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swarm-controller: disable repo creation on the agent forge users it creates

`ensure_agent_user` (the `CreateForgeUser` node) created the agent's
forge account but never set `max_repo_creation = 0`, relying on
hive-c0re's per-hive `ensure_repo_creation_disabled` pass to lock it
down later. That pass is being removed (#3507, #4669), and it is the
only guard against an agent token creating, owning and self-merging in
its own repo.

The node now PATCHes `max_repo_creation = 0` via `admin_edit_user`
after the create, on both the created and the already-exists path, and
a refused PATCH fails the node with Forgejo's message. The body mirrors
hive-c0re's `sparse_edit_user_option` (`login_name` + `source_id = 0`,
everything else unset).

The PATCH is unconditional: Forgejo's API never returns
`max_repo_creation` (it is in `EditUserOption` only, not `User`), so
there is no current value to verify against first.

Closes #4689
This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-09-24 13:34:04 +02:00 • committed by mara
commit 04d5bf5f3e

View file

@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ use forgejo_api::structs::{
AddCollaboratorOption, AddCollaboratorOptionPermission, ChangeFileOperation, AddCollaboratorOption, AddCollaboratorOptionPermission, ChangeFileOperation,
ChangeFileOperationOperation, ChangeFilesOptions, CreateBranchProtectionOption, ChangeFileOperationOperation, ChangeFilesOptions, CreateBranchProtectionOption,
CreateHookOption, CreateHookOptionConfig, CreateHookOptionType, CreateRepoOption, CreateHookOption, CreateHookOptionConfig, CreateHookOptionType, CreateRepoOption,
CreateUserOption, IssueListIssuesQuery, IssueListIssuesQueryState, IssueListIssuesQueryType, CreateUserOption, EditUserOption, IssueListIssuesQuery, IssueListIssuesQueryState,
RepoGetContentsQuery, RepoListPullRequestsQuery, RepoListPullRequestsQueryState, IssueListIssuesQueryType, RepoGetContentsQuery, RepoListPullRequestsQuery,
RepoSearchQuery, StateType, RepoListPullRequestsQueryState, RepoSearchQuery, StateType,
}; };
use forgejo_api::{ApiErrorKind, Auth, Forgejo, ForgejoError}; use forgejo_api::{ApiErrorKind, Auth, Forgejo, ForgejoError};
use futures_util::{StreamExt as _, TryStreamExt as _}; use futures_util::{StreamExt as _, TryStreamExt as _};
@ -361,8 +361,8 @@ impl Client {
.await .await
} }
/// Ensure `agent` exists as a Forgejo user account — the whole job of /// Ensure `agent` exists as a Forgejo user account that cannot create
/// the `CreateForgeUser` node, and the fix for the "user does not /// repos — the whole job of the `CreateForgeUser` node, and the fix for the "user does not
/// exist" failure `AddRepoMember` hit before this node existed: adding /// exist" failure `AddRepoMember` hit before this node existed: adding
/// a nonexistent user as a collaborator is a Forgejo validation error, /// a nonexistent user as a collaborator is a Forgejo validation error,
/// not an idempotent no-op, so something has to create the account /// not an idempotent no-op, so something has to create the account
@ -373,12 +373,8 @@ impl Client {
/// `forgejo admin` CLI, which assumes co-location with the forge host. /// `forgejo admin` CLI, which assumes co-location with the forge host.
/// This daemon has no such assumption — like every other call in this /// This daemon has no such assumption — like every other call in this
/// file, it only ever talks to the forge over HTTP — so this goes through /// file, it only ever talks to the forge over HTTP — so this goes through
/// `admin_create_user` instead. /// `admin_create_user` instead. The password is a throwaway: 32 random
/// /// bytes, generated once, never persisted or read again (see
/// The password itself is a throwaway: 32 random bytes, generated once,
/// never persisted anywhere, and never needed again (unlike
/// `hive-c0re`'s CLI path, which can ask forgejo to `--random-password`
/// on its own, the HTTP admin API requires a real value up front — see
/// [`crate::webhook::generate_hex_secret`], reused here for the same /// [`crate::webhook::generate_hex_secret`], reused here for the same
/// reason a webhook secret and this password are both "32 random bytes /// reason a webhook secret and this password are both "32 random bytes
/// nothing reads back"). /// nothing reads back").
