diff --git a/docs/network.md b/docs/network.md
index a2f0566a..aea7defc 100644
--- a/docs/network.md
+++ b/docs/network.md
@@ -100,6 +100,27 @@ When `isolateContainers = true`, `allowedTCPPorts` is extended with
 shared host netns) for the forge sub-domain, per-agent UI proxies,
 and any other HTTP services.
 
+### Reaching host-loopback services (`exposeHostPorts`)
+
+Agents are deliberately cut off from the host loopback (the bridge→
+`127.0.0.0/8` DROP rule below), so a service that only binds
+`127.0.0.1` on the host — e.g. a dev OTEL collector for
+`services.hyperhive.otel.endpoint` — is unreachable by default.
+
+`services.hyperhive.network.exposeHostPorts = [ 4318 ];` opens a
+controlled path for each listed TCP port `P`:
+
+- a socket-activated `systemd-socket-proxyd` (`hive-hostport-<P>`)
+  listens on `<bridgeIp>:P` and forwards to `127.0.0.1:P`;
+- `P` is added to the bridge-interface `allowedTCPPorts`.
+
+The agent then points at `http://<bridgeIp>:P` (default
+`http://10.42.0.1:4318`). This keeps the loopback DROP rule intact:
+agents only ever connect to the bridge IP, and the host's own proxy
+process is what dials `127.0.0.1`. The port is reachable by **every**
+agent on the bridge subnet (like DNS/gateway), so only expose services
+safe for any agent to reach.
+
 ## Container isolation
 
 `services.hyperhive.network.isolateContainers` (default `false`) flips
diff --git a/nix/modules/hive-network.nix b/nix/modules/hive-network.nix
index f4a6f9e9..0d02d5e1 100644
--- a/nix/modules/hive-network.nix
+++ b/nix/modules/hive-network.nix
@@ -92,6 +92,30 @@ in
       '';
     };
 
+    exposeHostPorts = lib.mkOption {
+      type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.port;
+      default = [ ];
+      example = [ 4318 ];
+      description = ''
+        TCP ports on the host's loopback (`127.0.0.1`) to expose to agent
+        containers at the bridge IP (`bridgeIp`). For each port `P`, a
+        socket-activated `systemd-socket-proxyd` listens on
+        `''${bridgeIp}:P` and forwards to `127.0.0.1:P`, and `P` is opened
+        on the bridge-interface firewall.
+
+        Use this to let agents reach a host-local service that only binds
+        loopback — e.g. an OpenTelemetry collector for
+        `services.hyperhive.otel.endpoint`. The agent points at
+        `http://''${bridgeIp}:P` (default `http://10.42.0.1:P`).
+
+        This does NOT weaken the bridge→loopback DROP rule (defence-in-depth):
+        agents never reach `127.0.0.0/8`; they connect to the bridge IP and
+        the host's own proxy process dials loopback. The exposed port is
+        reachable by EVERY agent on the bridge subnet (same as DNS/gateway),
+        so only expose services that are safe for any agent to reach.
+      '';
+    };
+
     isolateContainers = lib.mkOption {
       type = lib.types.bool;
       default = true;
@@ -205,10 +229,12 @@ in
       # Allow isolated agents to reach the gateway (nginx on the host, shared
       # netns). Port 80 covers `http://forge.<domain>`, per-agent UI proxies,
       # and any other HTTP services the gateway fronts. Port 443 for HTTPS.
+      # `exposeHostPorts` adds any operator-declared host-loopback proxies.
       networking.firewall.interfaces.${cfg.bridgeName}.allowedTCPPorts = [
         80
         443
-      ];
+      ]
+      ++ cfg.exposeHostPorts;
 
       # Tells hive-c0re to pass PRIVATE_NETWORK + bridge settings to each
       # container. HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET is host-bridge IP/prefix, not canonical
@@ -220,6 +246,52 @@ in
       };
     })
 
+    # Host-loopback port exposure: one socket-activated systemd-socket-proxyd
+    # per `exposeHostPorts` entry, listening on the bridge IP and forwarding to
+    # the host's loopback. This is how agents reach a host-local service (e.g. a
+    # dev OTEL collector on 127.0.0.1) without weakening the bridge→loopback
+    # DROP rule above — agents connect to the bridge IP, and the host's own
+    # proxy process is what dials 127.0.0.1. See docs/network.md.
+    (lib.mkIf (config.services.hyperhive.enable && cfg.exposeHostPorts != [ ]) {
+      systemd.sockets = lib.listToAttrs (
+        map (
+          p:
+          lib.nameValuePair "hive-hostport-${toString p}" {
+            description = "Host-loopback proxy socket for port ${toString p} (bridge→127.0.0.1)";
+            wantedBy = [ "sockets.target" ];
+            socketConfig.ListenStream = "${cfg.bridgeIp}:${toString p}";
+          }
+        ) cfg.exposeHostPorts
+      );
+
+      systemd.services = lib.listToAttrs (
+        map (
+          p:
+          lib.nameValuePair "hive-hostport-${toString p}" {
+            description = "Host-loopback proxy for port ${toString p} (bridge→127.0.0.1)";
+            requires = [ "hive-hostport-${toString p}.socket" ];
+            after = [ "hive-hostport-${toString p}.socket" ];
+            serviceConfig = {
+              ExecStart = "${config.systemd.package}/lib/systemd/systemd-socket-proxyd 127.0.0.1:${toString p}";
+              SyslogIdentifier = "hive-hostport-${toString p}";
+              # Pure userspace TCP proxy: no filesystem, no privileges, no extra
+              # address families beyond inet/unix. DynamicUser keeps it unprivileged.
+              DynamicUser = true;
+              NoNewPrivileges = true;
+              ProtectSystem = "strict";
+              ProtectHome = true;
+              PrivateTmp = true;
+              RestrictAddressFamilies = [
+                "AF_INET"
+                "AF_INET6"
+                "AF_UNIX"
+              ];
+            };
+          }
+        ) cfg.exposeHostPorts
+      );
+    })
+
     # Deprecation surface for the removed toggles. Both options are kept so
     # existing configs that set them to `true` still eval cleanly; setting
     # either to `false` no longer does anything (network + isolation are