# Outbound SSH for this agent: a certificate for a key it generates itself, # signed by the swarm's SSH CA, and a client config that offers it. # # On every agent that has a store address (the same switch as ./bao.nix: with no # store there is nothing to sign with). The agent has no standing SSH credential: # `${unitName}.service` generates an ed25519 key in its own `/run` directory # (tmpfs, never on disk), logs in to the swarm secret store with the identity # ./bao.nix keeps current, and has the public half signed by the store's SSH # engine (`swarm_secret_client::policy::SSH_MOUNT`). The role it signs through # issues a user certificate with this agent's name as its only principal, valid # for an hour; a timer signs again well before that runs out. # # Whether the store signs is the operator's per-agent switch in the swarm UI # (the `ssh` permission, `swarm-controller`'s `agent_ssh`). With it off the store # refuses, the unit logs one line and ends successfully, and the next tick asks # again; with it on the agent has a certificate within one tick. The unit # needs no change to be switched. # # A target machine trusts the CA, not this key: ../target-modules/agent-ssh.nix. { pkgs, lib, config, ... }: let baoCfg = config.services.hyperhive.agent.bao; # The unix user is named for the agent, so this is also the principal the # role puts on the certificate (the identity entity swarm-controller names # after the agent). agentName = config.services.hyperhive.agent.user.name; ca = import ../host-modules/lib/ssh-agent-ca.nix { }; # The server CA id ./bao.nix loads. serverCaCredential = "hive-agent-bao-server-ca"; unitName = "hive-agent-ssh-cert"; runtimeDir = unitName; keyFile = "/run/${runtimeDir}/key"; pubFile = "${keyFile}.pub"; # `ssh` reads `-cert.pub` by itself, but the config names it so # that the file a Host block uses is visible in the config. certFile = "${keyFile}-cert.pub"; stagingFile = "/run/${runtimeDir}/cert.new"; errFile = "/run/${runtimeDir}/bao.err"; # In the state dir, which is bound from the host, so a pin survives a restart. knownHostsFile = "/agents/${agentName}/state/ssh_known_hosts"; signPath = "${ca.mountPath}/sign/${ca.roleName}"; storeRetry = import ../host-modules/lib/store-retry.nix { }; in { config = lib.mkIf (baoCfg.addr != null) { # Every host: the certificate, and the pins in the state dir, which outlives # the container root. `accept-new` records a host's key at first contact and # refuses a changed one after that. programs.ssh.extraConfig = '' Host * IdentityFile ${keyFile} CertificateFile ${certFile} IdentitiesOnly yes StrictHostKeyChecking accept-new UserKnownHostsFile ${knownHostsFile} ''; systemd.services.${unitName} = { description = "sign this agent's SSH key with the swarm's SSH CA"; after = [ "network.target" # Ordering only: that unit reports a store this agent cannot reach as # itself, and should get to say so first. "hive-agent-bao-identity.service" ]; wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ]; path = [ pkgs.openbao pkgs.openssh pkgs.coreutils ]; # ../host-modules/lib/store-retry.nix. inherit (storeRetry) startLimitBurst startLimitIntervalSec; serviceConfig = storeRetry.serviceConfig // { Type = "oneshot"; # Not `RemainAfterExit`: the timer has to be able to start this unit # again. `RuntimeDirectoryPreserve` keeps the key between runs. RemainAfterExit = false; TimeoutStartSec = 30; User = agentName; Group = agentName; RuntimeDirectory = runtimeDir; RuntimeDirectoryMode = "0700"; RuntimeDirectoryPreserve = "yes"; UMask = "0377"; LoadCredential = [ serverCaCredential ]; }; environment = { BAO_ADDR = toString baoCfg.addr; BAO_CLIENT_CERT = baoCfg.clientCertFile; BAO_CLIENT_KEY = baoCfg.clientKeyFile; }; script = '' set -euo pipefail # No identity delivered: ./bao.nix's check reports that; saying it # twice adds nothing. for f in "$BAO_CLIENT_CERT" "$BAO_CLIENT_KEY"; do if [ ! -s "$f" ]; then echo "this agent has no store identity, so it cannot get an SSH certificate." >&2 exit 0 fi if [ ! -r "$f" ]; then echo "cannot read $f, so this agent cannot present its store identity." >&2 exit 1 fi done if [ -s "$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/${serverCaCredential}" ]; then export BAO_CACERT="$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/${serverCaCredential}" fi # `UMask=0377` makes every file this script creates `0400`, so each one # is removed before the command that creates it. key=${lib.escapeShellArg keyFile} pub=${lib.escapeShellArg pubFile} cert=${lib.escapeShellArg certFile} staged=${lib.escapeShellArg stagingFile} err=${lib.escapeShellArg errFile} trap 'rm -f "$err" "$staged"' EXIT # The key lives as long as /run does, which is as long as this # container: a restart is a new key. Only a pair with both halves is # kept. if [ ! -s "$key" ] || [ ! -s "$pub" ]; then rm -f "$key" "$pub" "$cert" ssh-keygen -q -t ed25519 -N "" -C ${lib.escapeShellArg "hive-agent-${agentName}"} -f "$key" chmod 0400 "$key" fi rm -f "$err" if ! BAO_TOKEN="$(bao login -method=cert -token-only 2>"$err")"; then echo "the swarm secret store at $BAO_ADDR refused or could not answer this agent's certificate login:" >&2 if [ -s "$err" ]; then cat "$err" >&2; fi exit 1 fi export BAO_TOKEN # No principal is requested: the role's default is this agent's own # name, and it refuses any other. rm -f "$err" "$staged" if ! bao write -field=signed_key ${lib.escapeShellArg signPath} public_key=@"$pub" >"$staged" 2>"$err"; then # A 403 is the operator's switch being off for this agent: not a fault, # so no failed unit. Anything else (a sealed or unreachable store) is # one, and retried. if [[ "$(<"$err")" == *"Code: 403"* ]]; then echo "SSH certificates are not enabled for this agent (the swarm store refused to sign); asking again next tick." exit 0 fi echo "the swarm secret store would not sign this agent's SSH key at ${signPath}:" >&2 if [ -s "$err" ]; then cat "$err" >&2; fi exit 1 fi # A reply that is not a certificate must not replace the one in use. if ! ssh-keygen -L -f "$staged" >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo "what the store returned at ${signPath} is not an SSH certificate; keeping the current one." >&2 exit 1 fi # One rename: ssh never reads a half-written certificate. mv -f "$staged" "$cert" echo "signed this agent's SSH key as ${agentName}, valid for ${toString ca.certTtlMinutes} minutes." ''; }; # Every third of the certificate's lifetime, so a store that is down for # a run or two does not outlast it. systemd.timers.${unitName} = { description = "sign this agent's SSH key again before its certificate expires"; wantedBy = [ "timers.target" ]; timerConfig = { OnUnitInactiveSec = "${toString ca.renewEveryMinutes}min"; RandomizedDelaySec = "1min"; }; }; }; }