feat(nix): issue each hive's CA under a swarm root CA
Cross-hive trust was O(n²) hand-pinning: every hive had to name every peer's CA. A swarm root makes it O(1) — trust the root once and every present and future peer validates. The root is generated by a new `swarm-ca` unit on a single-host swarm and operator-provided otherwise; `swarm.ca.autoConfigure` picks between them and derives its default from `swarm.peers` being empty, so "all on one host" is read off the deployment rather than remembered. Both modes produce the same artifacts in the same places, so splitting hosts later is moving the service dirs, not switching code paths. The root key never enters the nix store, and the root is never regenerated automatically — replacing it invalidates every peer at once. Each hive CA carries `nameConstraints` pinned to that hive's domain, so a leaked hive CA can only mint names inside its own subdomain, enforced by verifiers rather than by convention. `ca.pem` was serving as both the issuer and the anchor consumers trust; those are the same file only while it is self-signed. openssl will not terminate a chain at a trusted cert that isn't self-signed (rustls and Go will), so the promotion would have broken some consumers and not others. `hive-tls-ca` now also writes `trust-bundle.pem` — the hive CA plus whatever it is rooted at — and every anchor consumer reads that: agents, the CI and forge containers, and the peer-config recipe. On a hive with no swarm root the bundle is just that CA, so nothing consuming it needs a mode to branch on.
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8 changed files with 366 additions and 33 deletions
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@ -815,10 +815,13 @@ fn forwarded_env_vars() -> Vec<(&'static str, String)> {
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/// peer CAs sit alongside it as `peer-ca-<N>.pem`.
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const HIVE_CA_FILE: &str = "hive-ca.pem";
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/// Host path of the hive CA *certificate*, when self-signed TLS is active.
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/// `hive-tls.nix` sets `HIVE_TLS_CA_PATH` in hive-c0re's service env (to
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/// `<tls.stateDir>/ca.pem`) whenever the gateway serves a self-signed,
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/// hive-CA-signed leaf. Returns `Some(path)` only when the var is set AND
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/// Host path of the hive's TLS trust anchors, when self-signed TLS is
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/// active. `hive-tls.nix` sets `HIVE_TLS_CA_PATH` in hive-c0re's service env
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/// (to `<tls.stateDir>/trust-bundle.pem`) whenever the gateway serves a
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/// self-signed, hive-CA-signed leaf. The file holds one *or more* certs —
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/// the hive CA plus the swarm root it is issued under — and is copied
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/// verbatim, which `security.pki.certificateFiles` accepts; nothing here
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/// parses it. Returns `Some(path)` only when the var is set AND
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/// the cert exists on disk — so render + write stay consistent (we never
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/// emit a `certificateFiles` reference to a file we didn't embed). Only the
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/// public cert is ever read here; the CA private key never leaves the host.
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