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hive-c0re: drop the spawn-time forge user-email, repo-creation and config-repo passes

Browse source 
sync_agent no longer runs ensure_user_email, ensure_repo_creation_disabled
or ensure_config_repo. swarm-controller does all three before any deploy:
CreateForgeUser sets the account email and max_repo_creation = 0 (and the
agent_token backfill re-runs CreateForgeUser), CreateRepo creates and
protects agent-configs/<agent>, AddRepoMember grants the agent write on it,
and InitAgentConfigRepo seeds it.

What goes with them: the email-aligned and repo-creation-disabled marker
paths and the legacy email-marker relocate, sparse_edit_user_option,
is_forbidden and its tests, and ensure_org_repo. A config repo deleted by
hand is no longer recreated on the next spawn; the operator recreates the
agent at swarm level. Comments in swarm-controller that described the
removed hive passes now state only the current behaviour.

Closes #4848
This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-10-04 20:12:48 +02:00 • committed by mara
commit 1de8a01936
6 changed files with 44 additions and 351 deletions
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2
docs/integrations/forge.md
View file

@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ before the user-permission check, so `/api/v1/admin/*` returns
`403 Forbidden` for any token without the admin scope bits, even when
the bearer is a site admin.
**Migration note**: if `PATCH /api/v1/admin/users/{name}` returns 403
**Migration note**: if a hive-c0re call to `/api/v1/admin/*` returns 403
on an existing deploy, the core token predates the admin-scope
addition. Delete `/var/lib/hyperhive/forge-core-token` and restart
hive-c0re to re-mint with the new scopes.

46
hive-c0re/src/forge/mod.rs
View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
//! Optional Forgejo wiring — per-agent account alignment,
//! config-repo mirroring, meta read-access grants, and each agent's
//! read-only grant on `internal/docs` (the swarm-controller creates that
//! repo, with the other swarm-wide orgs, teams and repos).
//! Optional Forgejo wiring — config-repo mirroring, meta read-access
//! grants, and each agent's read-only grant on `internal/docs` (the
//! swarm-controller creates that repo, with the other swarm-wide orgs,
//! teams and repos).
//! No-op when `hive-forge` isn't running. Full design: `docs/integrations/forge.md`.
mod ci_runner;
@ -13,9 +13,8 @@ mod users;
pub use pr_comment::{config_repo, merged_pr_for_commit, post_pr_comment};
pub use reconcile::{fetch_forge_main, reconcile_config_apply, reconcile_config_status};
pub use repos::{
clone_config_into_proposed, ensure_config_repo, ensure_meta_remote, ensure_repo,
fast_forward_applied_main, fetch_config_main_into_applied, meta_read_access, push_config,
push_meta, shared_docs_access,
clone_config_into_proposed, ensure_meta_remote, ensure_repo, fast_forward_applied_main,
fetch_config_main_into_applied, meta_read_access, push_config, push_meta, shared_docs_access,
};
pub use users::core_token;
@ -26,10 +25,7 @@ use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use forgejo_api::{Auth, Forgejo};
use url::Url;
use users::{
ensure_core_avatar, ensure_core_user_and_token, ensure_repo_creation_disabled,
ensure_user_email,
};
use users::{ensure_core_avatar, ensure_core_user_and_token};
const FORGE_CONTAINER: &str = "hive-forge";
@ -185,8 +181,7 @@ pub(crate) fn api(token: &str) -> Result<Forgejo> {
Forgejo::new(Auth::Token(token), url).context("build forgejo api client")
}
/// Per-agent forge sync: align the agent's forge account (email,
/// repo-creation lockdown), mirror its config repo, grant read access
/// Per-agent forge sync: mirror the agent's config repo, grant read access
/// to `core/meta`, and wire the `meta` remote in its proposed repo. All operations are idempotent; failures
/// are logged as warnings but don't abort the caller.
///
@ -201,27 +196,14 @@ pub(crate) fn api(token: &str) -> Result<Forgejo> {
/// dashboard warning (see [`ensure_all`]); the rebuild path ignores it and
/// relies on the journal `warn!` lines alone (a rebuild is its own retry).
pub async fn sync_agent(name: &str, core_token: Option<&str>) -> bool {
// The agent's forge user and token are swarm-controller's now
// (`MintAgentForgeToken`); this hive no longer creates or re-mints
// either.
// The agent's forge account, token and `agent-configs/<name>` repo are
// swarm-controller's; this hive creates none of them and only pushes
// to the repo.
let mut ok = true;
// Align email to match the git user.email set by meta::render_flake
// so commits link to the agent's Forgejo profile. Best-effort;
// also patches up agents created before this fix (old @hive.local).
ensure_user_email(name).await;
// Block direct agent-initiated repo creation: agents create
// repos through hive-c0re, never with their own token. Idempotent +
// marker-guarded; also covers agents provisioned before this landed.
ensure_repo_creation_disabled(name).await;
// Mirror the agent's applied config repo into agent-configs.
// ensure_config_repo is idempotent; push_config catches any
// drift since the last run — e.g. the startup migration just
// relocated `deployed/0`, or a deploy landed while the forge
// was down.
if let Err(e) = ensure_config_repo(name).await {
tracing::warn!(%name, error = ?e, "forge: ensure_config_repo failed");
ok = false;
}
// push_config catches any drift since the last run — e.g. the
// startup migration just relocated `deployed/0`, or a deploy landed
// while the forge was down.
if let Err(e) = push_config(name).await {
tracing::warn!(%name, error = ?e, "forge: push_config failed");
ok = false;

