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swarm-logs-auth: check agent tokens on the log store's query route

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A new `auth_request` responder on the log store's host. nginx sends it
every `/select/logsql/` request whose `Authorization` is
`Bearer swarm-agent.<agent>.<secret>`; it answers 200 when the secret is
the one stored at `swarm/agents/<agent>/queue` (`swarm-agent-verify`),
401 otherwise. Every other bearer still goes to authelia, so agents
still presenting the hive's shared OIDC client keep working.

`auth_request` takes a fixed URI, so the split is a `map` on
`$http_authorization` plus an internal location that rewrites to the
map's pick. Checked against nginx 1.30.5 with stub upstreams: an agent
token only the stub validator accepts gets 200, a token only the stub
authelia accepts gets 200, every wrong one 401, and the internal
locations 404 from outside.

The responder serves a unix socket in its own traverse-only runtime
directory and reads the store under its own leaf
(`swarm-logs-auth`), whose policy is `swarm/agents/+/queue`, read-only.
glue-bao-tls mints the leaf where the store runs; elsewhere the
operator places it, and eval refuses a log store host without one.

Part of #4459.
This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-10-12 22:48:19 +02:00 • committed by mara
commit 1f4736e79b
16 changed files with 515 additions and 9 deletions
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7
docs/trust-boundary/security.md
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@ -82,6 +82,13 @@ A hive reads no **swarm service's** OIDC client secret. Every reader of
collector and the store forwarder each fetch theirs with a leaf of their own,
and the store's granter fetches the bao UI's.
Two services read **every agent's queue secret**
(`swarm/agents/<agent>/queue`), each under a leaf of its own whose policy
reaches that one leaf per agent and nothing else: the queue's auth callout
(`swarm-nats-auth`) and the log store's agent check (`swarm-logs-auth`, on the
log store's host). Either one compromised can present any agent's queue
secret, at the queue and at the log store's query route alike.
### Per-hive credentials live under the hive kind
`swarm_secret_client::policy` scopes the **hive** stanza narrowly (unlike the