move Permission into hive-types, drop swarm-controller's hive-sh4re dep

Cargo.lock

@@ -1675,6 +1675,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "hive-runtime",
  "hive-sh4re",
  "hive-sock-client",
+ "hive-types",
  "http-body-util",
  "hyper",
  "hyper-util",
@@ -2024,7 +2025,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "schemars",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
- "strum",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -4876,7 +4876,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "hive-jobq-metrics",
  "hive-jobq-wire",
  "hive-log",
- "hive-sh4re",
  "hive-types",
  "hmac 0.13.0",
  "http",
@@ -5031,7 +5030,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "async-nats",
  "axum",
  "data-encoding",
- "hive-sh4re",
+ "hive-types",
  "reqwest",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",

docs/process/conventions.md

@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ JSON-line protocol with their own result types; RFC 9457 is an HTTP format.
 
 ## Permissions
 
-One set of named `Permission` values (`hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission`)
+One set of named `Permission` values (`hive_types::Permission`)
 decides what an agent may do: which MCP and built-in tools it gets, and which
 host access it has.
 
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ agent grant itself any tool by submitting a config commit, bypassing the
 operator gate.
 
 **Adding to the set** — add a variant to `Permission` in
-`hive-sh4re/src/permissions.rs` and to `Permission::ALL`, and enforce it where
+`hive-types/src/permission.rs` and to `Permission::ALL`, and enforce it where
 it applies. A new `#[tool]` fn on `AgentServer` (`hive-agent-mcp/src/mcp/mod.rs`)
 goes into the matching `Permission::tools()` slice: that's the single source
 of truth `mcp_config::allowed_mcp_tools` (`hive-agent/src/mcp_config.rs`)

docs/turn-loop/mcp.md

@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ status hint lives in the wake prompt + UI header, not here.
 ## Tool allowlist (`hive_sh4re::permissions::ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS`)
 
 The built-in list and the `--tools` value it resolves to live in
-`hive-sh4re` alongside `Permission`, not in the harness, because the
+`hive-sh4re` (the `Permission` enum itself is in `hive-types`), not in the
+harness, because the
 subagent daemon spawns its own `claude` and must resolve the same set —
 see [`docs/tools/subagent.md`](../tools/subagent.md).
 

hive-agent-mcp/src/mcp/mod.rs

@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ impl AgentServer {
 }
 
 // IMPORTANT: when adding a new `#[tool]` fn to this impl, also add
-// its name to the matching `Permission::tools()` slice in hive-sh4re.
+// its name to the matching `Permission::tools()` slice in hive-types.
 // Claude Code's permission gate refuses uninlisted MCP tools in
 // non-interactive `--print` mode with "permissions not granted yet".
 #[tool_router]

hive-agent/Cargo.toml

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ hive-core-agent-sock.workspace = true
 hive-log.workspace = true
 hive-sh4re.workspace = true
 hive-sock-client.workspace = true
+hive-types.workspace = true
 libc.workspace = true
 opentelemetry.workspace = true
 opentelemetry_sdk.workspace = true

hive-agent/src/mcp_config.rs

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 //! running MCP server (a separate binary) — the `send` allow-list check that
 //! server enforces lives alongside it in the `hive-agent-mcp` crate.
 
-use hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission;
+use hive_types::Permission;
 
 /// Name of the hyperhive MCP server inside claude's view. Claude prefixes
 /// tools as `mcp__<this>__<tool>` (e.g. `mcp__hyperhive__send`).
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ fn extra_server_enabled(server: &str, perms: &[Permission]) -> bool {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod extra_server_gate_tests {
     use super::{extra_server_enabled, extra_server_required_permission};
-    use hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission;
+    use hive_types::Permission;
 
     #[test]
     fn bash_is_gated_behind_execution() {
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ mod extra_server_gate_tests {
 
 /// MCP tools claude is allowed to call without prompting, derived from
 /// the supplied permissions. Adding a new `#[tool]` fn to a server impl
-/// requires updating the matching `Permission::tools()` slice in hive-sh4re
+/// requires updating the matching `Permission::tools()` slice in hive-types
 /// (single source of truth).
 #[must_use]
 pub fn allowed_mcp_tools(perms: &[Permission]) -> Vec<String> {
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ fn build_mcp_servers() -> serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value> {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::{SERVER_NAME, allowed_mcp_tools};
-    use hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission;
+    use hive_types::Permission;
 
     fn qualified(tool: &str) -> String {
         format!("mcp__{SERVER_NAME}__{tool}")

hive-agent/src/swarm_permissions.rs

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ use std::path::Path;
 use std::sync::{PoisonError, RwLock};
 use std::time::Duration;
 