37
hive-c0re/src/forge/repos.rs
View file

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
//! Repo + org plumbing on the local Forgejo: org / repo creation,
//! the meta + shared-docs + knowledge repos, per-agent config-repo
//! Repo + org plumbing on the local Forgejo: the meta + shared-docs +
//! knowledge repos, per-agent config-repo
//! mirroring (`push_config` / `push_meta`), collaborator grants,
//! pull-mirrors, and branch-protection rules. The typed API-client
//! constructor + org-name constants live in the module root (`super`).
@ -86,15 +86,6 @@ pub async fn ensure_repo(name: &str, token: &str) -> Result<()> {
created_or_exists(res, &format!("core/{name}"))
}
/// Create `name` inside org `org` (used for `agent-configs/<agent>`).
/// Idempotent.
async fn ensure_org_repo(org: &str, name: &str, token: &str) -> Result<()> {
let res = api(token)?
.create_org_repo(org, repo_option(name, true))
.await;
created_or_exists(res, &format!("{org}/{name}"))
}
/// Dashboard-warning guard for the meta non-fast-forward condition.
/// Held while `core/meta` remote is ahead of our local mirror; cleared
/// automatically when the next push succeeds.
@ -155,30 +146,6 @@ pub async fn push_meta(dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
/// Ensure the `agent-configs/<name>` repo exists so the first
/// `push_config` doesn't 404, and add the agent as a **write** collaborator
/// (it can push feature branches + open config PRs). Branch protection on
/// `main` is swarm-controller's, not set here. No-op when the forge isn't
/// running or the core token isn't minted yet. Safe to call on every spawn
/// and on every startup (all steps idempotent).
pub async fn ensure_config_repo(name: &str) -> Result<()> {
if !is_present().await {
return Ok(());
}
let Some(token) = core_token() else {
return Ok(());
};
ensure_org_repo(CONFIG_ORG, name, &token).await?;
add_collaborator(
CONFIG_ORG,
name,
name,
AddCollaboratorOptionPermission::Write,
&token,
)
.await
}
/// Grant agent `name` read-only collaborator access to `internal/docs`.
/// Idempotent: re-adding an existing collaborator succeeds (Forgejo
/// answers 204 either way). Mirrors `meta_read_access` so agents can