@ -386,12 +382,41 @@ impl Client {
/// Idempotent, same as [`Self::ensure_org_repo`]: 409 folds to success /// Idempotent, same as [`Self::ensure_org_repo`]: 409 folds to success
/// unconditionally, 422 only after a follow-up `user_get` confirms the /// unconditionally, 422 only after a follow-up `user_get` confirms the
/// user (see [`folds_into_success`] — not every 422 means it exists). /// user (see [`folds_into_success`] — not every 422 means it exists).
/// Deliberately does not align the account's email or disable its own ///
/// repo-creation rights the way `hive-c0re`'s per-hive provisioning does /// Then locks the account out of creating repos
/// (`ensure_user_email`, `ensure_repo_creation_disabled`) — this account /// ([`Self::disable_repo_creation`]), whether it was just created or
/// only exists so `AddRepoMember` has something to add, and the owning /// already existed. Nothing else does that for a swarm-created agent, so
/// hive's own provisioning pass self-heals both once the agent spawns. /// a failure fails the node. Does not align the account's email the way
/// `hive-c0re`'s `ensure_user_email` does — cosmetic, not a guard.
pub async fn ensure_agent_user(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> { pub async fn ensure_agent_user(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
self.create_agent_user(agent).await?;
self.disable_repo_creation(agent).await
}
/// Set `max_repo_creation = 0` on `agent`'s account. Agents create repos
/// through the hive, never with their own token — a write-scoped token
/// can otherwise create and own a repo and self-merge in it, bypassing
/// the operator-only-merge policy. Existing repos are untouched; push,
/// PRs and clone keep working.
///
/// Unconditional rather than verify-then-patch: Forgejo's API never
/// returns `max_repo_creation` (it is a field of `EditUserOption` only,
/// not of `User`), so there is no current value to compare against.
/// Setting 0 on an account already at 0 is a no-op.
async fn disable_repo_creation(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
self.api
.admin_edit_user(agent, repo_creation_lockdown(agent))
.await
.with_context(|| {
format!("disable repo creation for forge user {agent} (max_repo_creation = 0)")
})?;
tracing::info!(%agent, "swarm forge: disabled repo creation (max_repo_creation = 0)");
Ok(())
}
/// Create `agent`'s account. Idempotent: an existing user (409/422) is
/// folded into success, same as [`Self::ensure_org_repo`].
async fn create_agent_user(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
let password = crate::webhook::generate_hex_secret() let password = crate::webhook::generate_hex_secret()
.context("generating a throwaway password for the agent's forge account")?; .context("generating a throwaway password for the agent's forge account")?;
let res = self let res = self
@ -1084,6 +1109,37 @@ fn initial_flake_nix() -> &'static str {
"{\n description = \"hyperhive agent\";\n inputs = { };\n outputs =\n { self, ... }@inputs:\n {\n nixosModules.default = {\n imports = [ ./agent.nix ];\n _module.args.flakeInputs = builtins.removeAttrs inputs [ \"self\" ];\n };\n };\n}\n" "{\n description = \"hyperhive agent\";\n inputs = { };\n outputs =\n { self, ... }@inputs:\n {\n nixosModules.default = {\n imports = [ ./agent.nix ];\n _module.args.flakeInputs = builtins.removeAttrs inputs [ \"self\" ];\n };\n };\n}\n"
} }
/// The `admin_edit_user` body that sets `max_repo_creation = 0` on `agent`
/// and nothing else. Same shape as `hive-c0re::forge::users`'
/// `sparse_edit_user_option`: `login_name` + `source_id = 0` (local auth,
/// which is what [`Client::create_agent_user`] creates) ride along because
/// Forgejo resets `use_custom_avatar` on an admin edit that omits
/// `login_name`; every other field is left unset so nothing else is touched.
fn repo_creation_lockdown(agent: &str) -> EditUserOption {
EditUserOption {
active: None,
admin: None,
allow_create_organization: None,
allow_git_hook: None,
allow_import_local: None,
description: None,
email: None,
full_name: None,
hide_email: None,
location: None,
login_name: Some(agent.to_owned()),
max_repo_creation: Some(0),
must_change_password: None,
password: None,
prohibit_login: None,
pronouns: None,
restricted: None,
source_id: Some(0),
visibility: None,
website: None,
}
}
