swarm ui ssh row with target snippets, docs for the per-agent switch
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# SSH access to a machine
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Let an agent SSH into a machine you name, such as a test VM, without copying a
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key onto it. The agent holds no standing SSH key. It asks the swarm's secret
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store for a certificate that lasts an hour, and the machine trusts the swarm's
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SSH certificate authority (CA) instead of a list of keys.
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key onto it. The agent holds no standing SSH key. While you allow it, the agent
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gets a certificate from the swarm's SSH certificate authority (CA) that lasts
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an hour. The machine trusts the CA, so it needs no list of keys.
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Agent-side, nothing changes until you do both of these:
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Two things have to be true before an agent gets in:
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1. Switch SSH on for the agent and name the machines it may reach.
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2. Make each machine trust the CA and list the agents allowed in.
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1. **You switch SSH on for that agent**, in the swarm UI.
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2. **The machine trusts the CA** and lists the agent.
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The permission to get a certificate is in the policy every agent shares, so
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every agent with a store identity can already get a certificate for its own
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name, whether or not you switch SSH on for it. That's harmless: no machine
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trusts a name it doesn't list. Switching SSH on only sets up the key, the
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renewal and the client config.
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Every agent already has an SSH client, a key it makes in memory, and a
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certificate unit. The switch alone decides whether the swarm signs.
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## 1. Switch it on for an agent
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In the agent's config:
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Open the agent's card in the swarm UI and find the **ssh** row. Select it and
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tick **allow the agent to get SSH certificates**. The default is off. The
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agent has a certificate within about 25 minutes of the change. Untick the box
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to stop new certificates. The row also shows the three forms of the target
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setup below, already filled in with the swarm's CA key and the agent's name.
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```nix
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services.hyperhive.agent.ssh = {
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enable = true;
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hosts.testvm = {
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hostName = "10.0.0.7";
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user = "test";
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port = 22; # the default
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hostKey = "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAA…";
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};
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};
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```
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The agent then runs `ssh user@host`, with no other setup. It offers its
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certificate and nothing else.
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`hostKey` is the machine's own host public key, the one line in
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`/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub` on it. The agent pins it: it refuses a
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machine that presents any other key, and never trusts a key on first sight.
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The agent then runs `ssh testvm` with no other flag. The agent's SSH client
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offers its certificate and nothing else. The option needs the agent to have a
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store identity, the same as for its other store credentials.
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**Host keys use trust on first use.** The agent accepts the key a machine
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shows on the first connection, keeps it in its state directory (so it survives
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restarts), and refuses a changed key afterwards. A swapped machine on the first
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contact would go unnoticed. The row's explainer says so.
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This doesn't open the network. If you set the hive's `egress.forward` to
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`reject`, the hive refuses the agent's direct connection to the machine's port
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@ -47,33 +36,31 @@ until a separate allowance exists; the default `log` lets it through. See
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## 2. Make a machine trust the CA
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On the swarm's store host, read the CA's public key:
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Open **on the target** in the same row. It shows the swarm's CA public key, a
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public value, and the agent's name, in three forms. Replace `<user>` with the
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account the agent logs in as. The target never contacts the swarm.
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- **NixOS:** the CA key in `services.openssh.settings.TrustedUserCAKeys` and
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`users.users.<user>.openssh.authorizedPrincipals = [ "<agent>" ];`. The same
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as one module: import `hyperhive.nixosModules.agent-ssh-target` and set
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`services.hyperhive.agentSshTarget` (`enable`, `caPublicKey`,
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`principals.<user>`).
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- **home-manager:** `home.file.".ssh/authorized_keys".text` holding one
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`cert-authority` line.
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- **plain ssh:** one line in the account's `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`:
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```
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cert-authority,principals="<agent>" ssh-ed25519 AAAA…
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```
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This works on any machine without a change to its sshd config.
