hive-priv: create agent socket dirs on start; drop hyperhive-agents.conf
/etc/tmpfiles.d/hyperhive-agents.conf was a boot-time backstop (#2290) that pre-created every agent's bind sources. The start preamble already creates them for every c0re-driven start, and on this host only hive-c0re starts agent containers. The file was also the reason the socket dir's owner had to be declared there, which is how it spent its life at `0777 root root` whenever the uid could not be resolved (#4742). - hive-priv gains `EnsureAgentSocketDir { name }`, called from `set_nspawn_flags` in every start path. It creates `/run/hive-agent/<name>` `0751 root:root` with mkdirat relative to an O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW fd for the parent. An existing entry has to be a directory (fstatat AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); anything else is refused, and a directory is left alone. hive-c0re's own create_dir_all went: its /run is read-only under ProtectSystem=strict. - The container's `hive-agent-user-migrate` activation chowns that dir to the agent user and sets 0751, the same way it already handles state/ and harness/. It refuses a symlink or non-directory there, since `test -d` and chmod follow links. No host-side passwd parse, and no window where the dir is world-writable. - `/run/hyperhive/agents/<name>` stays created by hive-c0re itself (`ensure_agent_runtime_dir`). It holds the `mcp.sock` that hive-c0re binds as hive-core, so it must not become root- or agent-owned. - The `/run/hive-agent` parent is declared in hive-priv.nix, `0755 root:root`, instead of hive-gateway's hive-core rule. hive-priv is its only writer now, and hive-priv's ReadWritePaths needs it to exist. - The manager start in `ensure_root_agent` now goes through `converge_start_preamble` + `start_with_fallback`. It was a bare start, so after a reboot the manager's bind sources existed only because of the tmpfiles file, and its limits drop-in did not exist at all. - Removed: `sync_tmpfiles`, `agent_uid_gid` / `parse_passwd_uid_gid`, `priv_client::sync_agent_tmpfiles`, `AgentTmpfilesEntry`, the tmpfiles body builder and their tests, plus the three call sites. - Legacy: hive-priv unlinks the file at every start, ignoring ENOENT. `SyncAgentTmpfiles` stays one release as a payload-ignoring variant that does the same unlink and returns Ok, for an older hive-c0re. Salvaged from #4752: the boundary.md correction that nginx only dials, because ProtectSystem=strict makes its /run read-only. Behaviour change: a manual `nixos-container start h-<name>` right after a reboot, before hive-c0re has started that agent, now fails on a missing bind source instead of starting. Closes #4742
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21 changed files with 369 additions and 421 deletions
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@ -283,50 +283,6 @@ fn an_unknown_state_is_never_reported_as_failed() {
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}
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}
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/// A malformed row for the wanted user must not end the scan.
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///
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/// The old implementation used `?` on the field reads, which are only reached
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/// once the name matches — so a short or unparseable row *for this agent*
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/// returned `None` from the whole function and hid a usable entry below it.
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/// The caller answers that `None` by declaring the socket dir `0777`.
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#[test]
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fn passwd_parse_keeps_scanning_past_a_malformed_row_for_the_same_user() {
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// The two `atlas` rows above the real one are what matters: a malformed
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// row for the SAME user is what used to end the scan, so the usable entry
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// below it was never reached. Rows for other users were always skipped
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// fine. Both unusable shapes are here because they leave the parser by
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// different arms — missing fields, and fields that will not parse — and a
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// mutation run showed the second arm untested when only the first was.
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let body = "\
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root:x:0:0:System administrator:/root:/bin/sh
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# a comment line, not a passwd entry
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atlas:x
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atlas:x:notanumber:994::/:/bin/sh
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atlas:x:1000:994:atlas:/home/atlas:/bin/sh
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";
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assert_eq!(parse_passwd_uid_gid(body, "atlas"), Some((1000, 994)));
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// Control: the same body must NOT answer for a user it does not carry,
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// or the assertion above is satisfied by any parse at all.
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assert_eq!(parse_passwd_uid_gid(body, "nobody-here"), None);
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}
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/// A matching name with unusable ids is not a match. Without this the parser
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/// could return a partly-parsed row and the caller would chown to it.
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#[test]
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fn passwd_parse_rejects_unusable_ids() {
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assert_eq!(
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parse_passwd_uid_gid("atlas:x:notanumber:994::/:/bin/sh", "atlas"),
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None
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);
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assert_eq!(parse_passwd_uid_gid("atlas:x:1000", "atlas"), None);
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assert_eq!(parse_passwd_uid_gid("", "atlas"), None);
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// Presence control for the three absences above.
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assert_eq!(
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parse_passwd_uid_gid("atlas:x:1000:994::/:/bin/sh", "atlas"),
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Some((1000, 994))
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);
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}
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/// A failed `nixos-container destroy` whose container is still listed fails,
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/// and keeps hive-priv's error in the chain. The destroy DAG gates the state
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/// purge on this call, so this is the case that must not read as success.
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