226
hive-c0re/src/forge/users.rs
View file

@ -1,14 +1,12 @@
//! Per-agent Forgejo user + access-token provisioning, account
//! policy (email alignment, repo-creation lockdown), avatar uploads,
//! and the bootstrap `core` admin user + token lifecycle. The typed
//! API-client constructor + `forgejo admin` helpers live in the
//! module root (`super`).
//! The bootstrap `core` admin user: its account, access-token lifecycle
//! and avatar upload. The typed API-client constructor + `forgejo admin`
//! helpers live in the module root (`super`).
use std::path::Path;
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use base64::Engine;
use forgejo_api::structs::{EditUserOption, UpdateUserAvatarOption};
use forgejo_api::structs::UpdateUserAvatarOption;
use forgejo_api::{ApiErrorKind, ForgejoError};
use reqwest::StatusCode;
@ -19,10 +17,9 @@ const TOKEN_NAME_PREFIX: &str = "hyperhive";
// to push the meta repo + drive admin API calls. Root-only. Literal lives
// in `crate::paths`; aliased here under the long-standing name.
use crate::paths::FORGE_CORE_TOKEN as CORE_TOKEN_PATH;
// Forge provisioning markers (`forge/core-avatar-set`,
// `forge/email-aligned-<name>`) live in `crate::paths` — one-shot guards:
// the upload/align runs once, the marker is written, subsequent startups
// skip. Delete one to force its step to re-run.
// The `forge/core-avatar-set` marker lives in `crate::paths` — a one-shot
// guard: the upload runs once, the marker is written, subsequent startups
// skip. Delete it to force a re-upload.
// The avatar PNG path is resolved by `core_avatar_png_path` below —
// only-used-here, so it lives in this module rather than the shared
// `hive_sh4re::assets` helpers (which now hold only `prompt_template`, the
@ -67,49 +64,6 @@ fn agent_email(name: &str) -> String {
format!("{name}@hyperhive.local")
}
/// `EditUserOption` with every field unset except the ones Forgejo's
/// validator effectively requires: `login_name` and `source_id = 0`
/// (local auth, the default for users hive-c0re creates). Omitting
/// `login_name` made Forgejo reset `use_custom_avatar` on every admin
/// edit — the same reason the old raw JSON bodies always carried both
/// fields. Callers set only the field(s) they mean to change on top.
fn sparse_edit_user_option(name: &str) -> EditUserOption {
EditUserOption {
active: None,
admin: None,
allow_create_organization: None,
allow_git_hook: None,
allow_import_local: None,
description: None,
email: None,
full_name: None,
hide_email: None,
location: None,
login_name: Some(name.to_owned()),
max_repo_creation: None,
must_change_password: None,
password: None,
prohibit_login: None,
pronouns: None,
restricted: None,
source_id: Some(0),
visibility: None,
website: None,
}
}
/// Whether a Forgejo API error is a definitive 403. The typed client
/// maps a 403 response to `ApiErrorKind::Forbidden` when the endpoint
/// spec lists it, or to `UnexpectedStatusCode(403)` otherwise — check
/// both defensively.
fn is_forbidden(e: &ForgejoError) -> bool {
match e {
ForgejoError::ApiError(api) => matches!(api.error_kind(), ApiErrorKind::Forbidden),
ForgejoError::UnexpectedStatusCode(s) => *s == StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
_ => false,
}
}
/// Ensure a forgejo user named `name` exists. Idempotent: forgejo
/// returns a "user already exists" error which we treat as success.
/// `admin` adds `--admin` (site admin) — used for the bootstrap
@ -152,116 +106,6 @@ async fn ensure_user_exists(name: &str, admin: bool) -> Result<()> {
}
}
/// Idempotently align the Forgejo account email to `agent_email(name)`.
/// Existing agents were created with `{name}@hive.local`; this corrects
/// that so git commits (which use `{name}@hyperhive`) link to profiles.
/// Best-effort: failures are warned, not propagated.
///
/// Marker-guarded: writes `EMAIL_ALIGNED_MARKER_PREFIX{name}` on first
/// success and skips the PATCH on all subsequent calls. This prevents
/// Forgejo's admin-user-edit endpoint from resetting `use_custom_avatar`
/// on every `sync_agent` tick. Delete the marker to force re-alignment.
///
/// Uses the admin REST API (`admin_edit_user`, i.e. `PATCH
/// /api/v1/admin/users/{name}`) rather than `forgejo admin user edit`
/// because the CLI dropped the `edit` subcommand somewhere between
/// forgejo 8 and current. The edit body carries `login_name` +
/// `source_id = 0` via [`sparse_edit_user_option`].
pub(super) async fn ensure_user_email(name: &str) {
let marker = crate::paths::forge_email_aligned_marker(name);
if marker.exists() {
return;
}
let Some(token) = core_token() else {
tracing::debug!(%name, "forge: skipping ensure_user_email — no core token yet");
return;
};
let email = agent_email(name);
let mut edit = sparse_edit_user_option(name);
edit.email = Some(email.clone());
let client = match api(&token) {
Ok(c) => c,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(%name, error = %e, "forge: PATCH user email: client build failed");
return;
}
};
match client.admin_edit_user(name, edit).await {
Ok(_) => {
if let Some(parent) = marker.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
}
std::fs::write(&marker, "").ok();
tracing::info!(%name, %email, "forge: user email aligned");
}
Err(e) if is_forbidden(&e) => {
