docs: suppress reviewed write-good.Passive false positives

133 hits across 38 files, all previously classified during #4548's sweep
and deliberately left un-rewritten (predicate-adjective state/necessity
description, design-intent idiom, structural/type-description idiom,
no-single-actor topology claim, parallel-triple exception, vale
substring-match artifact — see hyperhive#4548's per-PR bodies for the
per-hit reasoning).

Wraps each one in a scoped <!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO/YES -->
pair (the supported mechanism — TokenIgnores has a known offset-drift
bug) rather than a blanket per-file or per-rule silence, so a *new*
passive-voice hit anywhere in these files still fails once the rule
gates CI (next commit). Table/list false positives (docs/swarm/credentials.md's
renewal-table cells) wrap the whole block, not each cell.

Part of #4546.
This commit is contained in:
iris 2026-09-20 15:07:46 +02:00
commit 04e27c4fb6
38 changed files with 368 additions and 71 deletions

View file

@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ Configured via `services.hyperhive.network.*`.
One picture of the whole hive — two planes: **infra
containers share the host netns** and bind host ports directly;
**compute containers (agents + CI) each get a private netns** behind
the bridge. The unix-socket control plane rides the VFS and is
untouched by any of it.
the bridge. The unix-socket control plane rides the VFS, and none of
that touches it.
```
internet
@ -192,12 +192,16 @@ listed TCP port `P` on the bridge-interface `allowedTCPPorts`, so an
agent can connect to `<bridgeIp>:P` (point the collector endpoint at
`http://<bridgeIp>:4318`, default `http://10.42.0.1:4318`).
<!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO -->
This is **firewall-only**: the host service must bind an address
reachable from the bridge — `0.0.0.0` or the bridge IP — not loopback
only. The bridge→`127.0.0.0/8` DROP rule (below) is unchanged, so a
service bound to `127.0.0.1` only stays unreachable; rebind it to
`0.0.0.0`.
<!-- vale write-good.Passive = YES -->
The port is reachable by **every** agent on the bridge subnet (like
DNS/gateway), so only expose services safe for any agent to reach.