq!(classify(Verdict::Active), Ok(()));
assert_eq!(
classify(Verdict::Inactive),
Err(Refusal::Caller),
"authelia evaluated the token and said no"
);
assert_eq!(
classify(Verdict::Unavailable),
Err(Refusal::Bridge),
"a bridge that cannot ask must not admit — this variant reports a \
different fault, it is not a softer denial"
);
}
/// The whole point of the split, asserted on the value rather than
/// on message text — the previous code picked its status by matching on
/// a log message's wording, which is what let the two collapse.
#[test]
fn a_refusal_names_whose_credential_failed() {
assert_eq!(
Refusal::Caller.status(),
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
"the caller's token is the problem; retrying with the same one will not help"
);
assert_eq!(
Refusal::Bridge.status(),
StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
"the request was never evaluated — 401 here accuses the caller of our fault"
);
assert_ne!(
Refusal::Caller.status(),
Refusal::Bridge.status(),
"collapsing these back into one status is the bug this exists to prevent"
);
}
/// No response body may leak which of the four caller-side causes
/// applied, nor anything about this bridge's own credential.
#[test]
fn refusal_messages_say_nothing_useful_to_an_attacker() {
for refusal in [Refusal::Caller, Refusal::Bridge] {
let message = refusal.message();
for leak in ["secret", "client_id", "authelia", "http", "status"] {
assert!(
!message.to_ascii_lowercase().contains(leak),
"{refusal:?} message leaks {leak:?}: {message:?}"
);
}
}
}
}