-use hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission;
+use hive_types::Permission;
 use swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions::{HIVE_COPY_PATH, HiveCopy, Read, read};
 
 /// How often the key is read. Also the longest a change can take to reach

hive-agent/src/turn.rs

@@ -351,8 +351,7 @@ pub fn make_session(bus: &Bus) -> Result<AgentSession> {
 /// against the agent's permissions at the moment it asks.
 fn acp_permission_policy() -> PermissionPolicy {
     std::sync::Arc::new(|ask: &PermissionAsk<'_>| {
-        let web = crate::swarm_permissions::current()
-            .contains(&hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission::WebTools);
+        let web = crate::swarm_permissions::current().contains(&hive_types::Permission::WebTools);
         acp_permits(ask, web)
     })
 }

hive-c0re/src/agent_config/permissions.rs

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 use std::collections::BTreeMap;
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 
-use hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission;
+use hive_types::Permission;
 use swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions::{AgentPermissions, HIVE_COPY_FILE, HiveCopy};
 
 const FILE: &str = "swarm-agent-permissions.json";

hive-c0re/src/agent_config/topology.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 //! dashboard's tree view. All of that is gone; what the file is
 //! *for* now is the one thing that survived the removal — naming every
 //! agent, which is the set a
-//! [`hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission::ManageRootAgent`] holder gets
+//! [`hive_types::Permission::ManageRootAgent`] holder gets
 //! bind-mounted ([`all_agents`]).
 //!
 //! Broader-than-your-own bind-mount grants are **not** stored here: they
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ fn read_from(path: &Path) -> std::io::Result<BTreeSet<String>> {
 }
 
 /// Every agent the roster knows about, in name order. This is the set
-/// a [`hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission::ManageRootAgent`] holder gets
+/// a [`hive_types::Permission::ManageRootAgent`] holder gets
 /// bind-mounted, and it is deliberately unfiltered: that permission means
 /// "may manage any agent", so the set is all of them.
 ///

hive-c0re/src/lifecycle/host_config.rs

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use hive_priv_sock::{BindMount, CredentialMount};
-use hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission;
+use hive_types::Permission;
 
 use crate::coordinator::{AgentPaths, HiveEnv};
 

hive-c0re/src/workers/permissions_import.rs

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet};
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
-use hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission;
+use hive_types::Permission;
 use swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions::{
     self, AgentPermissions, IMPORT_REPLY_DEADLINE, Import, ImportReply,
 };
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ async fn send_at(client: &async_nats::Client, hive: &str, meta: &Path) -> Result
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::{FileMap, grants, seed_local_at};
-    use hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission::{self, *};
+    use hive_types::Permission::{self, *};
 
     fn file(json: &str) -> FileMap {
         serde_json::from_str(json).expect("decodes")

hive-c0re/src/workers/swarm_permissions.rs

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::Duration;
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
-use hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission;
+use hive_types::Permission;
 use swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions::{self, AgentPermissions, Read};
 
 use crate::coordinator::Coordinator;
@@ -216,12 +216,8 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(changed.is_empty());
         assert!(crate::permissions::read_at(&path).expect("read").is_empty());
         assert!(
-            !crate::permissions::holds(
-                &path,
-                "ruth",
-                hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission::ManageRootAgent
-            )
-            .expect("read")
+            !crate::permissions::holds(&path, "ruth", hive_types::Permission::ManageRootAgent)
+                .expect("read")
         );
     }
 

hive-sh4re/Cargo.toml

@@ -15,4 +15,3 @@ schemars.workspace = true
 serde.workspace = true
 # `stream_enrich` walks raw claude `stream-json` values into `term_msg` rows.
 serde_json.workspace = true
-strum.workspace = true

hive-sh4re/src/permissions.rs

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 //! server instead); the permission transfers to a subagent, not the
 //! mechanism.
 