// Core token missing admin scope — see
// `docs/integrations/forge.md::Token scopes` migration note.
tracing::warn!(
%name, %email, error = %e,
"forge: PATCH user email forbidden — core token likely missing admin scope. \
Delete {CORE_TOKEN_PATH} and restart hive-c0re to re-mint with the new scopes."
);
}
Err(e) => tracing::warn!(%name, %email, error = %e, "forge: PATCH user email failed"),
}
}
/// Disable direct repo creation for agent `name` by setting
/// `max_repo_creation = 0` on its Forgejo account. A write-scoped token
/// can otherwise create + own repos and self-merge, bypassing the
/// operator-only-merge policy.
///
/// `max_repo_creation = 0` means `CanCreateRepo()` is false for any
/// count (Forgejo: `MaxRepoCreation >= 0 && NumRepos >= MaxRepoCreation`),
/// so creation is refused while push / PR / clone stay intact. **Existing
/// repos are untouched** — this only blocks *new* direct creation.
///
/// Marker-guarded like [`ensure_user_email`]: the edit runs once per
/// agent (delete the marker to re-apply). The edit body carries
/// `login_name` + `source_id` for the same reason `ensure_user_email`
/// does — omitting `login_name` makes Forgejo's `EditUserOption`
/// validator reset `use_custom_avatar`. Best-effort: failures warn,
/// don't propagate.
pub(super) async fn ensure_repo_creation_disabled(name: &str) {
let marker = crate::paths::forge_repo_creation_disabled_marker(name);
if marker.exists() {
return;
}
let Some(token) = core_token() else {
tracing::debug!(%name, "forge: skipping ensure_repo_creation_disabled — no core token yet");
return;
};
let mut edit = sparse_edit_user_option(name);
edit.max_repo_creation = Some(0);
let client = match api(&token) {
Ok(c) => c,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(%name, error = %e, "forge: PATCH max_repo_creation: client build failed");
return;
}
};
match client.admin_edit_user(name, edit).await {
Ok(_) => {
if let Some(parent) = marker.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
}
std::fs::write(&marker, "").ok();
tracing::info!(%name, "forge: disabled direct repo creation (max_repo_creation=0)");
}
Err(e) if is_forbidden(&e) => {
tracing::warn!(
%name, error = %e,
"forge: PATCH max_repo_creation forbidden — core token likely missing admin scope. \
Delete {CORE_TOKEN_PATH} and restart hive-c0re to re-mint with the new scopes."
);
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(%name, error = %e, "forge: PATCH max_repo_creation failed");
}
}
}
/// Mint a fresh access token for `name`. Token name is suffixed with
/// a monotonic clock so re-issuing doesn't collide with an existing
/// token of the same name in the DB. `scopes` is the scope string
@ -461,7 +305,7 @@ pub fn core_token() -> Option<String> {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{CoreTokenCheck, classify_core_token_error, is_forbidden};
use super::{CoreTokenCheck, classify_core_token_error};
use forgejo_api::{ApiError, ApiErrorKind, ForgejoError};
use reqwest::StatusCode;
@ -521,58 +365,4 @@ mod tests {
CoreTokenCheck::Indeterminate
);
}
/// The typed client only produces `ApiErrorKind::Forbidden` when the
/// endpoint's spec lists 403; every other endpoint surfaces the same
/// response as a bare `UnexpectedStatusCode`. Both shapes must be
/// recognised, because the arms guarded by this predicate are what tell
/// the operator that `ensure_repo_creation_disabled` — the lockdown
/// stopping an agent from creating and self-merging in its own repo —
/// did not apply, and which credential to re-mint to make it apply.
/// Drop the second arm as "redundant" and that lockdown fails with a
/// generic warning that names no remedy.
#[test]
fn a_403_is_recognised_in_both_shapes_the_client_can_produce() {
assert!(is_forbidden(&api_err(ApiErrorKind::Forbidden)));
assert!(is_forbidden(&ForgejoError::UnexpectedStatusCode(
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN
)));
}
/// The other direction, and the more expensive one to get wrong: this
/// predicate gates advice to **delete the core token and restart
/// hive-c0re**. A widened match would hand that advice out for a 502
/// from a restarting forge or a client-side error that never reached
/// the network — destroying a working credential in response to a blip.
/// 401 is called out separately because it is the near miss: it *is* a
/// credential problem, but its remedy is [`classify_core_token_error`]'s
/// automatic re-mint, so classifying it as forbidden buries the cause
/// under a scope warning that does not apply.
#[test]
fn a_non_403_failure_is_not_reported_as_a_missing_admin_scope() {
for kind in [
ApiErrorKind::Unauthorized,
ApiErrorKind::NotFound { errors: None },
ApiErrorKind::ValidationFailed,
ApiErrorKind::Generic,
] {
let e = api_err(kind);
assert!(!is_forbidden(&e), "{e} must not read as forbidden");
}
for s in [
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
] {
assert!(
!is_forbidden(&ForgejoError::UnexpectedStatusCode(s)),
"status {s} must not read as forbidden"
);
}
// A failure with no HTTP status at all — the request never got an
// answer, so nothing has been said about the token's scopes.
assert!(!is_forbidden(&ForgejoError::KeyNotAscii));
assert!(!is_forbidden(&ForgejoError::HostRequired));
}
}

