swarm-otel: deliver the OIDC client secret through the secret store
The swarm collector's OIDC client secret only existed where authelia did: `swarm-otel-oidc-secret.service` copied the minted plaintext out of authelia's container tree, reachable only because the two share a host's network namespace. A swarm that placed authelia elsewhere delivered nothing, and the option's own description said so — "a deployment that places authelia elsewhere points this at a file it delivers itself." Same gap as #3853 and #4234, and this is the swarm-otel twin of #4234's fix for Grafana. Mirrors PR #4361 (Grafana) almost exactly: - `swarm-bao-otel-oidc.service` reads `swarm/services/<client-id>/oidc/client` out of the store, in every deployment, replacing the co-located copy unit outright — one delivery route, not two, per the ruling that landed under #4234. - Client registration moved out of `swarm-otel.nix`'s own `config` block (gated on this host running the collector) into `glue-swarm-otel-oidc-client.nix` (gated on this host running authelia), the same split `glue-grafana-oidc-client.nix` made. It was broken the same way: a split deployment registered the client nowhere at all, so authelia never minted a secret for the publisher to send on. - The publisher's `services` prefix (write grant in `swarm-bao.nix`, hive read grant in `policy::render`) already covers any service's path — nothing to add there. `swarm-secret-publisher.nix` only grew `serviceClientIds` by one entry. One judgement call, stated rather than buried: the store-reading unit renders only where this host holds a client identity (`deploy.bao.clientCertFile`/`clientKeyFile`), rather than asserting it the way `swarm-grafana.nix` does. Grafana's local login form is disabled unconditionally, so a Grafana with no OIDC secret has no way in at all — that earns a hard refusal. This collector without a credential still receives every hive's telemetry; only its own pushes to the stores go out unauthenticated and get refused there, an already-supported degrade the module's own `haveCollectorSecret` flag named before this change. So the reading unit follows the shape `glue-matrix-bao-token.nix` and `glue-queue-agent-credential.nix` use for their own optional readers: no unit when the identity is absent, not a build refusal. Fixtures mirror #4361's: `otelBaoWithAuthelia`/`otelBaoRemoteAuthelia` are the positive pair (co-located and split, both reading through the store), `otelNoIdentity` is the negative — no reading unit, no assertion firing, `clientSecretFile` left null. Refs #4258
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@ -64,10 +64,13 @@ let
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#
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# The ids come from `swarm.*`, which is identical on every host — that is what
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# lets this host name a service's client while running none of them, and it is
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# the same read the service's own module registers the client with. A swarm
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# that runs no Grafana mints no secret for it, so its entry skips below rather
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# than needing a condition here.
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serviceClientIds = [ hyperhiveCfg.swarm.grafana.oidc.clientId ];
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# the same read each service's own module registers its client with. A swarm
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# that runs no Grafana, or no collector, mints no secret for the one it lacks,
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# so its entry skips below rather than needing a condition here.
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serviceClientIds = [
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hyperhiveCfg.swarm.grafana.oidc.clientId
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hyperhiveCfg.swarm.otel.clientId
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];
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in
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{
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options.services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-secret-publisher = {
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@ -92,10 +95,11 @@ in
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identity's job (see `baoClientCertFile`), not this option's.
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Turning it off leaves every hive but this one without its agents'
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credential, and the swarm's Grafana without any login at all — its
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secret has exactly one route and this is the producer's end of it. So
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the honest reason to set it false is a deployment delivering those
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secrets by some other mechanism it owns.
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credential, the swarm's Grafana without any login at all, and its
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collector pushing unauthenticated — each secret has exactly one route
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and this is the producer's end of it. So the honest reason to set it
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false is a deployment delivering those secrets by some other
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mechanism it owns.
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'';
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};
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