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use hive_types::Permission;
 
 /// Built-in claude tools present in every session regardless of permissions.
 /// Anything not in this list (and not added by a permission's
@@ -90,131 +90,10 @@ pub fn subagent_builtin_tools_for(perms: &[Permission]) -> Vec<&'static str> {
     tools
 }
 
-/// One thing an agent may be permitted. Stored by its `snake_case` name.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize, strum::IntoStaticStr)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
-#[strum(serialize_all = "snake_case")]
-pub enum Permission {
-    /// `send`, `recv`, `ack_until`
-    Messaging,
-    /// `get_agent_meta` (`set_status` is always-on — see `ALWAYS_ON_TOOLS`)
-    Meta,
-    /// `get_loose_ends`, `cancel_loose_end`, `remind`
-    Inbox,
-    /// Gates whether the `bash` MCP server (`mcp__bash__run`/`status`/
-    /// `kill`) is rendered into the agent's config at all — see
-    /// `extra_server_required_permission` in `hive-agent/src/mcp_config.rs`.
-    /// `tools()` returns `&[]`: this isn't a `mcp__hyperhive__*`
-    /// allowlist entry, the gate lives at config-render time instead.
-    Execution,
-    /// Claude built-in web egress tools: `WebFetch` (retrieve a URL) and
-    /// `WebSearch` (search the web). Both are omitted from `--tools`
-    /// without it; holding it enables them in the session and in
-    /// `--allowedTools` so they run without a confirmation prompt.
-    WebTools,
-    /// Agent may manage *any* agent in the hive. Concretely, hive-c0re
-    /// bind-mounts every agent's state dir (RW) and config dir (RO) into the
-    /// holder's container, plus `/applied` and `/meta` read-only, so the
-    /// holder can recover an agent that is down. See
-    /// `lifecycle::host_config::set_nspawn_flags`.
-    ///
-    /// The name is historical, from when "the root agent" was the widest
-    /// thing to manage. Kept under that spelling because every stored grant
-    /// carries it.
-    ManageRootAgent,
-}
-
-impl Permission {
-    /// Every permission in a stable order.
-    pub const ALL: &'static [Self] = &[
-        Self::Messaging,
-        Self::Meta,
-        Self::Inbox,
-        Self::Execution,
-        Self::WebTools,
-        Self::ManageRootAgent,
-    ];
-
-    /// What an agent the swarm sets nothing for holds, whatever its name.
-    pub const DEFAULT: &'static [Self] =
-        &[Self::Messaging, Self::Meta, Self::Inbox, Self::Execution];
-
-    /// The MCP tool names (without the `mcp__hyperhive__` prefix) this
-    /// permission grants. Empty for the permissions that grant something
-    /// else; see each variant's doc comment.
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn tools(self) -> &'static [&'static str] {
-        match self {
-            Self::Messaging => &["send", "recv", "ack_until"],
-            Self::Meta => &["get_agent_meta"],
-            Self::Inbox => &["get_loose_ends", "cancel_loose_end", "remind"],
-            // `Execution` grants the out-of-process `bash` MCP server,
-            // gated at config-render time in `hive-agent/src/mcp_config.rs`
-            // — an out-of-process server has no later enforcement point, so
-            // that gate is the actual security boundary. `WebTools` grants
-            // Claude built-ins (`builtin_tools()`); `ManageRootAgent` grants
-            // bind mounts.
-            Self::Execution | Self::WebTools | Self::ManageRootAgent => &[],
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// MCP tools that are always exposed regardless of which permissions an
-    /// agent holds. `set_status` lives here because the operator
-    /// dashboard depends on every agent being able to report its status
-    /// chip — gating it would let a misconfigured agent go dark on the
-    /// dashboard. The server-side `SetStatus` handler has no permission
-    /// check either (only length validation), so listing it here keeps the
-    /// `--allowedTools` list honest with that reality.
-    ///
-    /// `compact` lives here too: it's pure self-management (no cross-agent
-    /// effect, no privilege), gated server-side on context usage, and every
-    /// agent should be able to reach for it — same reasoning as `set_status`.
-    ///
-    /// `mark_todos_done` too: todos are pushed to an agent whether or not it
-    /// holds `Inbox` (which only gates `get_loose_ends`/`cancel_loose_end`/
-    /// `remind`), so an agent without `Inbox` must still be able to clear
-    /// them.
-    pub const ALWAYS_ON_TOOLS: &'static [&'static str] =
-        &["set_status", "compact", "mark_todos_done"];
-
-    /// The Claude built-in tool names this permission enables. Only
-    /// `WebTools` returns a non-empty slice.
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn builtin_tools(self) -> &'static [&'static str] {
-        match self {
-            Self::WebTools => &["WebFetch", "WebSearch"],
-            _ => &[],
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
-    /// The stored names are the `snake_case` spellings the old tool-group
-    /// and capability files used, so an imported grant decodes.
-    #[test]
-    fn stored_names_are_snake_case() {
-        let names: Vec<&str> = Permission::ALL.iter().map(|p| <&str>::from(*p)).collect();
-        assert_eq!(
-            names,
-            [
-                "messaging",
-                "meta",
-                "inbox",
-                "execution",
-                "web_tools",
-                "manage_root_agent"
-            ]
-        );
-        for perm in Permission::ALL {
-            let json = serde_json::to_string(perm).unwrap();
-            assert_eq!(json, format!("\"{}\"", <&str>::from(*perm)));
-        }
-        assert!(serde_json::from_str::<Permission>("\"lifecycle\"").is_err());
-    }
-
     /// Adding permissions only ever adds built-ins — the base set is in every
     /// resolution, and no permission can remove one. Both `--tools` callers (the
     /// harness and the subagent daemon) rely on this to reason about "the

