A port nobody owns, a vb- veth that never joined the bridge and a machine whose
state file or namespace can't be read all left the bridge sweep silent, so a
container stayed unbound for 11 hours with nothing in the journal.
A timer run now prints one line for each, after the finding has stood for 60 s
and once until it clears, kept in <state file>.diag. Nothing it binds changes.
dnsmasq relays the hook's stderr at LOG_DEBUG as dnsmasq-script, and the
field log shipper's journald receiver keeps info and above, so no lease
add or renewal was visible in the field. The hook now also writes each
line to /dev/log at info priority with identifier egress-lease. The
stderr print stays. The VM test reads the lines back with
journalctl -t egress-lease -p info.
The lock wait polls try_lock and gives up at the pass deadline (30 s), nft, ip
and nsenter get 10 s each before they are killed, and both pin units get
TimeoutStartSec=90s, which systemd does not set for a oneshot unit.
Each refused frame now goes through its own chain, spoof_<reason>, whose log prefix names the check that refused it (mac, vlan, dhcp, v4, v6, arp). The unmetered log lines of all reasons share one named limit, spoof_unmetered, so the budget stays one for all ports and reasons.
The hive directory and the WireGuard mesh become handbook pages of their own,
the controller's mint-failure handling moves to controller.md, and the
credential-by-credential mechanics and the secret store UI's proxy move to a new
implementation page.
dnsmasq runs the dhcp-script on a renewal only with script-on-renewal, so a pair loaded at the first lease timed out while the lease kept renewing and the bridge table dropped the container's traffic. Set script-on-renewal, time pairs out remaining + 300s, default antiSpoof to log, and run the vm test through renewals with drop.
A forward chain in the hive-owned nft table logs each new flow from the agent bridge to the uplink (v4 and v6) and counts every packet. It never blocks. The mesh interface is skipped. Logging is rate limited per source address; a flow that limit cannot log gets one line from a shared limit with its own prefix. services.hyperhive.network.egress.forward selects accept, log (default) or drop; drop is refused at evaluation until the interception it needs exists.
The page-by-page and control-by-control description of the swarm UI moves to
4-implementation/web-ui/swarm-ui.md, with the quick-links wiring. The handbook
page keeps the route table, how to reach the UI, who may and what the browser
keeps. Links to the moved sections point at the new page.
credentials.md drops the target-shape framing and keeps the rules, where a
secret lives, the swarm- and hive-level secrets and how to add one. The queue
responder's keys, per-principal identities, how a reader reaches the store, the
store UI's login and where the root lives move to
4-implementation/swarm/credentials.md. The per-secret reference moves to
4-implementation/swarm/credentials-reference.md. Links and comments follow.
Every docs directory moves under 1-getting-started, 2-handbook,
4-implementation or 5-project; the options reference (section 3) comes from
the website and has no directory here. trust-boundary stays whole under the
handbook for now. web-ui, swarm and tools split between handbook and
implementation, and the command-line references move to
2-handbook/reference. Links, path references in code and nix, and the docs
index follow the moves; no page content changes.