28
hive-c0re/src/paths.rs
View file

@ -71,22 +71,6 @@ pub fn forge_core_avatar_marker() -> PathBuf {
forge_dir().join("core-avatar-set")
}
/// `forge/email-aligned-<name>` — marker: `<name>`'s forge email aligned.
#[must_use]
pub fn forge_email_aligned_marker(name: &str) -> PathBuf {
forge_dir().join(format!("email-aligned-{name}"))
}
/// `forge/repo-creation-disabled-<name>` — marker: `<name>`'s forge user
/// has had `max_repo_creation = 0` applied (blocks direct agent-initiated
/// repo creation). One-shot guard so the PATCH runs once per
/// agent (including agents provisioned before the change); delete to
/// re-apply.
#[must_use]
pub fn forge_repo_creation_disabled_marker(name: &str) -> PathBuf {
forge_dir().join(format!("repo-creation-disabled-{name}"))
}
/// `agent-identity/` — one subdir per agent holding the store identity this
/// hive collected for it. Staging only: the files exist so `systemd-nspawn`
/// has something to `--load-credential` from, and nothing on the host ever
@ -297,18 +281,6 @@ pub fn relocate_legacy_state() {
for (old_rel, new) in &moves {
move_if_legacy(&root.join(old_rel), new);
}
// `forge-email-aligned-<name>` markers: glob the flat root.
if let Ok(rd) = std::fs::read_dir(&root) {
for ent in rd.flatten() {
if let Some(name) = ent
.file_name()
.to_str()
.and_then(|s| s.strip_prefix("forge-email-aligned-"))
{
move_if_legacy(&ent.path(), &forge_email_aligned_marker(name));
}
}
}
}
/// Rename `old` → `new` when `old` exists and `new` doesn't, creating