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To read the CA key outside the UI, run this on the swarm's store host:
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```bash
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bao read -field=public_key ssh-agents/config/ca
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```
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The store also serves the same key without a token at
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`<store address>/v1/ssh-agents/public_key`. The key is public and you set it
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once. Then import the module on the machine, which can be any NixOS machine,
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and not only a hive host:
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```nix
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{
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imports = [ hyperhive.nixosModules.agent-ssh-target ];
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services.hyperhive.agentSshTarget = {
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enable = true;
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caPublicKey = "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAA…";
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principals.test = [ "atlas" "maia" ];
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};
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}
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```
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`principals.<user>` lists the agents that may log in as that local account. The
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account has to exist. An account with no entry accepts no certificate. The
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module writes no `authorized_keys`.
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## What an agent can and can't do
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- It can only get a certificate for **its own name**. The store signs for the
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@ -86,19 +73,17 @@ module writes no `authorized_keys`.
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## Revoking access
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- **One agent from one machine:** remove its name from that user's
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`principals` and deploy the machine. The next login attempt fails.
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- **One agent from every machine:** remove its name from every machine's
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`principals`. That's the revocation. No swarm-wide switch
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stops signing for an agent that a hive still declares: if you delete
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its cert-auth role `hive-agent-<name>` in the store, `swarm-controller`
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writes it back within five minutes. Signing stops only once no hive declares
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the agent any more (you destroyed it); the controller then stops renewing
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its store identity, and the identity lapses with its 7-day certificate.
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- **A certificate already issued** stays valid until it expires, at most three
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hours, whatever you remove. Removing a principal blocks new logins at once.
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- **The CA itself:** if the CA key changes, every machine needs the
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new public key. Nothing replaces the CA by itself.
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- **One agent from one machine:** remove its principal (the `authorizedPrincipals`
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entry, or the `cert-authority` line) and deploy the machine. The next login
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attempt fails.
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- **One agent from every machine:** untick the switch. The swarm stops signing
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for it within five minutes; an agent already signed in can still sign
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for up to an hour. Destroying the agent cuts its store identity off within
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minutes. Either way a certificate already signed stays valid until it
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expires, at most three hours, so removing the principal on a machine is what
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cuts it off there at once.
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- **The CA itself:** if the CA key changes, every machine needs the new public
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key. Nothing replaces the CA by itself.
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For the bao paths, field names and units, see
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[the SSH CA implementation page](../../4-implementation/swarm/ssh-ca.md).
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@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ the rest of the cell says how.
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| `swarm/agents/<agent>/claude-credentials` | `swarm-claude-login`, when you log the agent in from its card; one version per login | the agent, while it waits for a login | ❌ log in again | ✅ every 30 seconds while waiting |
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| `swarm/hives/<hive>/forge/token` | `swarm-controller`, every 5 minutes | `swarm-controller` and the hive | ✅ when missing or no longer matching the forge | ✅ read on every forge call |
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| `swarm/agents/<agent>/proxy-credential` | `swarm-controller`: 32 random bytes, at start and every 5 minutes for every agent that holds a store identity | the hive (`hive-c0re`) and the agent, which fetches it | ❌ never replaced: written only while the path holds nothing | ✅ `hive-c0re` re-reads it every 30 seconds |
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| `ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent` (a signing call, nothing is stored) | the store's SSH CA mount (`ssh-agents`), when the agent's `hive-agent-ssh-cert` unit asks it to sign the public key the unit generated in its own `/run`; the CA key is generated inside the store by `swarm-bao-agent-ssh-policy` | the agent, which keeps the key and the signed certificate in `/run` only; a target machine trusts the CA's public key by value | ✅ the certificate lasts 60 minutes; the CA is never replaced, and a target that holds a different CA key refuses every certificate | ✅ the agent signs again every 20 minutes |
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| `ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent` (a signing call, nothing is stored) | the store's SSH CA mount (`ssh-agents`), when the agent's `hive-agent-ssh-cert` unit asks it to sign, which the operator's per-agent `ssh` switch allows the public key the unit generated in its own `/run`; the CA key is generated inside the store by `swarm-bao-agent-ssh-policy` | the agent, which keeps the key and the signed certificate in `/run` only; a target machine trusts the CA's public key by value | ✅ the certificate lasts 60 minutes; the CA is never replaced, and a target that holds a different CA key refuses every certificate | ✅ the agent signs again every 20 minutes |
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| `swarm/hives/<hive>/squid-selfcheck` | `swarm-controller`, in the same pass as the agents' credentials | the hive: `hive-c0re` and `squid-selfcheck-credential` (root) | ❌ never replaced: written only while the path holds nothing | ✅ `hive-c0re` every 30 seconds, the root unit every 10 minutes |
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| `swarm/hives/<hive>/oidc/client` | authelia, first boot, straight into the store | the hive | ❌ minted once, straight into the store; minted again only when the store holds none | ✅ re-read when authelia refuses it |
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| `swarm/services/<clientId>/oidc/client` | authelia | that service | must be stated | must be stated |
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@ -39,18 +39,43 @@ each agent's cert login after the agent
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a glob, host certificates, other key types or another extension is a refusal
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from the store.