hive-subagent-mcp/src/session.rs

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ use hive_claude::{Attach, Claude, Config, SessionStore};
 use hive_runtime::{
     AcpCommand, AcpRuntime, PermissionAsk, PermissionPolicy, Runtime as _, RuntimeSpec, TurnStop,
 };
-use hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission;
+use hive_types::Permission;
 use swarm_wire::agent_inference::AgentInference;
 use tokio::sync::oneshot;
 

hive-subagent-mcp/src/swarm_models.rs

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
 use std::sync::{Arc, OnceLock};
 use std::time::Duration;
 
-use hive_sh4re::permissions::Permission;
+use hive_types::Permission;
 use swarm_queue_client::agent_inference::{self, read_own};
 use swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions::{self, HIVE_COPY_PATH, HiveCopy};
 use swarm_wire::agent_inference::AgentInference;

hive-types/README.md

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ Foundational shared **newtypes** for the hyperhive workspace. A zero-dependency
 
 ## What's here
 
+- **`Permission`** — the set of named permissions an agent may hold, with its
+  stored `snake_case` names and the MCP and built-in tools each grants.
 - **`Ident`** — a validated agent-name newtype. Typing agent-name fields as
   `Ident` (rather than bare `String`) gets serde-validated parsing **at the
   socket boundary for free**: a malformed name is rejected at deserialize time

hive-types/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! Foundational shared newtypes for the hyperhive workspace.
+//! Foundational shared types for the hyperhive workspace: [`Ident`] and [`Permission`].
 //!
 //! A zero-dependency (bar `serde`) leaf crate so every wire-type crate
 //! (`hive-sh4re`, `hive-host-sock`, `hive-core-agent-sock`) and both binaries
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@
 //! and get serde-validated parsing at the socket boundary for free — with
 //! no cross-crate coupling and without growing `hive-sh4re`.
 
+mod permission;
+
+pub use permission::Permission;
+
 /// The environment variable nix uses to hand this process the blacklist of
 /// names that already mean something to the message layer.
 ///

