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docs: suppress reviewed write-good.Passive false positives

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133 hits across 38 files, all previously classified during #4548's sweep
and deliberately left un-rewritten (predicate-adjective state/necessity
description, design-intent idiom, structural/type-description idiom,
no-single-actor topology claim, parallel-triple exception, vale
substring-match artifact — see hyperhive#4548's per-PR bodies for the
per-hit reasoning).

Wraps each one in a scoped <!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO/YES -->
pair (the supported mechanism — TokenIgnores has a known offset-drift
bug) rather than a blanket per-file or per-rule silence, so a *new*
passive-voice hit anywhere in these files still fails once the rule
gates CI (next commit). Table/list false positives (docs/swarm/credentials.md's
renewal-table cells) wrap the whole block, not each cell.

Part of #4546.
This commit is contained in:
iris 2026-09-20 15:07:46 +02:00
commit 04e27c4fb6
38 changed files with 368 additions and 71 deletions
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10
docs/swarm/secrets.md
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@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ eval, naming the option it wants. That's deliberate: a queue that started
without them would accept `CONNECT {"user":"auth"}` from anyone sharing the
host's network namespace, and nothing would look wrong until somebody connected.
**All four or none** — the seed paths are required too, not just the public
**All four or none** — you must supply the seed paths too, not just the public
keys. They're two halves of the same pair: the server verifies with the public
half, the responder signs with the private one. Supplying only the public keys
used to pass eval and leave the queue with an auth-callout nobody answers, which
@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ the client id it authenticates, because that's how a queue client reads them —
the secret by path, the id by value. No local fallback exists, and none is
possible, so absent files mean this hive's agents don't connect, which is what
a swarm looks like before the publisher on the authelia host has run. The
reader runs before `hive-c0re.service` and is wanted (not required) by it, so
reader runs before `hive-c0re.service`, which wants it (doesn't require it), so
an agent container never renders ahead of the credential; an unreachable store
delays the daemon's start rather than failing it.
@ -231,9 +231,9 @@ exists so a host holds **one** out-of-band secret, its client certificate, and
reads everything else with it.
Two things follow, and `swarm-grafana.nix` asserts both rather than degrading:
running Grafana requires `swarm.authelia.url` (its local login form is disabled
unconditionally, so SSO isn't a feature of some topologies — it's the only way
in), and it requires this host's `deploy.bao.clientCertFile` /
running Grafana requires `swarm.authelia.url` (this module disables its local
login form unconditionally, so SSO isn't a feature of some topologies — it's the
only way in), and it requires this host's `deploy.bao.clientCertFile` /
`clientKeyFile`. Each refusal names the option to set. Both used to be silent:
a null URL dropped the OIDC block, a missing leaf produced a warning, and
either one left a Grafana with no SSO and no password box — nothing failed, so