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## What an agent may call
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## The switch and the signing policy
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The shared agent policy `hive-agent` (`render_shared_agent`) holds one more
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stanza: `update` on `ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent`, and nothing on the rest of
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the mount. `swarm-controller` writes the policy at every start and at every
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agent mint, so a deploy that adds the stanza reaches existing agents when the
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controller restarts. A token already issued picks the change up on its next
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request, because bao reads policies per request.
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The operator's switch is the `ssh` field of the agent's record in `agent-permissions`
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(`swarm_wire::agent_permissions`), set with `PUT /api/agents/{name}/permissions`
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from the swarm UI's **ssh** row. Absent is off. A `PUT` or `DELETE` that leaves
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the field out keeps it.
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Signing is a separate policy, `hive-agent-ssh` (`policy::SSH_POLICY`,
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`render_ssh_signer`): `update` on `ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent` and nothing
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else. The shared agent policy `hive-agent` holds no SSH stanza. `swarm-controller`
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writes `hive-agent-ssh` at every identity mint and every pass of `agent_ssh.rs`,
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and attaches it to the agent's cert-auth role `hive-agent-<name>` as a second
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`token_policies` entry only while the switch is on.
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- **Rewrite.** A change of the field wakes `agent_ssh`'s pass at once, and the pass
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also runs every five minutes. It reads each role's policies and rewrites only
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`token_policies` (a partial write: the role's certificate, names and lifetimes
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stay) when they differ from the shared policy plus, if on, `hive-agent-ssh`.
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The identity mint (`agent_identity.rs`) keeps whatever the role has, so a
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certificate renewal doesn't switch it off. The pass doesn't create a missing role.
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- **When it takes effect.** A token carries the policies of the role it logged in
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under and keeps them until it expires, at most the role's `token_ttl` of one
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hour. Switching **on** reaches the agent at its next login, which its
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certificate unit makes on every run (every 20 minutes), so within about 25
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minutes of the pass. Switching **off** stops every new login at once; an agent
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already holding a token that carries the policy can still sign until that token
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expires, at most an hour. Neither touches a certificate already signed: it
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stays valid until it expires, at most three hours.
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- **The CA key.** `GET /api/ssh/ca` returns `{ "public_key": "ssh-ed25519 …" }`, read
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from `ssh-agents/config/ca` with the controller's own identity. The controller
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holds `read` on that path and nothing else on the mount: it can't sign. It
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answers 404 while the store holds no CA.