/// Whether a create-style call failed because the object already /// Whether a create-style call failed because the object already
/// exists. Forgejo signals this as HTTP 409 (conflict) or 422 /// exists. Forgejo signals this as HTTP 409 (conflict) or 422
/// (validation) — match both defensively, same as /// (validation) — match both defensively, same as
@ -1328,4 +1384,111 @@ mod tests {
"new logic: correctly refuses to fold a 422 with no confirmed existence" "new logic: correctly refuses to fold a 422 with no confirmed existence"
); );
} }
/// What [`stub_forge`] saw: method, path and JSON body of each request.
type Seen = std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<(String, String, serde_json::Value)>>>;
/// A stand-in forge on a loopback port — never the real one — answering
/// the admin user create (`POST`) with `create` and the admin user edit
/// (`PATCH`) with `edit` (status, JSON body), and recording every request.
async fn stub_forge(create: (u16, &'static str), edit: (u16, &'static str)) -> (Client, Seen) {
use axum::http::{Method, StatusCode, Uri, header::CONTENT_TYPE};
let seen = Seen::default();
let recorded = seen.clone();
let app = axum::Router::new().fallback(
move |method: Method, uri: Uri, body: axum::body::Bytes| {
let recorded = recorded.clone();
async move {
let json = serde_json::from_slice(&body).unwrap_or_default();
recorded.lock().unwrap().push((
method.to_string(),
uri.path().to_owned(),
json,
));
let (status, body) = match method {
Method::POST => create,
Method::PATCH => edit,
_ => (404, r#"{"message":"not stubbed"}"#),
};
let status = StatusCode::from_u16(status).unwrap();
(status, [(CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")], body)
}
},
);
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
let url = url::Url::parse(&format!("http://{}/", listener.local_addr().unwrap())).unwrap();
tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await });
let api = Forgejo::new(Auth::Token("stub-token"), url).unwrap();
(Client { api }, seen)
}
/// The `PATCH` [`Client::ensure_agent_user`] sent, if any.
fn lockdown_patch(seen: &Seen, agent: &str) -> Option<serde_json::Value> {
let path = format!("/api/v1/admin/users/{agent}");
seen.lock()
.unwrap()
.iter()
.find(|(method, p, _)| method == "PATCH" && *p == path)
.map(|(_, _, body)| body.clone())
}
/// A freshly created agent account is locked out of repo creation by
/// this node itself — not left for a hive-level pass to catch later —
/// and the edit sets nothing beyond `max_repo_creation` plus the
/// `login_name` / `source_id` pair Forgejo needs to leave the rest alone.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_created_agent_user_gets_repo_creation_disabled() {
let (client, seen) = stub_forge((201, "{}"), (200, "{}")).await;
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
let set: Vec<&str> = body
.as_object()
.unwrap()
.iter()
.filter(|(_, v)| !v.is_null())
.map(|(k, _)| k.as_str())
.collect();
assert_eq!(set, ["login_name", "max_repo_creation", "source_id"]);
assert_eq!(body["login_name"], "alice");
assert_eq!(body["source_id"], 0);
}
/// An account that already existed is locked down too: the node is
/// re-run, and an account created before this lockdown existed must
/// not keep repo creation just because the create step folded to
/// success. 409 rather than 422 so the case doesn't hinge on how a 422
/// is disambiguated.
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_existing_agent_user_still_gets_repo_creation_disabled() {
let (client, seen) =
stub_forge((409, r#"{"message":"user already exists"}"#), (200, "{}")).await;
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
}
/// A refused lockdown fails the node with Forgejo's own message, rather
/// than warning and reporting the account as provisioned — that is
/// `hive-c0re`'s `ensure_repo_creation_disabled` shape, which leaves an
/// agent able to create and self-merge with nothing marked failed.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_refused_lockdown_fails_the_node() {
let (client, _seen) = stub_forge(
(201, "{}"),
(403, r#"{"message":"token does not have required scope"}"#),
)
.await;
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap_err();
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
assert!(msg.contains("max_repo_creation"), "{msg}");
assert!(msg.contains("token does not have required scope"), "{msg}");
}
} }