hive-types/src/permission.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+//! The [`Permission`] set an agent may hold.
+//!
+//! Lives in this leaf crate so every crate that names a permission, hive and
+//! swarm side alike, can do so without depending on `hive-sh4re` (and through
+//! it `hive-priv-sock`). The built-in tool resolution that consumes it is
+//! `hive_sh4re::permissions`.
+
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+/// One thing an agent may be permitted. Stored by its `snake_case` name.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
+pub enum Permission {
+    /// `send`, `recv`, `ack_until`
+    Messaging,
+    /// `get_agent_meta` (`set_status` is always-on — see `ALWAYS_ON_TOOLS`)
+    Meta,
+    /// `get_loose_ends`, `cancel_loose_end`, `remind`
+    Inbox,
+    /// Gates whether the `bash` MCP server (`mcp__bash__run`/`status`/
+    /// `kill`) is rendered into the agent's config at all — see
+    /// `extra_server_required_permission` in `hive-agent/src/mcp_config.rs`.
+    /// `tools()` returns `&[]`: this isn't a `mcp__hyperhive__*`
+    /// allowlist entry, the gate lives at config-render time instead.
+    Execution,
+    /// Claude built-in web egress tools: `WebFetch` (retrieve a URL) and
+    /// `WebSearch` (search the web). Both are omitted from `--tools`
+    /// without it; holding it enables them in the session and in
+    /// `--allowedTools` so they run without a confirmation prompt.
+    WebTools,
+    /// Agent may manage *any* agent in the hive. Concretely, hive-c0re
+    /// bind-mounts every agent's state dir (RW) and config dir (RO) into the
+    /// holder's container, plus `/applied` and `/meta` read-only, so the
+    /// holder can recover an agent that is down. See
+    /// `lifecycle::host_config::set_nspawn_flags`.
+    ///
+    /// The name is historical, from when "the root agent" was the widest
+    /// thing to manage. Kept under that spelling because every stored grant
+    /// carries it.
+    ManageRootAgent,
+}
+
+impl Permission {
+    /// Every permission in a stable order.
+    pub const ALL: &'static [Self] = &[
+        Self::Messaging,
+        Self::Meta,
+        Self::Inbox,
+        Self::Execution,
+        Self::WebTools,
+        Self::ManageRootAgent,
+    ];
+
+    /// What an agent the swarm sets nothing for holds, whatever its name.
+    pub const DEFAULT: &'static [Self] =
+        &[Self::Messaging, Self::Meta, Self::Inbox, Self::Execution];
+
+    /// The MCP tool names (without the `mcp__hyperhive__` prefix) this
+    /// permission grants. Empty for the permissions that grant something
+    /// else; see each variant's doc comment.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn tools(self) -> &'static [&'static str] {
+        match self {
+            Self::Messaging => &["send", "recv", "ack_until"],
+            Self::Meta => &["get_agent_meta"],
+            Self::Inbox => &["get_loose_ends", "cancel_loose_end", "remind"],
+            // `Execution` grants the out-of-process `bash` MCP server,
+            // gated at config-render time in `hive-agent/src/mcp_config.rs`
+            // — an out-of-process server has no later enforcement point, so
+            // that gate is the actual security boundary. `WebTools` grants
+            // Claude built-ins (`builtin_tools()`); `ManageRootAgent` grants
+            // bind mounts.
+            Self::Execution | Self::WebTools | Self::ManageRootAgent => &[],
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// MCP tools that are always exposed regardless of which permissions an
+    /// agent holds. `set_status` lives here because the operator
+    /// dashboard depends on every agent being able to report its status
+    /// chip — gating it would let a misconfigured agent go dark on the
+    /// dashboard. The server-side `SetStatus` handler has no permission
+    /// check either (only length validation), so listing it here keeps the
+    /// `--allowedTools` list honest with that reality.
+    ///
+    /// `compact` lives here too: it's pure self-management (no cross-agent
+    /// effect, no privilege), gated server-side on context usage, and every
+    /// agent should be able to reach for it — same reasoning as `set_status`.
+    ///
+    /// `mark_todos_done` too: todos are pushed to an agent whether or not it
+    /// holds `Inbox` (which only gates `get_loose_ends`/`cancel_loose_end`/
+    /// `remind`), so an agent without `Inbox` must still be able to clear
+    /// them.
+    pub const ALWAYS_ON_TOOLS: &'static [&'static str] =
+        &["set_status", "compact", "mark_todos_done"];
+
+    /// The Claude built-in tool names this permission enables. Only
+    /// `WebTools` returns a non-empty slice.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn builtin_tools(self) -> &'static [&'static str] {
+        match self {
+            Self::WebTools => &["WebFetch", "WebSearch"],
+            _ => &[],
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl Permission {
+    /// The stored `snake_case` name; identical to the serde form.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Self::Messaging => "messaging",
+            Self::Meta => "meta",
+            Self::Inbox => "inbox",
+            Self::Execution => "execution",
+            Self::WebTools => "web_tools",
+            Self::ManageRootAgent => "manage_root_agent",
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<Permission> for &'static str {
+    fn from(perm: Permission) -> Self {
+        perm.as_str()
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// The `as_str` spelling of every variant. `ALL` is stable-ordered, so
+    /// a variant added to the enum but not to `ALL` or `as_str` shows here.
+    #[test]
+    fn as_str_pins_every_variants_name() {
+        let names: Vec<&str> = Permission::ALL.iter().map(|p| <&str>::from(*p)).collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            names,
+            [
+                "messaging",
+                "meta",
+                "inbox",
+                "execution",
+                "web_tools",
+                "manage_root_agent"
+            ]
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The serde form of every variant, pinned independently of `as_str`:
+    /// stored grants decode by it, so it must stay byte-identical.
+    #[test]
+    fn serde_form_pins_every_variants_name() {
+        let want = [
+            (Permission::Messaging, "\"messaging\""),
+            (Permission::Meta, "\"meta\""),
+            (Permission::Inbox, "\"inbox\""),
+            (Permission::Execution, "\"execution\""),
+            (Permission::WebTools, "\"web_tools\""),
+            (Permission::ManageRootAgent, "\"manage_root_agent\""),
+        ];
+        assert_eq!(want.len(), Permission::ALL.len());
+        for (perm, json) in want {
+            assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&perm).unwrap(), json);
+            assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::<Permission>(json).unwrap(), perm);
+        }
+        assert!(serde_json::from_str::<Permission>("\"lifecycle\"").is_err());
+    }
+}