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## The agent's unit
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With `services.hyperhive.agent.ssh.enable`, `nix/agent-modules/ssh.nix` adds
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`nix/agent-modules/ssh.nix` is on in every agent that has a store address
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(`services.hyperhive.agent.bao.addr`), with no option. It adds
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`hive-agent-ssh-cert.service` and its timer, as the agent user:
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- the key is `/run/hive-agent-ssh-cert/key` (directory `0700`, files `0400`,
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@ -58,14 +83,18 @@ With `services.hyperhive.agent.ssh.enable`, `nix/agent-modules/ssh.nix` adds
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`key-cert.pub` beside it;
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- each run logs in to the store with the cert identity `hive-agent-bao-identity`
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keeps, signs `key.pub` through the role, checks the answer parses as a
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certificate and renames it into place;
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certificate and renames it into place. A `403` from the signing call is the
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switch being off: the unit prints one line and exits 0, and the next tick asks
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again. Any other failure fails the unit, which retries;
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- the timer fires 20 minutes after each run, a third of the 60-minute lifetime,
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from the same file as the role's TTL;
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- the generated `/etc/ssh/ssh_config` has one `Host <name>` block per entry
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(`HostName`, `User`, `Port`, `IdentityFile`, `CertificateFile`,
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`IdentitiesOnly yes`, `StrictHostKeyChecking yes`), and
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`/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts` one pinned line per `hostKey` (`[host]:port` for a
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port other than 22).
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- the system `/etc/ssh/ssh_config` has one `Host *` block: `IdentityFile` and
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`CertificateFile` from `/run`, `IdentitiesOnly yes`,
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`StrictHostKeyChecking accept-new`, and
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`UserKnownHostsFile /agents/<name>/state/ssh_known_hosts`. The host binds the
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state directory in, so the pins survive a restart; the container root
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doesn't. The agent trusts the first key a host shows and refuses a changed
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one.
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## The target module
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@ -84,11 +113,8 @@ per-agent allowance for it yet.
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## Revocation
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Every agent shares the role, which holds nothing per agent, so there is no
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per-agent signing switch. `swarm-controller`'s renewal pass (`agent_renewal.rs`) re-mints
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the store identity, and writes the cert-auth role `hive-agent-<name>` back, for
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every agent a hive still declares, so deleting the role doesn't stick. Nothing
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in the controller deletes the role when you destroy an agent; the renewal pass
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skips a destroyed agent and its identity lapses with its 7-day
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certificate. A target's `principals` list is the immediate control. A
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certificate already signed stays valid for at most `max_ttl` (180 minutes).
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Unticking the switch stops signing as described above. Destroying an agent
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disables its identity entity and deletes its cert-auth role
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(`agent_cutoff.rs`), after which its tokens stop working at once. A target's
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principals list is the immediate control per machine. A certificate already
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signed stays valid for at most `max_ttl` (180 minutes).
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@ -851,6 +851,17 @@ back, so the controller's log (`agent max repos`) is the record of what it appli
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to each agent. The controller tries an agent whose account the forge refuses again
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every five minutes.
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The **ssh** row is whether the agent may get SSH certificates from the swarm: a
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badge reading on or off, off by default. Selecting it opens an explainer, a
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checkbox that does a `PUT` of `ssh` with the stored permissions beside it, and
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a folded **on the target** section. That section reads `GET /api/ssh/ca` and
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shows the swarm's CA key and the agent's name as the lines for a NixOS machine,
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a home-manager user and a plain `authorized_keys` file, with a copy button; the
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card builds the text in `frontend/packages/swarm-ui/src/agent/detail/ssh.ts`. A `PUT`
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that leaves `ssh` out, and the `DELETE` of **use the default**, keep it. The
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controller attaches the signing policy to the agent's login role within five
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minutes; see [the SSH CA](../swarm/ssh-ca.md#the-switch-and-the-signing-policy).
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A saved change isn't instant. The hive reads the grant about every 30 seconds
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and the agent takes it at its next turn. A change to `manage_root_agent`
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restarts the agent after its current turn. The card reads
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@ -349,6 +349,11 @@ off creating organizations on every agent account. A `PUT` that leaves the field
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out, a `DELETE`, and a re-create keep the stored value; the route refuses more
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than 100.
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**SSH switch** — the record also carries `ssh`, whether the agent's login role
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attaches the SSH signing policy. An absent value is off. Only the controller reads
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it (`agent_ssh`). A `PUT` that leaves the field out, a `DELETE` and a re-create
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keep the stored value.
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**How a change applies** —
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- The agent's harness reads its own key every 10 seconds and builds every
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turn's `--tools`, `--allowedTools` and MCP config from the last value, so a
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