56
swarm-controller/src/forge.rs
View file

@ -397,8 +397,8 @@ impl Client {
/// Then locks the account out of creating repos
/// ([`Self::disable_repo_creation`]), whether it was just created or
/// already existed. Nothing else does that for a swarm-created agent, so
/// a failure fails the node. Does not align the account's email the way
/// `hive-c0re`'s `ensure_user_email` does — cosmetic, not a guard.
/// a failure fails the node. Leaves an existing account's email as it
/// finds it.
pub async fn ensure_agent_user(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
self.create_agent_user(agent).await?;
self.disable_repo_creation(agent).await
@ -421,13 +421,8 @@ impl Client {
/// account once and checks the one thing that *is* comparable: the
/// email. A match against either [`agent_email`] (what
/// `create_agent_user` itself sets) or [`legacy_agent_email`] (what
/// `hive-c0re::forge::users::ensure_user_exists` used before its own
/// `ensure_user_email` alignment pass runs) counts as this agent's
/// account — the legacy value has to be accepted too, not just the
/// aligned one, because `ensure_user_email` only runs on the forge-host
/// hive and only once it has a core token and has ticked at least once,
/// so a real, existing legacy agent can still carry the old email when
/// this node reads it mid-rollout. A mismatch against both means the
/// older hive-created agent accounts carry) counts as this agent's
/// account. A mismatch against both means the
/// name collided with an account this node didn't create, so it fails
/// the node rather than sending the PATCH (or silently skipping) to an
/// account nobody verified is agent-controlled.
@ -1139,30 +1134,23 @@ fn initial_flake_nix() -> &'static str {
/// [`Client::disable_repo_creation`] before it sends the account's PATCH. Same
/// format string as `hive-c0re::forge::users::agent_email` — not called
/// across the crate boundary (see this module's doc comment), but both
/// creators (and `hive-c0re`'s `ensure_user_email`, which aligns older
/// accounts to it) converge on this exact value, so it doubles as the
/// creators use this exact value, so it doubles as the
/// marker that distinguishes an agent's own account from an unrelated one
/// that happens to share its username.
fn agent_email(agent: &str) -> String {
format!("{agent}@hyperhive.local")
}
/// The pre-alignment email `hive-c0re::forge::users::ensure_user_exists`
/// gave an agent account before that crate's own `ensure_user_email`
/// existed — see that function's doc comment ("Existing agents were
/// created with `{name}@hive.local`; this corrects that"). Accepted by
/// [`Client::disable_repo_creation`]'s guard alongside [`agent_email`]
/// because `ensure_user_email`'s alignment PATCH only runs on the
/// forge-host hive, and only after it has a core token and has ticked at
/// least once, so a real legacy agent can still carry this value when this
/// node reads it.
/// The email older hive-created agent accounts carry, and keep: nothing
/// rewrites it to [`agent_email`]. Accepted by
/// [`Client::disable_repo_creation`]'s guard alongside [`agent_email`] so
/// such an account is still recognised as the agent's own.
fn legacy_agent_email(agent: &str) -> String {
format!("{agent}@hive.local")
}
/// The `admin_edit_user` body that sets `max_repo_creation = 0` on `agent`
/// and nothing else. Same shape as `hive-c0re::forge::users`'
/// `sparse_edit_user_option`: `login_name` + `source_id = 0` (local auth,
/// and nothing else. `login_name` + `source_id = 0` (local auth,
/// which is what [`Client::create_agent_user`] creates) ride along because
/// Forgejo resets `use_custom_avatar` on an admin edit that omits
/// `login_name`; every other field is left unset so nothing else is touched.
@ -1548,9 +1536,9 @@ mod tests {
}
/// A refused lockdown fails the node with Forgejo's own message, rather
/// than warning and reporting the account as provisioned — that is
/// `hive-c0re`'s `ensure_repo_creation_disabled` shape, which leaves an
/// agent able to create and self-merge with nothing marked failed.
/// than warning and reporting the account as provisioned, which would
/// leave an agent able to create and self-merge with nothing marked
/// failed.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_refused_lockdown_fails_the_node() {
let (client, _seen) = stub_forge(
@ -1598,10 +1586,9 @@ mod tests {
);
}
/// A legacy account `hive-c0re::forge::users::ensure_user_exists` (or
/// its `ensure_user_email` alignment pass) created carries the same
/// `{agent}@hyperhive.local` marker, plus the `login_name`/`source_id`
/// fields its own `sparse_edit_user_option` sets — this node must still
/// A legacy hive-created account can carry the same
/// `{agent}@hyperhive.local` marker, plus `login_name`/`source_id` from
/// a hive admin edit — this node must still
/// lock such an account down, not just ones it created itself.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_legacy_hive_created_agent_account_still_gets_locked_down() {
@ -1621,14 +1608,9 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
}
/// argus's round-2 🟡: `hive-c0re`'s `ensure_user_email` alignment pass
/// (the thing that rewrites a legacy `{name}@hive.local` account to
/// `{name}@hyperhive.local`) only runs on the forge-host hive, and only
/// once it has a core token and has ticked — so a real, pre-existing
/// agent can still be sitting on the pre-alignment `@hive.local` email
/// when this node reads it. The guard must accept that value too, not
/// just the aligned one, or a real agent would fail with "not this
/// agent's" during the rollout window.
/// A real, pre-existing agent account can carry the legacy
/// `@hive.local` email, and nothing rewrites it. The guard must accept
/// that value too, or such an agent would fail with "not this agent's".
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_pre_alignment_legacy_email_still_gets_locked_down() {
let (client, seen) = stub_forge(