docs(#14): update network isolation docs - remove stale manager special-case claim
This commit is contained in:
parent
3c012efbea
commit
0ac6028844
1 changed files with 15 additions and 0 deletions
|
|
@ -122,6 +122,21 @@ address arithmetic.
|
||||||
`HOST_BRIDGE=<bridgeName>` via `lifecycle::set_nspawn_flags` when
|
`HOST_BRIDGE=<bridgeName>` via `lifecycle::set_nspawn_flags` when
|
||||||
creating or updating containers. Each agent gets a deterministic IP
|
creating or updating containers. Each agent gets a deterministic IP
|
||||||
derived from its name so the address is reproducible across destroy/recreate.
|
derived from its name so the address is reproducible across destroy/recreate.
|
||||||
|
This applies uniformly to all containers including the manager — no special
|
||||||
|
case.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Why isolation is safe for the manager**: all hive-c0re communication goes
|
||||||
|
through unix domain sockets (`/run/hive/mcp.sock` for agent requests,
|
||||||
|
`/run/hive/priv.sock` for privileged ops, per-agent manager sockets).
|
||||||
|
These are bind-mounted into containers via the nspawn conf. UDS paths
|
||||||
|
traverse the VFS, not the network stack, so `PRIVATE_NETWORK=1` does not
|
||||||
|
affect them.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The nix side also enables IP forwarding + NAT (agents reach the internet
|
||||||
|
through the host) and drops bridge-subnet → loopback traffic (defence-in-depth
|
||||||
|
against a compromised agent reaching the c0re dashboard HTTP at
|
||||||
|
`127.0.0.1`). Agents have no legitimate reason to reach the dashboard over
|
||||||
|
loopback — the hive-c0re admin socket is a UDS, not TCP.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Prerequisites before flipping on
|
### Prerequisites before flipping on
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue